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Abstract 
This project seeks to trace the power of social media in serving as a virtual civil 
society in the Arab world, focusing on Egypt as a case study. This study aims to 
explore the role of social media in mobilising Egyptian activists across 
generations, and particularly in reaching out to people under the age of 35 who 
constitute around 50 per cent of the population. Studies preceding the 2011 
uprising reported that young Egyptians were politically apathetic and were 
perceived as incapable of bringing about genuine political changes.  
Drawing on a range of methods and data collected from focus groups of young 
people under the age of 35, interviews with activists (across generations and 
gender), and via a descriptive web feature analysis, it is argued that online action 
has not been translated into offline activism. The role of trust in forming online 
networks is demonstrated, and how strong ties can play a pivotal role in 
spreading messages via social media sites. Activists relied on social media as a 
medium of visibility; for those who were not active in the political sphere, social 
media have been instrumental in raising their awareness about diverse political 
movements and educating them about the political process, after decades of 
political apathy under Mubarak’s regime. The most important benefit of using 
social media is the increased political knowledge and information available 
regarding the political situation in Egypt, despite many young people still 
confining their political activities to passive acts of ‘share’, ‘like’ or ‘post’ on 
social media. Activists have used social media to ensure visibility of their actions, 
not only nationally, but also regionally and internationally. There remains a 
strong need for offline organization and activism by using social media as a 
communication avenue, not necessarily as a catalyst for changing the political 
process.  
A number of problems associated with the use of such media in political 
deliberations concerning Egypt are highlighted, notwithstanding the positive 
effects of social media on the political socialisation of young Egyptians.  One such 
problem is the lack of sustainability in online campaigns which should ideally 
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convert into offline collective action. It can be argued that a sustainable civil 
society and a truly diverse public sphere rests on more sustainable, offline 
action, which can indeed bring about significant changes in the Egyptian political 
sphere. 
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Introduction 
0.1 Objectives  
The Egyptian activist, Wael Ghonim, addressed thousands of Egyptian demonstrators in 
Tahrir Square, after his release from state security custody on 7 February 2011, as the 
administrator behind the Facebook page that sparked the protests. Wael Ghonim was 
Google Marketing Manager in the Middle East, and the founder of the ‘We are all Khaled 
Said’ Facebook page, set up to commemorate the 28-year-old man, Khaled Said, beaten 
to death by police officers who suspected that he was the mastermind behind a political 
rally. The Facebook page became a hub for international support which also sparked 
another Facebook page, calling for the huge demonstrations that have paralysed Egypt 
from 25 January 2011 until the present. 
Wael Ghonim was reported ‘missing’ (incarcerated), following this uprising on 27 January, 
and re-appeared two weeks later. Ghonim admitted in his first TV interview, following his 
release, that many people, including police forces, did not take his and other young 
people’s use of social media as a sign of real mobilisation; not many could have predicted 
the power of the internet or what Ghonim called ‘the revolution of the youth of the 
internet’; when the uprising proved successful, Ghonim and other young men were 
arrested, suspected of having been backed by ‘foreign forces’ who offered training and 
funding, although many of those young men, as Ghonim said in his interview, were well-
off: ‘If I was [sic] a traitor I would have stayed in my villa with my swimming pool in the 
Emirates. We are not traitors,’ he said. Ghonim’s role in sparking the uprising on the 
internet was acknowledged in the government’s attempts to block Facebook and Twitter 
accounts in Egypt, amidst condemnation by the U.S.A. and other Western countries. 
This project seeks to trace the power of social media in serving as a virtual civil society in 
the Arab world, focusing on Egypt as a topical case study. The project then addresses an 
acute area of research, documenting the impact of media technologies on political 
movements, particularly in a region like the Arab world, which has witnessed severe 
political turmoil following its independence in the 1950s and 1960s. A particular 
investigation will be conducted on how social media could facilitate the change in the 
balance of power between the Egyptian regime and the opposition, and how the use of 
this type of media may lead to more collective action in Egypt. 
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The massive protests of 2011, which marked the end of ‘the spiral of silence’ for millions 
of Egyptians (Iskandar, 2013),  and the massive coverage across regional as well as 
international media was significant for this researcher,  not only because of family 
connections in Cairo, but also because it was relevant to this thesis. The revolution of 
2011 appeared to be the climax of the political situation in Egypt; however, the upheaval 
would be repeated in 2013, following the election of a Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 
member as president, who would be ousted after only one year in power. The fast pace 
of this dynamic field in Egypt has its challenges (see Chapter 4) but it has also proved 
academically stimulating to be at the heart of events as they unfold, and to witness how 
people’s attitudes and responses to questions (by academics or journalists) could change 
within a short time. 
The role of social media in the uprisings has attracted a great deal of attention from many 
postgraduate students, including this researcher – one only has to consult the repository 
of theses at the American University in Cairo to access a long list of Master’s dissertations 
dealing with similar issues, in one way or another, regarding the role of social media 
(Facebook or Twitter), in the revolution; despite the inevitable challenges of studying a 
field in flux, it has been a privilege to have been in the middle of these events in Egypt 
and to have talked to so many citizens, including those interviewed for this research. 
0.2 Problem statement 
This study aims to explore the role of social media in mobilising Egyptian activists across 
generations, and particularly in reaching out to people under 35 years old, said to 
constitute around 50 per cent of the population. The study demonstrates the activists’ 
perception of the role of social media and their use, since 2011. Another theme pertinent 
to this study is the ability of these activists to utilise social media to convert online 
activities into offline collective action by reaching out to marginalised groups, or the 
silent majority (what Egyptians call the ‘Couch Party’). The study therefore has the 
following objectives: 
(i) to identify the uses of social media in political activism in Egypt, drawing 
on fieldwork among activists (across generations) since 2011; 
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(ii) to assess the  views of the young generation (under the age of 26) in the 
use of social media for their activism, and whether the so-called ‘Facebook 
revolution’ has had an impact on encouraging them to further participate in 
the political process; 
(iii) to assess whether social media have, or could have been used to mobilise 
previously marginalised groups (socially or politically) into offline action. 
  
0.3 Research questions  
This project aims to propose answers to the following questions:  
1. To what extent has the internet changed the political sphere in 
Egypt: has it allowed a more democratic environment?  
2. To what extent has the use of social media led to more collective 
action in Egypt?  
3. Have social media facilitated the transformation of online 
activities into offline activism?  
4. How have social media contributed to attract the socially or 
politically marginalised groups in Egyptian society?  
 
0.4 Methodological considerations   
The uprisings that swept the Arab region after December 2010 began in Tunisia with the 
toppling of Ben Ali, followed by Egypt and the fall of Mubarak, and continued through 
Syria, Yemen and Libya. They attracted global attention, not only from media 
professionals, but also from academics, who saw in this wave of protests an ideal 
opportunity to investigate the role of technology, especially the internet and social 
media, in mobilising massive protests. The advantage of these new and social media is 
that they can connect citizens across the world, and in the case of Egypt, Egyptian 
citizens residing in Egypt can link up with Egyptians in Diaspora, who can play a role in 
publicising the local Egyptians actions by using the same media (Iskandar: 2013). 
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Social media can be used as a powerful political and mobilisation tool. The most recent 
example is in Egypt, where several websites, especially those ignited by the so-called 
‘April 6 Youth Movement’ (following the strike of 6 April 2008, calling for socio-economic 
and political reforms), have had a pronounced impact on the current protests in the 
country. The movement demanded higher wages, better public services and the end of 
government corruption and police torture. Faced with continuing protests, the 
government shifted into a policy of making concessions that would appeal to the protest 
groups.  
Theories of social movement and collective action (Tarrow: 1998; Tilly & Tarrow: 2007) 
acknowledge that collective action may be bound to its specific cultural context, as 
participants’ dispositions and repertories tend to differ from one region to another. 
Technology is one variable that impacts on the success and sustainability of collective 
action, including protests, strikes, sit-ins, and so on. Technology here should not refer 
only to information and communications technology (ICT), social and new media, but it 
should also embrace other technological advances such as the use of web-based radio 
stations: the Banat-wa-Bas (‘Girls Only’) station in Egypt, for example, which gained 
fame for its owner and director, Amani-el-Tunsi, which subsequently witnessed the 2011 
uprising. It can also refer to the rise and proliferation of satellite television channels 
beginning with Al-Jazeera, set up in Qatar in 1995. It is to be noted that the number of 
such channels has risen to over five hundred since then (Mellor et al., 2011),.  While 
some scholars praise such satellite technology for advancing the public sphere in the 
region (Miles: 2005), others (Mellor: 2007) warn that this advance has not yet translated 
into any real transformation of the political structure within the region.  
Citizens have not been free to form or join social movements in an authoritarian state 
such as Egypt; since its independence from Britain in 1952, the country has been under 
the tight control of army officers, beginning with Gamal Abdel Nasser, who dissolved civil 
society associations and banned political opposition as well as imprisoning large number 
of Muslim Brotherhood supporters. Egyptians were occupied with accumulating wealth 
and ‘making ends meet’ during Sadat’s rule in the 1970s, under his ‘open door’ policy. 
Associations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and trade unions were allowed to practice 
their activities, but they were threatened by the emergency laws which could lead to 
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sudden imprisonment, without trial, of some of their members. Mubarak’s rule began in 
1981 and was characterised by more privatisations; many of the young protestors who 
joined the 2011 protests, grew up during this period and became accustomed to wide-
spread corruption, the large gap between social classes, and the alliance between the 
government (particularly Mubarak’s son, Gamal) and wealthy businessmen (see Chapter 
One).  
Studies preceding the 2011 uprising reported that young Egyptians were politically 
apathetic and were perceived as incapable of bringing about genuine political changes 
(Abdel Ghany, 2004; Asaad and Barsoum, 2007).  How could the same youth trigger a 
massive revolution in 2011? 
This project will be an example of interdisciplinary research, linking social theories with 
media studies; while traditionally, media and cultural studies (particularly Birmingham 
School) have been deeply rooted in literary and textual analysis, sociology and social 
theory have been more concerned with the overall analysis of social systems and 
structures such as labour, demographics, urbanisation, globalisation, and so on. The 
combination of these two approaches will provide powerful analytical tools to unearth 
the intricate and intertwining relationship between subjectivity embodied in the 
activists’ narratives with the analysis of objective conditions such as the globalisation of 
communication and political development.  
 
Research methods are better drawn from a variety of disciplines as ‘no single 
methodology can hope to capture the rich complexities of life on the Internet’ (Norris: 
2001: 36); indeed, it has been difficult to attempt an analysis of the current evolving and 
dynamic political scene as Egypt, but it is believed that this project will benefit future 
studies.  The new insights into young people’s media use are presented here by utilising 
descriptive web feature analysis as well as qualitative analysis (interviews and focus 
groups - this cohort audience is particularly important because they are expected to play 
a crucial role as participants in shaping the political future of the country).  It will also 
shed new light on the significant role that social media are expected to play in the future, 
particularly with the declining credibility of traditional mainstream media in the Arab 
world, usually run by political parties; as a result, social media are actually reshaping how 
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politicians relate to their constituents, and how young people are demanding more 
political reforms, demonstrated in the recent popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. All 
this serves as proof of the significance of social media, but also of the speed of their 
progress throughout the Arab world. This analysis will seek to unravel how young people 
evaluate the generational gap in accessing new technology, and the impact that social 
media has, not only on their sense of national identity but also on their vision of Egypt’s 
future, and how they assess the risks of using these modern types of media.  
0.5 The role of new and social media in collective action 
‘Social media’ is defined by Mayfield (2008) as online media which allow: (i) participation 
via users’ feedback and interaction; (ii) openness due to their accessibility to everyone, 
without restrictions on membership or engagement (except, of course, economic and 
access issues due to lack of funds or connection break-down to wired PCs); (iii) 
conversation and two-way communication amongst users; (iv) community formation 
amongst people with similar interests; and (v)) connectedness through providing links to 
other sites and networks. One important feature of social media is their speed in 
spreading information as well as ideas and debates: such media have become immensely 
popular over the past decade or so. 
These new media sites have been seen as a potential opportunity to confront 
authoritarian regimes, while simultaneously avoiding heavy state interference in the 
public sphere. The significance of these media is not to be measured by how many users 
there are in Egypt (or elsewhere in the region) but rather, by what users can do with 
such media, compared to mainstream media which may be blocked by professional 
gatekeepers such as journalists. These media provide a flexible communication structure 
that can also be creative and disseminated under anonymous profiles in order to escape 
state control. Social media are part of the so-called Web 2.0 services which also embrace 
blogs, Wikis and Google+, among many others. What is unique about Web 2.0 is its 
interactivity, in that users can comment, interact and even produce content, rather than 
merely receiving information without being able to respond to it, thereby facilitating the 
creation of digital networking.  
Networking is the core activity of activism and a key to the success of collective action 
(McAdam & Paulsen: 1993), with the internet transforming societies into a network-
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based society (Shirky, 2011). Once people join a network, they engage in maintaining 
links to other members, but the important step is to recruit participants to this network, 
and here lies the significance of strong ties, or the relationships which potential users 
have within or outside of a network, which may influence their decision to join the 
network or not. Social media allows users to access others’ ‘friends’ and send messages 
to a large number of people with a click of a button, which makes the transmission of 
information instantaneous and free, compared to other media (Boyd & Ellison: 2007).  
Users can also identify others, who may not be their friends, offline, because they share 
similar interests or views (Boyd & Ellison: 2007; see also Chapter Eight); consequently, 
users can maintain strong as well as indirect ties with other users via social media sites 
(Ellison et al.: 2006).  
An important feature of the use of social media in political action is that such media 
usually lack the hierarchy present in offline networks, therefore, a social media 
movement, for instance, can be either ‘leaderless’ or related to a few leaders, but later 
able to disperse itself amongst different users and locales (such as the ‘April 6 Youth 
Movement’, which later split into at least two groups).  It is also important to note that 
Facebook groups, for example, may target Egyptians across all ideologies such as 
Islamist, liberal, Nasserite, and so on, if, and only if, they manage to embrace one goal 
such as that of ending Mubarak’s rule. Participants here are bound by their shared 
grievances (Spier: 2011), but once the goal is achieved, the challenge will be to sustain 
the group and its network (see Chapters Six, Seven and Eight).  
 
0.6 Contribution to knowledge  
This thesis aims to contribute to the growing literature about the role of new and social 
media in mobilising for collective action, particularly in authoritarian regimes such as 
that in Egypt. The study also aims to contribute to the understanding of activists in 
Egypt: their perception of the role of social media in their political activities, as well as 
how these activities are perceived by young users who may not necessarily be part of 
any political action, movement or party. Given the newness of this field of study 
concerned with social media and their relationship to activism in the Arab region, this 
project enhances the understanding of this field for the benefit of future studies, 
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particularly if such studies take comparative approaches between Egypt and other Arab 
states. The thesis addresses further knowledge in understanding the role of social media, 
beyond the usual dichotomy of embracing or dismissing that role as facilitator of political 
action; the project acknowledges the role of such media as a factor that has to be seen 
alongside other factors such as agency, offline activism, viability of civil society 
association and state censorship. The project benefits from the synthesis of social 
movement theories and civil society formation in order to comprehend the dynamic role 
played by online networking in mobilising offline action. The project contributes to 
previous literature on collective action by situating it in the context of the developing 
world, focusing on Egypt as a topical example. What the following chapters demonstrate 
is the heterogeneity of Egyptian groups, despite their ethnic and, for the majority, 
religious unity.  
0.7 Outline  
The thesis is divided into eight chapters as follows: 
Chapter One presents a historical background of the Egyptian case, including discussion 
of historical key events in Egypt. This chapter also examines  political, economic and 
education challenges which faced Egypt prior to 2011, which are also currently on-going. 
Chapter Two provides a review of selected studies which have dealt with the role of social 
media in the Egyptian uprisings, as well as some studies which compared mainstream and 
social media. The review is divided into three broad themes: (i) new media for collective 
action; (ii) Facebook revolution; and (iii) traditional versus new media.  
Chapter Three provides a theoretical discussion of the development of social movements 
and the emergence and role of civil society. The discourse draws on literature developed 
in Western democracies, before it discusses the unique situation of the Egyptian case, 
shedding light on the development of civil society associations in Egypt.  
Chapter Four introduces the methodology of this study, by examining the significance of 
qualitative research and the choice of each method used here: interviews, focus groups 
and web feature analysis. The summary concludes with a reflection on ethical and other 
challenges encountered during the fieldwork. 
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Chapters Five, Six and Seven present the research findings. Chapter Five begins with 
scrutiny of the web content analysis, focusing on four selected Facebook groups: Dar Es-
Salam, ‘April 6 Youth Movement’, ‘We are all Khaled Said’ and Tamarod.  
Chapter Six discusses the findings of the interviews, with a sample of Egyptian activists. 
The analysis is anchored in the themes that emerged during the interviews which 
revolved around the use of social media for political socialisation, the visibility gained via 
social media sites, how politics can be decentralised on social media, and the activists’ 
perception of the role of mainstream (traditional) media vis-à-vis social media. 
Chapter Seven continues the analysis of interviews, focusing on the tendency of some 
activists to denounce joining parties, preferring instead to form and join movements with 
a mission similar to NGOs such as eradicating illiteracy, poverty and housing problems. 
This group of activists forms what this researcher refers to as ‘independent political 
movements’, illustrated by focusing on independent media as topical examples. 
Chapter Eight presents the findings of the focus groups conducted primarily with young 
citizens under the age of 35. Here again, the discussion is thematically divided by focusing 
on young people’s perception that 2011 was a turning point in their engagement with 
political discussions, and how they perceived the role of mainstream vis-à-vis social 
media.  
The final Discussion and Conclusion consolidates the discussions presented in the above 
chapters and concludes with pointers for future research.  
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Chapter One 
Egypt – historical background 
 
1.0 Introduction 
One remarkable fact about Egypt is that 97 per cent of its land is barren while the 
remaining 3 per cent, around the Nile Valley, is the most densely populated and 
economically active. With a fast growing population (85 million inhabitants), the 
population density is around 83 inhabitants per km2, occupying only 3 per cent of the 
total territory, which is not only a major burden on the public service providers, but on 
the environment, in general. Access to water is another problem in Egypt, as the amount 
available is insufficient: the  annual entitlement is 55 billion cubic metres from the Nile 
River, whose total flow is shared with other African countries, including Sudan and 
Ethiopia. If the population grows as forecast (around 150 million by 2050), then the 
country would need about 50 per cent more of that water to meet the demand (Ibrahim, 
2012). Most of the Nile water is used on agriculture (3 per cent of the total).  
Egypt’s energy sector contributes about 6 per cent of GDP, and a proportion of the gas 
production is exported to other countries such as Jordan and Syria; the controversial gas 
supply treaty with Israel was cancelled in 2012 (Feteha, 2012). Egypt has extensive 
reserves in the Western Desert, and, after Algeria, is regarded as one of the largest gas 
producers in Africa; despite these reserves, the government has announced plans to 
import gas from Qatar in the future, if Egypt is to maintain the envisaged growth rate of 5 
per cent per annum (Feteha, 2012). Households consume a major part of the gas supply 
and industry uses about a third.  
The country’s GDP has seen a steady annual increase of about 4 per cent over the past 
decade (except 2008 when it leaped to 7 per cent), but living conditions have 
deteriorated for the average Egyptian, and the percentage of poor (those earning less 
than $2 a day) has soared to 40 per cent of the population. The national poverty index 
classifies the poor as those who earn less than $1.25 a day, reducing their percentage of 
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the population to around 25 per cent. This rate increased from 16.7 per cent in 1999 to 
25 per cent in 2010-2011, during the last decade of Mubarak’s rule (Abdel Razek, 2011). 
An average Egyptian needs about LE265 per month, according to the national poverty 
index and a family of five would need LE2, 275 per month to survive: the minimum wage 
is only LE700. It is also argued that illiterate people are those most likely to be hit by 
poverty (Abdel Razek, 2011).  
This chapter provides a brief historical introduction to Egypt, focusing on selected key 
moments in Egypt’s political and economic development. It begins with a brief overview 
of the significant revolutions in Egypt’s recent history, starting with the 1919 revolution,  
regarded as the trigger that set off Egypt’s independence. A brief discussion follows on 
the political and economic impact of these revolutions in the post-independence era. 
 
1.1 Historical turning points 
The first significant mass revolution in recent Egyptian history was the 1919 revolt, staged 
mostly by peasants and fuelled by the workers and Wafd party. Its importance lies in its 
emergence as the culmination of European colonialism and the beginning of the modern 
state in Egypt (Goldberg, 1992).  The revolution erupted after four national leaders were 
exiled, including Saad Zaghloul, leader of the Wafd Party, for insisting on recognition of 
the status of its delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference, at a time when Egypt was 
declared a protectorate.  The massive protests were eventually put down by British 
troops. The revolution resulted in a new constitution in 1923, with Saad Zaghloul as the 
first popularly elected prime minister in 1924. Britain also recognised Egyptian 
independence, although continued to be physically present in Egypt.  That period 
witnessed dire living standards for peasants and workers, with their food supplies 
declining and rising inflation (Goldberg, 1992, p. 267). Beinin argues that the working 
class experienced its formative period between 1882 and 1913, with the beginning of the 
Egyptian occupation and the flow of foreign capital to Egypt (1981, p. 13). This 
represented about 70 per cent of the total capital; by 1916, Egypt had around 15 
modern-style factories, employing around 35,000 workers, most of which were 
established and run with foreign capital.  
22 
 
Discontent with British domination fuelled several protests until January 1952, which 
witnessed the burning of Cairo and climaxed in the Free Officers’ coup in July of the same 
year. The Free Officers, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and Mohammed Naguib, called for 
independence and the end of the monarchy, and mobilised Egyptians around the project 
of modernising Egypt (Sedra, 2011). The newly independent government embraced a 
different version of socialism; private enterprises were still present in the country, 
working alongside the nationalised factories, while the state was taking over welfare 
services, including housing and education. The state outlawed strikes, suppressed 
political pluralism and introduced new workers’ rights. The government enforced new 
legislation aimed at protecting workers, such as reducing working hours to seven a day, 
and introducing a minimum wage, pensions, injury compensation and health insurance. 
The state also selected workers’ representatives on management boards in public sector 
firms, and initiated the provision of a share in the company profits to its workers. It also 
subsidised the cost of basic food items such as bread and sugar. This did not mean the 
end of private entrepreneurship; although the state enforced a minimum wage in private 
businesses as well, it encouraged the private sector of small and medium enterprises, 
making a distinction between the government’s socialist philosophy and traditional 
Marxist ideology. Nasser stressed this difference, in fact, when he said:  
There is a difference between us [Socialists] and Marxists. The latter do not believe in 
private property whereas we divide it into two categories: one that exploits and one that 
does not exploit. We are against the exploiting enterprise. Thus, the mode of production 
should be nationalised and be under the total control of the people. This means that the 
public sector should have the lion’s share of production [...] in our Arab Socialism - we did 
not abolish private property. So in our land reform, we did not nationalise the lands, but 
gave it back to the peasants. We took it from the landowners and gave it to the peasants as 
their own property. This is so different from the Communist ideology which calls for getting 
rid of land ownership altogether, and confining it to either state owned land or collective 
ownership. This applies to housing as well: we did not nationalise housing, but we built 
state houses and sold them to the people. We give those with limited resources the 
opportunity to own their flats (quoted in Al- Shelby, 2004, p. 144).  
The workers’ unions, however, were largely monopolised by public sector workers who 
depended on the state for many services, including education of their children, health 
insurance and pensions. Unions were also the place to inform workers about the 
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revolution and its ideology, based on the belief that workers had rights to several 
services, but also had duties towards their workplace and the state; in return for state 
services, the Nasserite regime abolished pluralist political life and banned parties and 
associations - apart from those authorised and controlled by the state. The Free Officers 
decided to monopolise power, setting up an authoritarian regime and warning against 
diversity which might lead to chaos and tensions. The power was in the hands of the 
military elites, and the state set up the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1962 as the only 
alternative to political parties, and the only legitimate political institution in the country.  
The rising pressures on state budgets after the war (and defeat) of 1967, followed by the 
death of Nasser in 1970, persuaded the new president, Anwar Sadat (also one of the Free 
Officers), to take the country into an era of Infitah or ‘Open Door’ policy, launched in 
1974. Egypt was open to foreign investment and trade, according to this initiative, which 
resulted in the rise of inflation and imports. Real wages also fell, and Sadat was forced to 
remove the state subsidy on basic food elements in 1977 by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Workers protested against the deteriorating living standards and the rising 
prices, and these protests intensified in January that year when the state attempted to 
carry out the IMF instructions to end the subsidies, which forced the state to reverse this 
decision. Protests and strikes hit the capital, Cairo, between 1974 and the massive 
protests of 1977, with workers chanting, ‘where is our breakfast, hero of the crossing?’1 
(Pousney, 1993, p. 96).  
Sadat’s aim was to show that his regime would restore pluralism in political life by 
allowing the establishment of three political fora representing the right, centre and left, 
within the ASU. These were the Liberal Socialist Forum, Arab Socialist Forum and 
Nationalist Progressive Unionist Forum. All fora participated in the 1976 parliamentary 
election, and Sadat later decided to transform them into full political parties, 
consequently allowing other parties to also launch themselves. Among the new ones 
were the New Wafd Party, the National Democratic Party (replacing the ASU and led by 
Sadat) and the Socialist Labour Party. These new decisions, while taking the shape of 
political reforms, continued to  reinforce the role of the state as the decision-maker in 
                                                          
1 referring to Sadat, following the crossing of the Bar Lev line, built by Israel and crossed by the Egyptian 
army in the 1973 war, see http://countrystudies.us/egypt/43.htm. 
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liberalising or restraining political life in Egypt (Hassan, 2010, pp. 320-321). Sadat also 
allowed the Socialist Labour Party to win 29 seats in the election, but this did not stop his 
confrontations with the opposition, peaking in 1981 when he ordered the arrest of all 
opposition leaders. He also introduced the famous ‘Law of Shame’ of May 1980, 
threatening critics of the regime, including journalists and editors, with imprisonment and 
exclusion from any public or syndicate post.  The crackdown of 1981 and the arrest of 
over 1,500 opposition leaders and journalists, culminated in the assassination of Sadat 
during the celebration ceremony of the anniversary of the October 6 War.  
Following the assassination of Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, his deputy, took over the 
leadership. He was also an army officer who had participated in the October war. 
Learning from Sadat’s mistakes, Mubarak aimed to loosen the grip on political parties, 
especially after 1987 when the constitutional court ruled that the election law was illegal. 
Mubarak held new elections in 1987 which marked the beginning of relatively democratic 
and fair elections, allowing all opposition groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, to 
participate under the umbrella of the Socialist Labour coalition. The opposition won 22 
per cent of the seats, compared to 13 per cent in 1984, whereas the ruling National 
Democratic Party (NDP) lost some seats: from 87 per cent in 1984 to 78 per cent in 1987 
(Hassam, 2010, pp. 323).  Mubarak’s early years appeared to introduce political reforms; 
in reality, his regime still ruled Egypt based on one-party ideology, with his NDP as the 
dominant party on the political scene; as a result, the opposition asked Mubarak to step 
down from leading the NDP, and become instead the president of all Egyptians (Hassam, 
2010, p. 323).  
State monopoly of power continued with the parliamentary elections of 1990 and 1995 
and the landslide victory of the NDP, which triggered the constitutional court’s ruling that 
both elections were unlawful, delegitimising the NDP’s method of winning those 
elections. The discontent with the NDP continued until the 2005 presidential elections, 
following a national referendum which would allow several candidates other than NDP 
nominees. The voters, however, were surprised that Mubarak still secured a landslide 
victory over two opponents, Ayman Nour of the Ghad (‘Tomorrow’) Party, and Noaman 
Gomaa of the National Wafd Party. Other candidates were also excluded, for example, 
Sadat’s nephew, Talaat Sadat, and Muslim Brotherhood members. Other parties such as 
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the leftist Tagammu Party boycotted the election, declaring the whole process as 
fraudulent (Hassan, 2010, pp. 326). Ayman Nour, who was placed as distant second in the 
2005 presidential election, was later arrested on charges of forgery and was stripped of 
his parliamentary immunity as MP for the Ghad Party; he was released in 2009 on health 
grounds. Gomaa, on the other hand, criticised the state apparatus of propaganda against 
the opposition candidates, including himself, as a ‘token candidate’ (Spiegel, 2005). 
Nasser relied on the support of workers and trade unions exalting his Socialist Union as 
the only legitimate political forum in Egypt, while Sadat relied on the right and more 
liberal movements, based on the support of the middle-class and private sector elites. 
This could arguably have been connected to Sadat’s shift towards more liberal policies, in 
order to please his new ally, the U.S.A. His ‘Open Door’ policy appealed to the private 
sector elites, and Mubarak continued and expanded this policy, while avoiding the 
sudden removal of state subsidies which triggered the 1977 protests. This group of elites 
proved to have a central role in Egyptian political and economic life, not only during 
Sadat’s rule but more so during Mubarak’s. It was particularly during the rise of Gamal 
Mubarak, the president’s son, in the Egyptian political scene in 2000, and rumours of a 
plan to groom him for the post of president, that the private sector elites gained more 
and more powers. During Nasser’s, Sadat’s and Mubarak’s rule, the state and the 
president enjoyed unrivalled legislative and executive powers. Presidential decrees could 
therefore become formal laws, such as the ‘Law of Shame’ introduced by Sadat. Even if 
laws were debated in parliament, the president usually had control over the majority of 
MPs, mostly from the ruling NDP.  The state also tolerated corruption, as long as it 
secured the loyalty of the influential group of businessmen.  Many of them were 
encouraged to participate in parliamentary elections, competing for parliamentary 
immunity that came with such posts. Gamal Mubarak was known to be friends with many 
such businessmen, particularly Ahmed Ezz, who monopolised steel manufacturing in 
Egypt. These businessmen spent large sums of money on buying votes during the 
elections, particularly from their workers in the new satellite industrial cities. Ezz was 
sentenced to seven years in prison and fined $3 billion in October 2012,  on charges of 
corruption. He was arrested only a few days after Mubarak’s resignation, following the 
26 
 
revolution of January 25 2011; however, he was released in 2014, after paying a fine of 
100 million Egyptian pounds. 
 
1.2 Political life 
In his book, Neopatriarchy, the late Palestinian intellectual, Hicham Sharabi suggested 
that Arab societies are based on neo-patriarchy or: 
The dominance of the Father (patriarch), the center around which the national as well as 
the natural family, are organised. Thus between ruler and ruled, between father and child, 
there exist only vertical relations: in both settings the paternal will is the absolute will, 
mediated in both the society and the family by a forced consensus based on ritual and 
coercion....the neo-patriarchal state, regardless of its legal and political forms and 
structures, is in many ways no more than a modern version of the traditional patriarchal 
sultanate (1988, p. 7). 
The constitution of 1923 laid the foundation of a democratic system in Egypt, with such 
measures as freedom of the press and political pluralism. The 1952 coup, however, ended 
this democratic experience before it had matured. The Free Officers resorted to 
authoritarian rule and revived the patriarchal state to which Sharabi referred. The 
Nasserite regime removed political opposition, bestowing all legitimacy on the Socialist 
Union. Sadat experimented with minor political reforms by permitting the establishment 
of political parties, but his rule ended with the so-called ‘iron-fist’ policy towards political 
opposition (Hassan, 2010, pp. 320-322). Sadat once said that he and Nasser were the last 
Pharaohs: ‘The rules [...] have been issued for our successors. Ordinary presidents such as 
Mohammed, Ali and Omar will follow us. And of course, they need these rules’ (cited in 
Hassan, 2010, pp. 327).  
Mubarak’s rule did not differ greatly from his predecessors in that his NDP monopolised 
political power and corruption was allowed to flourish in Egypt. The early years of 
Mubarak’s tenure propagated democratic reforms and he was quoted as saying that: 
Democracy is not only essential in itself, but also predicts stability and ensures prosperity. It 
is a requisite for the growth of the economy and the welfare of the people. The regime is 
for everyone and the opposition is an indivisible part of it because Egypt is the homeland of 
all Egyptians (cited in Hassan, 2010, pp. 323).  
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The 1990s and 2000s witnessed a major setback to these promises of political reforms, 
however, with accusations of monopolising political power as well as falsifying election 
results; in spite of being under judicial supervision, the NDP managed to win landslide 
victories such as that in the 2000 election, not to mention Mubarak’s victory over his 
rivals in the 2005 presidential election (Hassan, 2010, pp.323-26). It was predictable that 
protest movements would grow in Egypt under these circumstances.  
Hassan (2010, pp. 328) divides the protest movements in Egypt into three categories: the 
first is the political protest of the Kefaya (‘Enough’) movement, established in 2004, 
opposing the rule of  (political) inheritance and the grooming of Gamal Mubarak to 
succeed his father; the second category refers to the series of labour and workers’ 
protests against high prices and low wages; and the third refers to the youth movements, 
particularly on the internet and social media sites such as the ‘April 6 Youth’ movement 
and ‘We are all Khaled Said’ groups, calling for the end of corruption and state emergency 
laws. The emergency law enforced in 1981 was an attempt by the state to curtail any 
dissent on the basis of protecting state security and stability; however, the law was 
mainly used to suppress collective action such as demonstrations and protests. Business 
elites were also content with the financial benefits they gained from their alliance with 
the regime, and consequently did not challenge Mubarak (Huntington, 1991, pp. 67). Civil 
society associations did not support political or social reforms in the country, despite the 
presence of the above three categories of protest movements in Egypt. This is because, 
as Tadros argues, such associations were manipulated by the state and their political 
agenda changed according to the agenda of their donors; for instance, US support for this 
sector in Egypt soared after the events of 9/11, in order to drive home the need for 
democratic reforms and human rights-friendly policies. This scheme weakened after 
2006, and support for human rights associations was reduced by 70 per cent in 2009 
(Tadros, 2009, pp. 11).  
State laws such as No. 84 of 2000, gave the Ministry of Social Solidarity the power to ban 
any civil society association if it proved to ‘violate public morality’, a term which can be 
stretched to mean any threat to public order, however that is defined by the 
government. NGOs, for instance, could not join international networks without prior 
permission from the government. One such NGO was the New Woman Foundation set up 
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in the 1980s, but whose application to the ministry was rejected; although the NGO 
challenged the ministry’s decision in court and won the case, the court’s decision was not 
enforced (Tadros, 2009). The state therefore managed to curtail citizens’ participation in 
public affairs, even though the law approved of citizens’ involvement in political life. The 
civil society sector did not necessarily challenge state power, but re-defined the public 
sphere and set the agenda for political debates. This sector expressed the demands not 
only of workers, but also of the rising bourgeoisie calling for additional rights. The ‘April 6’ 
protest movement was based on the objections of both female and male workers in 
textile factories in Mahalla town. The movement used the workers protest as a pretext 
for their initiative on social media, in order to set up the ‘April 6’ group on Facebook. A 
small number of families had accumulated huge wealth from seizing state funds during 
Mubarak’s rule (Hassan, 2010, pp. 324) and nepotism prevailed; with corruption, 
resistance to change, centralised authority and the patron-client relationship between 
the regime and the elite, and despite public distrust of state institutions such as hospitals 
and schools, Egypt was dominated by authoritarian rule until the outbreak of the massive 
protests in January 2011. The working classes were deeply dissatisfied with deteriorating 
state services and the state’s protection of the business elites; this was illustrated in 2006 
when the Al-Salam ferry, carrying 1,400 passengers - mainly Egyptian workers returning 
from Saudi Arabia - sank. The accident was due to the owning company’s failure to meet 
minimum safety standards, and led to the death of over 1,000 passengers, the majority of 
whom were poor workers.  The accident fuelled public resentment and protests, after the 
owner of the ferry was allowed to leave the country and before the conclusion of the 
investigations, which eventually freed him.  
Radical Islamist groups such as Gamaat Islamya, on the other hand, managed to 
accumulate public support, particularly in poor neighbourhoods across Egypt during the 
1970s, during the 1980s, such groups attacked tourist sites, cinemas, churches and arts 
festivals, escalating in the early 1990s. The number of violent attacks rose to 741 during 
the five-year period between 1992 and 1997, compared to 143 during the period from 
1970 to 1991 (Hafez, 2003, pp. 34-48). The 1980s saw the state reluctantly accept the 
status of the Muslim Brotherhood as a movement but not as an independent political 
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party; the Muslim Brothers won parliamentary seats through their alliance with the Wafd 
party.  
The above movements were characterised by their loose organisations and exclusive 
membership, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Hafez, 2003, pp. 110-111). This flexible 
structure gave rise to competition between group members in order to win their support, 
either through moral disengagement, the ethical justification of violence or the 
abrogation of responsibility for violence (Hafez, 2003, pp. 190).  
1.3 Economic challenges 
Sadat initiated the ‘Open Door’ policy, Mubarak and his regime followed with a major 
privatisation project which eventually managed to increase foreign and local investments, 
but failed to alleviate poverty or increase living standards (Joffe, 2011, pp. 520). The 
regime had been concerned with the project of modernising and re-vamping Cairo as a 
global metropolis since the mid-1980s, evidenced by the numerous construction projects, 
particularly of hotels and touristic sites. These sites, even if located within the heart of 
the capital, may have appeared to be disconnected with the surrounding urban 
environment to the ordinary people; for instance, new gated communities were 
constructed on the outskirts of Cairo, with unit prices that were only affordable by the 
minority wealthy elite. These new constructions, whether hotels, shopping malls or 
trading centres, may also have seemed unrelated to the surrounding areas, for example, 
the World Trading Centre towers built in the heart of Imbaba slums, symbolised global 
capitalism and the economic impact of this fast-moving economic development with 
which many citizens simply could not match.  Such buildings were usually the result of 
global cooperation in planning and construction, and touristic sites were normally 
guarded by heavy ‘high-tech’ security measures, due to fear of the surrounding urban 
masses (Kuppinger, 2005, pp. 349). These sites exemplify the intersection of capital, 
consumption and leisure moulded after American models such as the World Trade Centre 
towers: ‘they almost seem like “quasi-fortresses [...] inaccessible to most urban residents 
except as workers’ (Kuppinger, 2005, pp. 349).  
Mubarak’s era saw the construction of new hotels to host the growing number of 
tourists, and new tourist villages were built in remote cities such as Sharm-el-Shaykh, 
which later became the Mubaraks’ favourite resort. Egypt also depended on the revenue 
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of tourists from neighbouring Arab countries, although these numbers may plunge and 
rise, according to the political and security situation in the whole region. Militant Islamic 
groups targeted the tourism industry in the early 1990s, particularly aiming at Western 
tourists through a series of violent attacks and explosions. These incidents intended to 
illustrate the growing power of such militant groups and their dominance in certain 
neighbourhoods in Cairo, particularly poor areas such as Imbaba. The country had lost 
massive revenues from plunging tourism by the mid-1990s, triggering violent 
confrontations between government security forces and the militant groups, which 
seemed to lead to the elimination of such groups in Cairo (Kuppinger, 2005, pp. 354). 
The fast moving economic development had its negative consequences in increasing the 
poverty rate across Egypt, particularly in rural areas. 20 per cent of the population was 
below the poverty line in 2011, as previously mentioned, and the unemployment rate 
was growing, particularly among the youth. The younger generation outnumbers the rest 
of the population, therefore it should be playing a significant role in the modernisation 
project. A large number of them face unemployment, and they lack adequate learning 
opportunities, given the deteriorating state of public education and the rise of expensive 
private schools and foreign universities. They feature in public discourse, sometimes as 
‘confused youngsters’ and other times as ‘makers of life’, as disseminated by the 
televangelist, Amr Khaled.  Khaled became famous through his televised Islamic 
programmes, appealing to the young to utilise their physical and mental abilities to help 
others  in eradicating illiteracy or collecting donations for the poor, for example; although 
they represent the majority in Egypt, young people may feel detached and apathetic, 
which is why one in four of them dream of emigrating to another country (Achy, 2010). 
Nine out of ten jobless in Egypt are under the age of 30, and the unemployment rate for 
women is higher. This situation means that the basic dream of a decent job and 
affordable housing may seem unattainable to many young people, and also accounts for 
the late marriage age in Egypt.  Giant shopping malls built since the late 1990s had 
become a safe and modern haven for many urban youths in the meantime, who took 
refuge in these air-conditioned spaces to pass the time (Abaza, 2006).  
Young people were also seen as an untapped source, particularly the case of Islamist and 
development NGOs; for instance, educated middle-class preachers such as Amr Khaled 
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and Moaz Masoud appealed to a large, young audience and their TV shows called for 
them to place their available resources at the disposal of their country. This is the same 
discourse propagated by NGOs such as Resala Association, originally set up by a group of 
engineering students which later became one of the largest charities in Egypt; even 
though the main driver behind Resala is religion, the benefit of this charity work reaches 
out to several segments of the poor, through various projects set up to help them such as 
providing small medical equipment or donating other goods or services. Young people’s 
engagement in these charities calls for a new way of analysing development discourse in 
Egypt, not only as the linear expansion of elements such as education and technology, 
but also as an integral system of relationships between these different elements 
(Escobar, 1995, 40); for instance, although young Egyptians participated in numerous 
charities such as Resala, they did not particularly challenge the political and economic 
status quo, but provided instead, instant and short-term solutions to the poor’s 
problems, such as donations in cash or kind, rather than eradicating structural economic 
and political problems which were causing the poverty level in Egypt to rise. They also did 
not question or aim to eliminate the increasing segregation between factions of the 
population, or what Abaza (2006) termed ‘the new liberal dream’ of segregation. This 
concept refers to the former regime’s efforts to attract foreign and local investments in 
the construction of gated communities in Cairo’s suburbs, housing the rich minority while 
reinforcing the vast gap between the rich and poor through barrier separation.   
This growing gap between the rich and the poor, or minority and majority, led to several 
rebellious outbreaks since independence in 1952. One of them was the massive protests 
in January 1977, when Sadat’s regime announced the abrupt end of state subsidies on 
basic food stuffs: the protests forced the regime to reverse its decision.  Egyptian skilled 
and semi-skilled labourers  have emigrated to the neighbouring oil-rich countries since 
the 1970s, as a temporary solution to the pressing economic situation. Their remittances 
not only constituted an important source of revenue for Egypt: their investments in real-
estate projects upon their return were a significant contribution to the economy.  
This disparity between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ also led to a number of young people 
embracing radical Islamist ideologies such as Al-Takfir wal-Higra (Repentance and Holy 
Flight) during the 1970s and the subsequent violent clashes with state security forces, 
32 
 
following the kidnapping of a former minister for religious endowments in 1977. These 
clashes took place again in the 1990s, when militant Islamist groups took possession of 
the poor neighbourhood of Imbaba, declaring it  their ‘emirate’. The dominance of these 
militant groups formed, what Ismail (2000) called ‘spheres of dissidence’, which were 
temporarily beyond state control.  New clashes and rebellious outbreaks erupted in the 
country, such as the demonstrations staged by the Kefaya movement, set up in 2004, 
when Mubarak announced his intention to run for a fifth term, and rumours circulated 
around his plan to make his son, Gamal, his successor. The case in Syria was similar when 
Bashar inherited his father’s position as head-of-state. New protest movements broke 
out in 2006, following strikes in the textile factory in Mahalla town, giving rise to the 
Facebook group, ‘April 6’ movement, and attracting young people in Egypt and the 
Diaspora. 2010 saw further protests, following the killing of a young man, Khaled Said, by 
security agents, in an Internet cafe in Alexandria.  This episode gave rise to the Facebook 
group, ‘We are all Khaled Said’, which attracted thousands of young Egyptian 
sympathisers. The 2000s saw a period of crackdowns on many bloggers and new media 
activists such as Wael Abbas, whose famous blog about police torture in Egypt made 
headlines in international news outlets. Abbas was later sentenced to six months in 
prison. Other bloggers were detained and jailed, sometimes for years, on the charge of 
criticising the president, religious institutions or religions (Islam and Christianity). Nasser 
and Sadat had controlled  youth gatherings such as student unions through legislation 
(Law 357 of 1952), Mubarak’s regime sought to extend this ban and control the new 
media and internet; this, however, appeared to be beyond state control. The rise of the 
new ‘media-savvy’ generation of bloggers and social media activists is the focus of this 
investigation on the educational and technological developments in Egypt, particularly 
over the past three decades of Mubarak’s rule. The following sections account for key 
trends in these changes.  
1.4 Education and information  
The revelation that the second-in-command of Al-Qaeda, Ayman Al-Zawahri, and Bin 
Laden’s confidant, was a graduate from the Faculty of Medicine in Cairo in 1974, and the 
fact that several of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were university graduates, 
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commentators began to draw attention to the Egyptian schooling and university system: 
whether it served as an incubator for radical Islamic thinking (Fahmy, 2012).  
Mohamed Abouelghar (2006), a professor of medicine at Cairo University, diagnoses the 
problem of higher education in Egypt as lacking in critical thinking, or, as he puts it: 
Egyptian university graduates are capable only of waiting for orders and executing them. No 
thinking, no arguing, no questioning; no objecting and not even dialoguing: a personality 
that does not (and cannot) create or think. This graduate is usually stuck with this type of 
passive personality for the rest of his or her life. So no matter how high he climbs in the 
hierarchy, he still listens to the orders of those above and gives orders to those below, 
leaving no room -- not the slightest possibility -- for thinking or questioning, not to mention 
criticising and hopefully improving. We then end up with a state of paralysis: a frozen 
society unable to move, grow, develop or produce. Who would expect a great scientist, an 
inventor or a philosopher to emerge from such a society? 
Other commentators wondered if the higher education system in particular should not 
emulate the Western (Anglo-American) model, as it was arguably not suitable for Egypt, 
where the majority of the population is Muslim. Islamists, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, debated whether the educational system should follow secular Western 
models or be rooted in the Islamist tradition; in the light of the rise of radical Islamist 
groups during the 1980s and 1990s, another debate focused on whether there should be 
closer scrutiny of schools’ curricula: (i)  in order to ensure that they provided adequate 
guidance for youngsters in learning about moderate Islam; and (ii) whether the curricula 
were based on education (ta’alim) and not on guidance (tarbiyya), referring to the name 
of the Ministry of Education in Egypt which is literally translated as the Ministry of 
Guidance and Education (tarbiyya and ta’alim). The debate centred on the meaning of 
Islamic thinking and the conflicting interpretations of Islam, and how these should be 
integrated into the national education system (Cook, 2000, pp. 488-489). The number of 
universities in Egypt increased from four state universities in the 1950s to 18 government 
universities in the 2000s, while the number of private and foreign universities also 
increased, with fees exceeding LE60,000  per year. Private schools and universities 
generally distinguish themselves from public universities by their investment in new 
technology and facilities.  
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State investment in advanced technology has increased during the past decade and this is 
illustrated in the number of mobile phone subscribers as well as the statistics showing 
access to the internet in Egypt, summarized in the following tables. 
Indicator Unit Nov 2010 Nov 2011 Annual 
growth rate  
per cent 
Mobile 
Subscription   
 
Million 
Subscription 
66.87 81.70 22.18 
 
Mobile 
Penetration  
 
per cent 85.71 100.79 15.08 
Table 1.1. Penetration of mobile phones in Egypt 
 (Source: Ministry of Communications and Information Technology) 
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The following table summarises the growth in the ICT sector: 
Indicator Unit Nov 
2010 
Nov 
2011 
Annual 
growth rate  
per cent 
ICT companies 
 
Companies  3889 4388 12.83 
 
Number 
of People 
Employed in 
ICT Sector  
 
Thousand 
Employees 
 
204.53 213.12 4.20 
ICT Issued 
Capital 
 
Billion 
EGP 
44.80 45.34 1.21 
Table 1.2  ICT sector in Egypt 
(Source: Ministry of Communications and Information Technology) 
 
 
The total number of Facebook users in the Arab world was more than 21 million Arabs (in 
2010), with the highest penetration in the UAE. Egypt had around 22 per cent of the total 
users in the region, and young people made up 75 per cent of Facebook users in the Arab 
world, with a ratio of 2:1 male to female users, compared to 1:1 globally.  
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Percentage of Individuals using the Internet  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Egypt 0.64 0.84 2.72 4.04 12 13 14 16 18 26 31 40 44 
Table 1.3 Usage of Internet in Egypt 
(Source: World Telecommunication ICT indicators, available at: www.itu.int)  
The highest growth was registered among people between the ages of 15 and 29, who 
constituted one third of the total Arab population (Dubai School of Government, 2011).  
The Arab Knowledge Report (2009) estimated the number of Arab users on the internet 
reached 60 million, and in December 2010, Google estimated that the number of Arab 
users would exceed 100 million Arabs by 2015 (Ghannam, 2011).  Traditional campuses’ 
failure to provide critical thinking spheres, encouraged young Egyptians to resort to 
virtual reality as a field for debating their future. The Egyptian regime, and Arab regimes 
in general, however, reacted with direct aggression and violence against the young 
people who used social media to voice their dissatisfaction which was regarded as a 
challenge to the existing regimes. The Bahraini government, for instance, imprisoned the 
blogger, Ali Abdulemam, for posting what they claimed to be false news, on his 
BahrainOnline.org site (Ghannam, 2011, 5). The site revealed the government’s 
crackdown on the Shi’ite population, the majority of Bahrainis;  in addition, a study by the 
Harvard Berkaman Centre showed that Egypt had the largest number of blogs in the 
region in 2009, and that blogs were usually used for political and social purposes (Bruce 
et al. 2009). Radsch (2008) identifies three phases of the Egyptian blogosphere: the first 
one is an experimentation phase with blogs used by an elite group; the second is an 
activist phase which marked the rise of such movements as Kifaya; and the third is the 
diversification phase which includes a plethora of blogs dealing with political, social and 
religious topics.  Many of those bloggers were journalists, which showed a dynamic 
interaction between journalism and social media. Faris (2010) also provides a pioneering 
study regarding the use of social media in Egypt, in order to combat authoritarian 
regimes and how such media lead to more collective action.  This is despite the attempts, 
at least by the former regime, to show foreign donors, especially the U.S.A., that the 
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country was implementing democratic reforms. Heydemann (2007: 7) argues that 
authoritarian regimes such as the former regime in Egypt, created what is called 
‘upgrading authoritarianism’, meaning that they created opportunities in the electoral 
arena and the economic sphere and maintained close ties with foreign regimes that 
shared the lack of interest in human rights. The Egyptian government invested in the 
development of its ICT infrastructure, with the aim of serving commercial and 
administrative needs while reducing its capacity to mobilise political unrest. This is why it 
did not filter the internet (as the Syrian government did) and instead, set up the Internet 
Police in 2004 (Faris, 2010, 62).  
Protestors can move their dissent to other arenas such as mobile phones or emails, even 
if authoritarian regimes filter internet access. New media can indeed be used in 
resistance movements, such as email bulletins in Zimbabwe (Rahimi, 2003). Faris (2010, 
p. 7) argues that the presence of an independent press such as the Al-Masry Al-Youm 
newspaper helped to bridge the link between bloggers and human rights activists by 
exchanging information and stories about human rights violation in Egypt. Egyptians 
usually used social media as their own personal news agencies to exchange news about 
torture and other regime abuses, such as the blogger, Wael Abbas, mentioned above. 
Abbas once said that Egyptian bloggers like him were ‘recording history so that in the 
future no one [would] dare to lie about it’ (cited in Faris, 2010, p. 100). Another activist, 
Hosam El-Hamalawy, commented on the ease of organising a demonstration by using 
social media, compared to the traditional methods in the 1990s:  
in order to organise a demonstration in the 1990s, there was so much secrecy, you couldn’t 
talk over the phone, you would meet people, you would chat, and how would you publish 
for a demonstration, you had to ‘print out something  (cited in Faris, 2010, p. 107). 
It is still important, however, to recall that social and independent media cannot in 
themselves replace civil society (Nanabhay & Farmanfarmaian, 2011). The following 
chapter provides a review of some of the key studies about new media and activism.  
1.5 Chapter summary  
Egypt has passed through different regime stages:  from the Free Officers’ coup in 1952 
to the revolution against the last Free Officer, Mubarak, in 2011. Nasser used the rhetoric 
of helping workers and the poor through implementing socialist principles, and Sadat 
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appealed to the rising middle-class. He initiated the ‘Open Door’ policy to stimulate the 
economy and attract foreign investments to Egypt. His policy was followed by Mubarak, 
who managed to attract foreign investments while increasing the gap between the rich 
and the poor; indeed, the poverty rate increased dramatically during Mubarak’s rule.  
What the three former leaders, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, had in common was that 
their rule was authoritarian in the sense that as presidents, they had unrivalled legislative 
and executive power. This is an important fact that is still being debated in Egypt during 
the writing up of the new constitution. The restraint on individual and collective 
freedoms, however, did not stop new social movements, particularly among the majority 
of young people; although apparently leaderless, they took the new social media as their 
preferred platform to debate and expose the regime’s violation of basic human rights.  
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Chapter Two  
Literature Review 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief overview of selected studies regarding the role of 
technology, mainly the internet concerning the Arab Spring, with a particular focus on the 
Egyptian case. The position of technology should be seen in the light of the growing ICT 
expenditure in many Arab states, which had increased dramatically, but the highest 
percentage was registered in the GCC states; while Egypt’s ICT spend in 2004 was 2.37 
per cent of its GDP, Bahrain invested 6 per cent of its GDP in its ICT infrastructure (Dutta 
et al. 2007, p. 84). 
The internet bandwidth in Egypt increased from 850 Mbps in 2003 to 2060 Mbps, a year 
later (Dutta et al., 2007, 83).  Egypt also had the largest IT sector in the region, in order to 
meet the increasing demand for software - and 70 million Egyptians owned a mobile 
phone which could be used to access social media  (Dutta et al., 2007,p.  84). Egypt also 
set up ‘Smart Village’ to attract foreign investors such as Microsoft, Oracle and HP (Attia 
et al., 2011, p. 2). 
Abdulla (2007) shows that the internet in the Arab world proliferated among people aged 
20 - 30; in fact, there were more than 1 million Twitter users in Egypt (in 2001), and the 
revolution resulted in 100 per cent increase (Chebib & Sohail, 2011, p. 141). The Arab 
world had more than 300 million inhabitants in 2007, but Arab web pages represented 
less than 0.5 per cent of the total web pages in 2006 (Dutta et al., 2007, p. 85). 
It can be difficult to classify youth as a social set, owing to a range of different and equally 
important characteristics that influence this categorisation. They can be defined 
according to their methods of communication, for instance, ‘the Facebook generation’ 
(El- Sharnouby, 2012, pp. 21-22), or according to their religiosity (Sobhy, 2009).  
The 1950s and 1960s generation, or ‘Nasser generation’, had a clear sense of identity, in 
historical terms, as they subscribed to the pan-Arabism project (El-Sharnouby, 2012, p. 
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23); economically, this group of young people (under the age of 29) constituted an 
important consumer segment, comprising around 47 per cent of the working age 
population in the Arab region (Dhillon et al., 2009).  It was arguably for that reason that 
the former Egyptian regime invested one million Egyptian pounds to support youth 
enterprises in 2004, and arranged for the National Bank for Development to dedicate 
about 25 million Egytian pounds for the same purpose (El-Sharnouby, 2012, p. 8). 
Following the economic ‘Open Door’ policy of the  1970s, the unemployment rate among 
people aged 16 to 24 increased and contributed to the delay in marriages, partially 
caused by the difficulties in finding affordable housing (El-Sharnouby, 2012, p. 8). The 
young generation were then turned into a problem rather than the hope of the nation; 
they had simply become the youth bulge. They  also became a social problem: rewish 
generation - politically apathetic (El-Sharnouby, 2012, p. 29) prey to Western impulses. 
The Egyptian writer, Saad Edeen Wahba, once wrote that the presence of McDonald’s 
restaurants in Cairo was an American conspiracy to corrupt young Egyptians (Al-Kahtani, 
2000, p. 105).  This gave rise to a new religious discourse in the media by young 
televangelists such as Amr Khaled, Moez Masoud and others. Khaled declared his 
purpose in Sonna’ el-Hayat was ‘to wake youth up from their sleep’ as well as ‘to 
challenge and combat programmes such as “Star Academy”, “Super Star” and “Star 
Makers” and the role they played in corrupting Arab youth’ (Sobhy, 2009, p. 32). Amr 
Khaled’s preaching, available on his multi-lingual website, called for the young to define 
their ‘target in life’ and reach it, calling them ‘life makers’.  
A recent survey among Arabs between the ages of 18 and 24 (Khoury, 2011, p. 14) shows 
the influence of family and religion on their lives; in Egypt, for example, young people 
expressed the belief that starting a family was the most important goal for around 63 per 
cent of them; in Jordan, however, they tended to link success with the status of their 
family in society rather than with their own efforts; in the GCC states, they showed high 
levels of optimism about their future, except in Bahrain. Frustration with, and distrust of, 
existing regimes also triggered a new form of youth civic activism, whether through 
traditional NGOs or political action through youth organisations, or both. Examples of 
civic activities are Resala in Egypt, Tawasul in the Emirates and Sharek in Palestine (see 
Khoury, 2011 for an overview of such recent studies).  
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The following sections review selected studies dealing with how young people used 
technology and the internet to mobilise collective action. These studies are grouped into 
three broad themes relevant to this project. The choice to place these studies into these 
categories is based on the belief that it will better reflect the focus of previous studies on 
the Egyptian uprisings and the role of social media, and that it will also help to provide 
pointers for discussion in the fieldwork, to be reviewed in the discussions on 
methodology and theoretical framework.  
This review has helped to shape the focus of the fieldwork, concentrating on the 
questions posed to the interviewees regarding: 
• The role of new social media in fostering cyber-activism 
• New social media as a virtual public sphere 
• The symbiotic relationship between new social media and mainstream media  
The following sections critically review each theme, drawing on relevant previous studies 
and concluding with pointers for the fieldwork.  
2.1 New media for fostering cyber activism 
Communication networks are the dynamo of power in modern societies, according to 
Castells. He defines a network as ‘a set of interconnected nodes [...] [a] complex structure 
of communication, constructed around a set of goals that simultaneously ensure a unity 
of purpose and flexibility of execution by their adaptability to the operating environment’ 
(2009, pp. 19-21). This network can be controlled by a process of ‘switching’ in which 
networks can be connected or disconnected to form certain strategic alliances (Castells, 
2009, pp. 45-46).  The internet can be used to challenge top-down hierarchal authority 
models in favour of more horizontal networking, as is the case in cyber Islamic 
movements (Bunt, 2009, p. 2). Another example is the anti-globalisation movement, 
which, according to Castells (2001, p. 141), ‘is not simply a network, it is an electronic 
network [...] and because the Internet is its home it cannot be disorganised or captured’.  
Social media are communication tools that facilitate interpersonal and group interaction 
by using a large variety of devices such as ‘sharing’, ‘adding’, ‘commenting’, and 
uploading texts, images, audio and video material. Facebook is widely used by Arab 
populations, and, in Egypt alone, there were more than 8 million Facebook users (in 
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2011), the majority of whom were aged between 15 and 29. The first quarter of 2011 saw 
the highest increase of Facebook users in Egypt (Chebib & Sohail, 2011, p. 140). Social 
media have affected political elections and changes in the U.S.A., Canada, Iran, China, 
Malaysia, in addition to several Arab states such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Syria, 
Algeria and Bahrain (Attia et al., 2011, p. 1). The term ‘web 2.0’ refers to the second stage 
of internet development in which users can share and interact online.  The so-called user-
generated content has thus turned users into ‘producers’ who simultaneously consume 
and produce content (Bruns, 2008). This development has been seen as promising a new 
openness and power for citizens and users, and thereby ending the ‘gatekeeper’ ideology 
in which a few (whether politicians or media professionals) control the dissemination of 
information (Scholz, 2007).   
The recent events in the Arab World or what is referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’, have 
drawn attention to the use of the internet and social media in collective action. Fadi 
Salem, Director of the Governance and Innovation Programme at the Dubai School of 
Government, commented that ‘it is no coincidence that Tunisia witnessed an 8 per cent 
sudden surge in the number of Facebook users during the first two weeks of January 
2011, coupled with a shift in the usage trend from merely social in nature into primarily 
political’ (cited in Chebib & Sohail, 2011, p. 144).  Social media have also made it easier 
for journalists to approach new contacts and obtain access to citizens’ postings. The 
internet can also be used as a means of surveillance by state security, for example, or for 
filtering information such as in Syria. ‘Reporters without Borders’ (RSF) classified Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Libya as ‘enemies of the internet’ in 2005; this list added Egypt 
in 2010, but in 2011, the list was confined to Saudi Arabia and Syria.  Following the 
Egyptian revolution, citizens in North Sudan announced wide protests against the regime 
of President Al-Bashir. The government followed the protestors’ communications on 
Facebook and managed to send police forces to arrest them prior to demonstrations, 
having used social media to spy on them (Comninos, 2011, p. 10).The same happened in 
Saudi Arabia, where protests were scheduled for 11 March 2011, but the activists were 
arrested for promoting them on Facebook and Twitter (Comninos, 2011, p. 10). 
Crisis situations motivate peoples’ need to access and exchange communication as fast 
and as widely as possible, which may explain the proliferation of Twitter usage in the 
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Middle East. The combination of traditional, mobile and social media also helps 
demonstrators to coordinate their protests.  Other scholars (Vedel, 2003; Chadwick, 
2006) identify four main functions of technologies in social changes, such as campaigning, 
information dissemination, e-government, and virtual participation. The increase of social 
media usage should also be seen as part of the revolution of media in the Arab world, 
starting with the proliferation of satellite television. One of the frequently cited quotes 
during the revolution was that of a young Egyptian activist who claimed that 
demonstrators used ‘Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and 
YouTube to tell the world’ (cited in Chebib & Sohail, 2011, p. 139). Egyptian activists did 
not only send ‘tweets’ to each other but also addressed international media and the 
whole world (Idle and Nunns, 2011, 20).  Even trans-national media such as Al-Jazeera 
depended on footage sent by citizen journalists on the ground (Chebib and Sohail, 2011, 
p. 139). 
The Egyptian uprising in 2011 spurred a wave of scholarly and media articles and 
commentaries linking street protests to cyber activism, seen as a tool for encouraging 
civic engagement and providing a new platform for political expressions (Khamis & 
Vaughn, 2011). Leaning on Howard’s  definition of cyber activism (2011, p. 145), Khamis 
& Vaughn (2011) regard this as the way new and social media are used to advance a 
political cause, which is otherwise difficult to promote offline. Understood this way, cyber 
activism can mobilise citizens by spreading stories of injustice (blogs about police torture 
discussed in Faris, 2010), or advocating a strong political cause avoiding state censorship 
(such as campaigning to end Mubarak’s succession plans – Lim, 2012); although it lacks 
the planning and facilitation characteristics of offline mobilisation, cyber activism can still 
lead to mobilisation by encouraging civic engagement (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011).   
 
 Miladi (2011) also argues that new media have played a key role, not only in Egypt but in 
neighbouring Tunisia, where voices of the youth reached international media, thanks to 
cell phones, blogs and social media, thereby serving as an alternative uncensored news 
agency. Social media provided new tools to call for protest, and it was not unusual to find 
notices encouraging  citizens to congregate in certain public Squares (Miladi, 2011). 
Twitter for instance, Idle & Nunns (2011) argue, was used as a tool for citizen journalism 
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during the Egyptian uprising. Mellor (2013) argues that social media accounts can serve 
as artefacts to help commemorate the uprisings, as well as individual testimonies of 
those taking parts in the events.  
 
Communication technologies can foster a collective identity across a geographically 
dispersed population. Individuals may get the sense, through online discussion groups for 
example, that they are members of a larger community with shared grievances (Garrett, 
2006; Aday, 2010). This allows civic groups to find and attract new members and to build 
affiliations with groups in other cities and countries (Howard, 2011). Relationships can be 
strengthened through the maintenance of networks across distances, sharing information 
and discussion. The creation of community and collective identity can, in turn, facilitate 
mobilisation in support of collective action (Garrett, 2006; Aday, 2010). Social media can 
also facilitate collective action through framing processes. The creation of particular 
group understandings regarding the meaning and significance of specific events and 
politics can be crucial to the support of a movement. Social networking services and 
satellite television in Iran, for example,  circulated videos of the killing of a young woman, 
Neda Agha-Soltan, during post-election demonstrations in 2009, filmed by mobile 
phones. She became a symbol of the protests and a signal to the general public that the 
protestors are ‘like them’ (Aday, 2010). This framing was particularly significant in an 
environment where the government had attributed the protests to foreign agitators.  
Howard (2010, p. 3) argues that the new information and communication technologies 
such as cell phones and the internet have been utilised by social movements and activists 
in Muslim countries to mobilise people, such as in Indonesia in 1998. Other examples 
cited by him were the ‘Tulip Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, when cell phones were 
used to organise activists, or in Kuwait in 2005, when young protestors relied on text 
messaging to co-ordinate demonstrations. 
It can be argued that communication via social media sites has replaced interpersonal or 
face-to-face communication, particularly in times of political upheaval. It is when citizens 
lose trust and confidence in state institutions that they resort to personal interactive 
communication;  consequently, Twitter and Facebook users trusted their messages from 
each other rather than the government media (Attia et al., 2011, p. 4). Collective action is 
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simply not possible without mobilising other citizens or users, or, as Arendt (1958, p. 188) 
puts it: ‘action [...] is never possible in isolation; to be isolated is to be deprived of the 
capacity to act.’  
Egyptian activists used social media such as Twitter to post maps indicating safe routes 
for protestors, away from government-hired thugs (Meier, 2011). Social media facilitated 
activists in spreading the word, share ideas and even arrange practical action such as 
requesting blood donations (Idle & Nunn, 2011). These media also helped activists not 
only link up with Arabs in Diaspora, but also international media and organisations, 
thereby creating a virtual global public sphere (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). Social media, 
therefore, served not only as an ‘alternative’ communication tool and medium, but also 
as a platform for exchanging views and information, which leads this review to the next 
theme: how new and social media served as a virtual public sphere. 
 
2.2 New social media as a virtual public sphere 
Online deliberation can facilitate a critical debate with citizens from diverse 
geographical spaces, arranged at low costs, unlike offline debates which require a 
strong network, enough resources to arrange meetings and communication matters. 
Habermas sees the potential of the new media and the internet in serving as a virtual 
public sphere, or, as he puts it: ‘a dispersed public interconnected almost exclusively 
through the electronic media can keep up to date on all kinds of issues and 
contributions in the mass media with a minimum of attention’ (2006, p. 9). 
 
The internet alone cannot provide the platform or structure, however,  which allows 
citizens to effectively deliberate, especially when media professionals, such as 
journalists, can still act as gatekeepers, filtering or moderating forum discussions, not 
to mention that not all online discussions can be meaningful as envisaged in the 
normative idea of a public sphere. The most important obstacle to having a fully-
fledged online public sphere is arguably the dominance of certain online groups such 
as famous activists, artists or journalists and politicians. This obstacle, argues 
Papacharissi (2010, p. 122), makes most discussions on the internet ‘amorphous, 
fragmented, dominated by a few, and too specific to live up to the Habermasian ideal 
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of ‘rational accord’.  This view is shared by Peter Dahlgren (2000, p. 158), who sees 
online deliberation as fragmented fora amongst groups of users who share similar 
views, which is far from the normative Habermasian idea of a critical, rational debate 
amongst groups with different views; in addition, not all citizens have access to the 
internet or social media, and this is particularly the case in developing societies such 
as Egypt, where the digital divide amongst social groups can be wider than that 
recorded in Western societies. This usually makes online deliberations to be 
dominated by those already politically active, offline (Cammaerts & van Audenhove, 
2005, p. 193). The internet, like offline media, can therefore be dominated by 
experts, pundits and media professionals, rather than being a forum for marginalised 
actors across social groups (Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010).   
 
Some scholars, on the other hand,  argue that despite its shortcomings, the internet 
and new media can provide different avenues in order to seek, retrieve and 
disseminate information, relevant to rational and critical deliberation (Slevin, 2000, p. 
185). Online discussions are fundamentally different from offline ones, which make it 
difficult to effectively compare them; for instance, comments by online users can be 
exchanged at different times: they can be posted much later, not immediately as in 
offline discussions. This means that, the internet provides different communication 
avenues with its distinct rules, according to Bohman (2004), but it still serves as an 
alternative forum for rational deliberation. Citizens can also access  myriad different 
opinions and not just the views of like-minded people, argues Goode (2005, p. 119). 
This can promote further reflection and dialogue, and the internet is able to 
encourage citizens who normally do not engage in offline discussions, to contribute to 
an online debate and share their ideas. 
 
The internet can indeed allow for fast and wide dissemination of messages; it can also 
provide a new avenue for deliberation and discussion amongst diverse groups, 
thereby encouraging users to familiarise themselves with dissident views. The 
Egyptian uprising of 2011 was an example of employing the internet, and particularly 
social media, to disseminate information and spur participation (Tufekci & Wilson, 
2012, p. 376; Lim, 2012, p. 244).   
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The recent uprisings in Egypt and other parts of the region have been called ‘Facebook 
revolutions’, due to the spread of the use of social media to disseminate information 
about the protests and protesters (Comnions, 2011). The user-generated content 
uploaded by the protesters was created by amateurs in the form of blogs, ‘tweets’, video 
and audio clips. There were more than a million Twitter users in Egypt between January 
and March 2011, and the most popular ‘hashtags’ during that period were ‘#egypt’ and 
‘#jan25’ (Chebib & Sohail, 2011 p. 141). Many Egyptians resorted to the internet during 
the January 25 revolution; for instance, a survey by Kavanaugh et al. (2012) showed that 
the vast majority of a sample of 240 Egyptians used the internet and social network sites 
such as Facebook on a daily basis during the uprising. Papacharissi & Oliveira (2012) 
examined Twitter archives for the period from 25 January to 25 February 2011 for the 
#egypt hashtags, and applied a content, computer-mediated text analysis to identify 
patterns, topics and network frames in the Twitter posts. Their analysis showed that 
posts tended to revolve around big events in proximate locations and reflected network 
framing and actions.  They were also inclined to be associated with specific activists and 
intellectuals such as Wael Ghonim and Gigi Ibrahim. The camera-phone footages were 
collected and posted online by  satellite broadcasters such as Al-Jazeera, which not only 
added to the fame of these activities but also to the role of social media; as one activist 
put it, ‘we built a media camp in Tahrir Square. It was two tents, and we were around five 
or six technical friends with their laptops, memory-readers, hard disks. We all had 
physical means with us and we hung a sign in Arabic and English on the tent saying: ‘Focal 
point to gather videos and pictures from people in the street’[…] and we received a huge 
amount of videos and pictures and then we go [sic] back online and keep posting them 
online. In the first few hours, I gathered 75 gigabytes of pictures and videos from people 
in the streets’ (quoted in Aouragh & Alexander, 2011, p. 1352). 
Mohammed’s study (2011) aims to analyse the Egyptian blogosphere and whether it 
plays a role in providing a virtual public sphere. He examines the major themes in Abbas’s 
blog, and its major discursive features such as style, language, quality of argument, and 
actors in this discourse. One of his selected blogs was that by the Egyptian activist, Wael 
Abbas, a freelance journalist and award-winning activist. His blog, Egyptian Awareness, is 
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informal and is written entirely in familiar Egyptian dialect, which makes it accessible to 
all Egyptians. Four issues relate to online public spaces: access, freedom to communicate, 
deliberation of discussion and quality of discourse (Mohammed, 2011, p. 44). He analyses 
blogs, because they are a tool available to all citizens, assuming they have access to the 
internet. Mohammed claims that most Egyptian bloggers are women and they usually 
write about their life experiences, both personal and political (p. 46). 
Tufekci & Wilson (2012) provide a study based on a survey of participants in the Egyptian 
revolution. They argue that Facebook was utilised as a new source of information which 
was not easily controlled by the former regime. They also argue that social media here 
played a pivotal role in shaping how citizens made decisions about participating in the 
protest and how they organised it. Their aim was to show whether protestors used social 
media to plan and mobilise the protests. They conducted 1,200 interviews with 
participants and asked them to complete questionnaires in Arabic. The results showed 
that the average age of participants was 26, and the majority of them was male (75 per 
cent); 60 per cent of them were educated at college or university level. Female 
participants tended to use social media, such as Facebook, more than males, and also for 
reporting about the protests. The study showed that satellite TV and phones were still 
the most popular media choices for participants; almost half of the participants produced 
and disseminated video or images from the protests using Facebook, mobile phones and 
Twitter.  
Using modelling analysis, Al Ani et al. (2012) provided an analysis of Egyptian blogs 
authored between 2004 and 2011. They showed how blogs were used by social 
movements such as the Kefaya (Enough) movement to disseminate news about protests 
and to mobilise events. Blogs were also used as an alternative media channel for posting 
eyewitness accounts of harassment. Their analysis covered 18,000 individual posts, of 
which nearly six thousand were in Arabic and the rest in English. Their analysis 
documented a remarkable reduction in the personal topics blogs between 2006 and 
2011, compared to a constant increase in political ones. The blogs consequently shifted 
from a focus on particular narratives towards more universal issues. Personal blogs 
continued to reflect bloggers’ concerns with the impact of human rights violations on 
their daily lives, thus highlighting their role as citizen journalists. Blogs in English tended 
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to focus on human rights and revolutionary issues, which is justified by the fact that these 
blogs were inclined to be ‘outward-facing instruments of communication to a foreign 
audience’ (p. 22). Al Ani et al. (2012) divided the blogs into three types: those reporting 
news, those providing commentary and the remaining coded as ‘other’, which covered a 
range of topics including art and TV programmes. The majority of blogs provided 
commentary, during the revolution, rather than news about the events. Bloggers saw a 
means to challenge the coverage in mainstream media in their blogs, such as the Egyptian 
blogger who remarked on the coverage of the Tunisian uprising:  
The official media is [sic] reminding us over and over, by all possible and provoking ways, 
that what happened in Tunisia can’t and will not happen to Egypt, the official media is 
speaking about pseudo-achievements of Mubarak’s economic policies, living in their dream 
world that the people will buy their lies anymore. All these statements and all these denials 
are actually a strong indicator of how scared and fragile the Egyptian regime is currently 
[...]’ (p. 23).  
The bloggers therefore provided counter-narratives and testimonies to what the national 
state media was offering, highlighting their testimony as first-hand experience and 
description of the protests.  
Another important aspect in analysing social new media as a virtual public sphere is the 
issue of access: not only in terms of access to hardware, but also linguistic and media 
skills needed to communicate with groups located overseas. Allam (2012), for instance, 
shows that English is the common language for young Egyptians who use social 
networking sites, although many of them also use both Arabic and English. The majority 
of her informants confirm that they used social networks in order to improve their 
country, while 50 per cent of them used it to seek out political information or engage in 
political debate. El-Sharnouby (2012, p. 13) conducted a research among a sample of 
young Egyptians who had been involved in the demonstrations since 25 January 2011, as 
well as those who had not. She carried out 29 interviews with young people, in total,  of 
whom 17 were female and the rest male. She grouped them into two main categories: 
lower middle-class (salaried employees who earn less than £40 a month) and upper 
middle-class, (salaried professionals earning considerably more).  El-Sharnouby states in 
her interviews with young people from Tahrir:  
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Class was a very important factor in the imagination of a young person that could bring 
about change as they are to a great extent educated and organised. Hence, heroic youth 
who made Tahrir were strongly related to the image of middle-class, educated, decent-
looking men (El-Sharnouby,  2012, p. 41). 
 An example of this perception is reflected in one of her interviewee’s statements when 
she saw pictures of ‘martyrs’ on the streets:  
They looked as if they just [come] out of prison. They …[did] not looking like demonstrators 
or people who love[d] their country. I got the feeling they [were] youth who went out to 
steal and then died [...] they [had] a scary look on their faces. If they […] pass[ed] by you on 
the street, you [would] get the feeling they [were] baltagyya [thugs] (El-Sharnouby, 2012, 
p. 41).  
Another informant defined the (ideal) participant as: 
Someone [who] is dressed nicely and goes on the street to chant, without [using] swear 
words, while focusing on his [or her] freedom. I saw some in the demonstrations where I 
felt they [had] nothing to do with the Revolution, like some looking at women and just 
going for fun. Someone who is well-travelled  and educated; someone who saw people 
abroad and underst[oo]d things. Someone who underst[oo]d basic human rights (El-
Sharnouby, 2012, p. 42). 
 Another interviewee stressed that the protests were attributed to the high-tech and 
media-savvy youth:  
The first people who started the demonstrations [were the] youth from Facebook who got 
to know each other through the internet. They are the ones who are well-educated. The 
government thought that the ones who would demonstrate, however, [could] only be from 
poor [backgrounds] who cannot live [under the current circumstances]. So this was new - 
the revolution does not come from the poor and hungry but from [the] educated who are 
upset [...] the old regime did not see this coming as they were all old and [did] not know 
anything about the internet. [...] they thought the youth only [sat] on the net to chat or 
watch sex movies, and really, everyone thought so (El-Sharnouby, 2012, p. 42).  
An informant from the lower middle-class said that the upper middle-class youth could 
not do a demonstration without the Muslim Brotherhood, especially the class that was 
there: ‘The upper middle-class who has some money, their purpose in life is so different 
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[from] ours. They might be upset that a police [officer] would stop them and look at their 
car [...] but I would not be upset [by] these things’ (El-Sharnouby, 2012, p. 43).  
Another one, who worked as a driver, said: ‘if I had the money that would cover me 
for a week then I would take [to] the streets [...] so unfortunately I could not protest but 
my heart was with the protestors’ (El-Sharnouby, 2012, p. 44).  
Hossam El-Hamalawy noted that activists who were fluent in English would be 
responsible for informing their networks abroad: 
even after the government banned Twitter, I was logging in via a proxy site in order to disseminate 
the news about the protests to mainly people abroad. And that is part also of the division of labour; I 
mean we have allies abroad...trade unionists, human rights activists, foreign journalists, all of these 
people we need to get the word out to’ (quoted in Aouragh & Alexander, 2011, pp. 1349-1350).  
Another activist, Amr Gharbia, said: 
what we call a social network is not actually a social network; these are social tools. Twitter 
and Facebook are not the social network: we are the social network. And we have personal 
relations with each other. And to prove that, when the social networks were gone, they 
were filtered or blocked, during the high days of the revolution in Egypt a couple of weeks 
ago, we still operated [...]. The social network is us. We use whatever tools we have. They 
may be internet tools; they may be phone lines; they may be paper-based communications. 
Turning off the technology doesn’t turn off the social network, because it is about people, 
not about technology (quoted in Aouragh & Alexander, 2011, p. 1351). 
The above examples of activists illustrate the typical image of protestors in Tahrir 
Square (at least during the 2011 uprising) being middle-class with high education 
credentials (mostly from foreign schools or universities) and high media skills. This 
constitutes an obstacle to the function of new social media as a liberating and 
alternative public space for deliberation, if users are already discriminated against 
due to their social ranking or cultural and social capital; also, for the internet to 
function as a virtual public sphere, online debates should echo offline discussions, 
thereby extending the possibility for citizens to engage in meaningful and topical 
exchanges of opinion which can result in significant offline action. This latter point is 
crucial to the fieldwork, and will be discussed in more detail in Chapters Five,, Six, 
Seven and Eight. The next section reviews studies on the comparison of the final 
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theme in this research: the symbiotic relationship (if any) between mainstream and 
new social media in the 2011 uprising.  
 
2.3 The relationship between mainstream and new social media 
Some scholars (Peterson, 2011, p. 14) argue that international media such as Al-
Jazeera helped shape public opinion outside of Egypt by messages communicated via 
social media. Hermida (2012) also argues that, in general, the Arab Spring coverage 
was characterised by the use of non-elite sources such as ‘tweeters’, which shows the 
influence of this group in reaching out to international media, even though this cohort 
of users is small, compared to the overall population of Egypt. New and social media 
have facilitated the dissemination of news about the uprising in Egypt, prompting 
many more Egyptians to take to Tahrir Square; however, owing to the fact that not 
everyone in Egypt had access to social media, people depended on other means of 
communication such as inter-personal networks and mainstream media such as Al- 
Jazeera. 
 
Hamdy & Gomaa (2012) provide the content analysis of a sample of newspaper articles 
collected from semi-official and independent newspapers, in addition to posts from 
social media sites. The analysis identifies four main frames: conflicts, responsibility, 
economic consequences, and human interest. Semi-official newspapers unsurprisingly 
depended on the conflict frame in contrast to social media posts in which the human 
interest frame dominated. The independent press, on the other hand, used a range of 
frames, including conflict as well as human interest. Social media posts tended to 
highlight not only human suffering as a result of the revolution, but also ‘martyrdom’ 
and anger.   
Al-Maskati (2012) analyses the coverage of the Egyptian protests provided by Al-Ahram, 
Arab News, China Daily, Guardian International, International Herald Tribune and 
Jerusalem Post, focusing on the intensity of the coverage, potential shifts in tunes and 
interaction with social media. His study shows that the Egyptian Al-Ahram attempted to 
delegitimise the protesters and their demands, by depending on pro-government 
representatives as their sources, and regularly employing negative keywords to portray 
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the protesters. The two Arab newspapers, Arab News and Al-Ahram showed some 
changes from being less pro-government to more pro-democracy, while the remaining 
newspapers were consistent in their coverage.  All the newspapers preferred to rely on 
conventional sources in breaking the news about the protests, rather than those from 
social websites, although significant quotes from such websites were sometimes used. 
In her survey of a sample of Egyptian audiences, Allam (2012, p. 166) shows that the main 
source of information during the revolution was satellite television such as BBC Arabic 
and Al-Jazeera, followed by international outlets such as CNN. Private television channels 
were also among the preferred outlets (Dream TV, Al-Mehwar, ON TV and Al-Hayat TV).  
Television was also seen as playing an important role as the main source of news during 
the uprisings; for instance, one of Egypt’s most famous online activists, Wael Ghonim, 
acknowledged the impact of Al-Jazeera:   
The channel’s talk shows offered heavy criticism of many Arab leaders. Within a few short 
years, Al-Jazeera became the most viewed channel in Egypt and the entire Arab region. The 
network sets an example that has been followed by many channels throughout the Middle East 
(2012, p. 38). 
Aouragh & Alexander (2011) propose a distinction between the use of the internet as a 
tool to bring about change from below, and as a space for collective dissent. Their 
interviews with a sample of Egyptian activists who used social media reflect their 
rejection of the claim that the events of January 25 were a Facebook revolution, as this 
risks drawing a simplistic causal relationship between technology and the uprising, while 
the latter depends primarily on the support of millions of people, whether online or 
offline. Such a simplistic claim, in their view, undermines the decades-long protest 
movements in Egypt which started early in the twenty-first century. The study aimed to 
explain how the activists used the internet and the techniques that worked on online 
activism.  One such activist saw the internet as an online space to galvanise public 
opinion: 
to have a space, an online space, to write and talk [to] people, to give them messages which 
will increase their anger, this is my favourite way of online activism. This is the way online 
activism contributed to the revolution. When you asked people to go and demonstrate against 
the police, they were ready because you had already provided them with materials which made 
them angry (quoted in Aouragh & Alexander, 2011, p. 1348).  
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New communication technologies have become the infrastructure for sharing and 
learning about diverse views and for new approaches to political representation and 
participation (Howard, 2011; Mäkinen and Kuira, 2008). The ‘April 6’ movement in Egypt, 
which relied on Facebook and other social media tools, provided a structure for a new 
generation of Egyptians to ‘virtually’ assemble and communicate about their grievances. 
They fell outside the small, traditional group of activists and opinion-makers in the 
country, and represented a new form of civil society organisation. Howard stresses that 
new civic associations were emerging throughout the Muslim world, due to the relevant 
infrastructure provided by information and communication technologies. The formation 
of such groups is especially important in countries where political parties can be illegal 
(Howard, 2011). Social and new media such as ‘blogs’ and Facebook, tend to play a 
significant role when access to mainstream media is restricted (Papacharissi & Oliveira, 
2012: 266). Twitter, for instance, allowed communication during the Iranian state 
censorship of mainstream media coverage, following the 2009 elections (Christensen, 
2009).  
Arab youths from Tunisia and Egypt asserted that Facebook was primarily used to raise 
awareness about on-going civil movements and to spread information to the whole 
world, and, to a lesser extent, to organise action,  according to a survey by the Dubai 
School of Government (2011).  The survey showed that the total number of Facebook 
users in the Arab world reached nearly 28 million by early April 2011, almost double the 
figure noted in the same period in 2010. The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries 
continued to dominate the top five Facebook users, while Egypt had nearly a quarter of 
all Facebook users in the region; as for Twitter, the School’s report estimated the number 
of users to be around 1.1 million in the region, and the most popular topics that were 
‘tweeted’ were Egypt, the January 25 Revolution, Libya, Bahrain and protests; in fact, the 
report estimated that over 60 per cent of all ‘tweets’ generated within the first quarter of 
2011 originated from users in Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  
Information and communication technologies reduce the outlay associated with 
publishing and accessing information, and facilitate communication and coordination 
across distances. This, in turn, reduces the transaction costs for organizing collective 
action and the costs of participation (Aday, 2010; Meier, 2009; Garrett, 2006). The 
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internet, for example, more specifically allows groups advocating social change to spread 
not only their ideological messages, but also their training programmes and operation 
plans. YouTube videos enable core activists to explain a movement’s principles and tactics 
in order to disperse followers without having to travel (Papic and Noona, 2011). Ushahidi 
in Kenya significantly reduced the costs of participating in a collective human rights 
campaign: the sole requirement being a mobile phone signal (Goldstein and Rotich, 
2008). 
Howard (2010, p.38) argues that the new information technologies have played a causal 
role in democratisation in several Muslim states; for him, the term ‘digital divide’ should 
not be measured merely by the distribution of hardware and software among 
populations, or the skills needed to handle this information technology, but rather, by the 
impact of using it  to further develop political institutions. The use of new media such as 
the internet, has also been the result of the presence of political opposition parties in 
exile, and their use of new media as a means of communicating with their supporters 
inside their home country. The internet has also been used as ‘the site of political 
contestation between the state and civil society, and between secularism and Islamism’ 
(Howard, 2010, p. 132). Kurds used emails and faxes as their primary tools for organising 
demonstrations in 22 countries across Europe, following the abduction of Abdullah 
Ocalan in 1999 (Howard, 2010, p. 133). the Committee for the Defence of Legitimacy 
Rights and Movement for Islamic Reform in Saudi Arabia, made use of the internet to 
expose the royal family’s corruption, and to debate the implementation of Shari’a law 
(Howard, 2010, p. 134). Howard argues that online civic life flourishes when the state is 
authoritarian and bans civic political life, or when the opposition is legal but ineffective in 
challenging single-party governance (2010, p. 135). 
To sum up, some scholars ( Feezel, Conroy & Guerrero, 2009, p. 17) argue that online 
groups seem to perform positive civic functions as well as off-line groups, and that online 
engagement triggers a more efficacious reaction among online users in comparison to 
traditional media users. Other scholars, however (Gladwell, 2010) argue that ties among 
online groups are weak, and that Facebook ‘friends’, for instance, are not real friends, 
and thus, they cannot serve as platforms for high-risk activism.  
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2.4 Chapter summary  
Saco (2002) argues that there have been two positions regarding the effect of 
technologies on social change: utopian and dystopian; while the former is more 
optimistic and sees technology as a catalyst for change, the latter is more pessimistic and 
sees technology as a potential means of reinforcing the status quo. Howard (2010) adds a 
third view which sees technology as a facilitator for change, but states that technology 
alone cannot lead to democratic transformation without the presence of well-educated 
strata that contribute to an active civil society. He illustrates his argument by referring to 
the situation in Iran, noting that Farsi was the tenth most popular blogging language 
(Howard, 2010, p. 4), and that images of the death of Neda Agha-Soltan, who was killed 
during a protest in Iran in 2009, were distributed digitally and helped inspire the protest 
movements, 40 days later (p. 7). Iranian protestors were eager to fill the space of the 
foreign press by sharing captured images and clips from the Iranian streets on social 
media, even when the Iranian government blocked foreign correspondents from 
reporting within Iran (p. 8).  
New media technology has certainly offered unprecedented opportunities for civic 
engagement in Egypt. It is true that Tahrir provided a space for all young people, across 
gender, class and religion, and the same space was offered virtually, thereby defying state 
censorship and state centralisation. The impact of social media was even illustrated in an 
Egyptian parent’s appreciation of Facebook to the extent that he named his daughter 
‘Facebook’, during the 2011 revolution (Kaveney, 2011). 
The above review identified three important themes relevant to this study: the role of 
new social media in fostering cyber activism; the role of such media in serving as a virtual 
public sphere and civil society; and the relationship between mainstream and social 
media. A closer examination of the role of actors and agency in mobilising action (cyber 
activism) is lacking in the above studies: the engagement in deliberation (virtual public 
sphere) and with mainstream and social media, alike. This study adopts qualitative 
methods (interviews and focus groups) in order to fill this gap in research, by examining 
how activists as well as (social and mainstream) media users perceive the role of social 
media in mobilising people for action and in facilitating virtual deliberation avenues,. 
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The three themes identified in the Literature Review will be further discussed in the 
Methodology chapter as pointers for the interviews with focus groups, and reference will 
be made to them in the discourse on civil society in Egypt, as part of the Theoretical 
Framework. The subsequent chapters will discuss the situation in Egypt in more detail, 
and question whether Egyptian citizens and activists managed to translate online 
activities into offline activism. 
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Chapter Three 
Civil society – a theoretical framework 
 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides an assessment of selected theories that discuss the emergence of 
social movements, and how they may be incorporated as part of a thriving civil society. 
The discussion will begin with views regarding social movements and civil society which 
are largely applicable to Western democracies, followed by a section dedicated to 
examining opinions regarding Egypt, thus shedding some light on the role of civil society 
in the Egyptian political sphere, and providing a few examples of recent movements and 
civil society associations. The discussion ends with an inspection of the role of social and 
new media in paving the way for these associations, as well as allowing social movements 
to flourish, by comparing the views of scholars who were enthusiastic about this role to 
those who were more cautious in their evaluation.  
 
3.1 Social movement 
A social movement is ‘a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents 
preferences’, whether in favour of, or against social change (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, pp. 
1217-1219), whereas social organisation would imply a more formal entity ‘which 
identities its goals with the preferences of a social movement’. Social movements usually 
depend on trust generated via social networks as a basis for recruitment (Snow et al. 
1980, p. 791). One example here is Amani el-Tounsi’s testimony on the Egyptian uprising 
in her book, Amani: A Girl from Tahrir (2011), in which she reflects on the exchange of 
views with like-minded individuals who finally convince her to return to the Tahrir 
protests, following the violent battle on 2 February. It is this exchange with friends and 
people she trusted which helped her make up her mind. Movements are based on trust, 
not only between close friends, but also between strangers with common interests (Stolle 
& Rochon, 1998, p. 48). It is also claimed that movements which are linked to other 
groups will grow more rapidly than those which are closed and exclusive (Snow et al. 
1980, p. 797).  
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Socialisation is regarded as playing a major role in motivating activists into action, and so 
are self-concept and values (Duncan, 1999; Hercus, 1999). Activists are not necessarily 
those who are more knowledgeable and motivated towards political action than non-
activists; in fact, research shows that the major difference between activists and non-
activists is the amount of time and effort dedicated to political projects, and that activism 
is usually preceded by previous engagement in social or political movements, even on a 
voluntary basis (Wiltfang & McAdam, 1991; Stewart, Settles, & Winter, 1998). There are 
also some demographic characteristics that predict the level of social activism among 
populations; for instance, the middle-class is claimed to devote more time to 
volunteering activities than the working classes, and women and young people tend to 
offer more of their time to such activities than do men or the elderly (Franz & McClelland, 
1994).  Some scholars (Giugni, 1998) argue that social movements can result in noticeable 
changes traced through three different levels: the change of power relations (cultural), 
the change in policies (structural or institutional), and change at both cultural and 
institutional levels. These changes, moreover, must be explained through a prism of 
theories acknowledging the changes at technological, social and cultural levels (Mackay & 
Gillespie, 1992, p. 686; Schroeder, 2007). 
The uprisings in 2011 in the Arab World are said to have begun with a series of non-
violent similar uprisings in the past, confined to local surroundings. One example is the 
first Palestinian Intifada (1987-1993) and another, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon 
(2005), in the wake of the assassination of the prime minister, Rafiq Al-Hariri, resulting in 
the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in that year (Bayat, 2010, p. 6). Bayat also argues 
that people resort to street politics if they are prohibited from practicing their voting 
rights.  
Recent social movements in Egypt, include the famous movement,’ We are all Khaled 
Said’, named after Khaled Said who was beaten to death by the Egyptian police forces in 
June 2010, while sitting in a cybercafé in Alexandria city. Khaled’s family released 
photographs of the corpse, showing evidence of a brutal assault which triggered massive 
public anger. The incident also resulted in the emergence of several Facebook groups 
condemning police brutality, such as ‘We are all Khaled Said’, founded by Wael Ghonim, 
who was then working for Google in Dubai. The page attracted hundreds of thousands of 
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people within a few days, and many of them used Khaled’s photograph as their profile 
picture. The former regime arranged the trial of the two detectives involved in Khaled’s 
death, as a result of this massive protest. Social movements such as the above-mentioned 
‘We Are All Khaled Said’, began campaigning in order to form a network. The success of 
this network would determine its sustainability in the future, for example, in the form of 
a legal entity or organisation. Not all campaigns follow this model, however, as only a few 
remain justifiable or sound. The following diagram reflects the life-time of a successful 
social movement: 
 
• Figure 3.1 lifetime of social movement  
 
A return to this model will be made in the overall findings discussion,  in order to place 
social media in this cycle. Suffice to say here, that when a movement turns into an 
institutionalised group, it is then claimed to be part of organised civil society, which is 
necessary to preserve a healthy public sphere, as will be discussed in the following 
section.  
3.2 Civil society 
The concept of civil society is found in de Tocqueville’s example of voluntary association 
as a means of promoting democratic and public participation (Foley & Edwards, 1996). 
Gramsci also emphasised the role of social institutions in challenging the status quo and 
state dominance (Katz, 2003). Civil society can be defined as ‘a sphere of social 
interaction between the household and the state which is manifest in norms of 
community cooperation, structures of voluntary associations, and networks of public 
Motivation  
Campaign Network  
Organisation 
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communication’ (Bratton, 1994, p. 2). Civil society associations include diverse groups 
such as neighbourhood committees and charity organisations (Foley & Edwards, 1996, p. 
38).   
Calhoun (1993) distinguishes between civil society and public sphere, where the 
definition and importance of the latter ‘is largely to go beyond general appeals to the 
nature of civil society’ in explaining ‘the social foundation of democracy’ (p. 269). It is 
worth noting that Habermas has not elaborated on the theory of power in his notion of 
public sphere, and how power can be a barrier to communicative rationality (Flyvbjerg, 
1998, p. 215). Foucault, on the other hand, focuses on ‘conflict and power relations as the 
most effective point of departure for the fight against domination’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998, 224).  
The rise of markets led thinkers such as Adam Smith, to suggest social activities ‘without 
the intervention of government’ (Calhoun, 1993, p. 271). A successful political sphere 
‘depends on a favorable organisation of civil society’ (Calhoun, 1993, p. 274), whereas a 
public sphere is essential for citizens to express and exchange personal views, civil society 
is the ‘organised expressions of these views’ (Castells, 2008, p. 78); moreover, the 
identity ‘of the political community is a product, not simply a precondition, of the activity 
of the public sphere of civil society’ (Calhoun, 1993, p. 280). The Hegelian definition of 
civil society is based on the educative element of civil society, Foucault’s work suggests 
the role played by civil society in enforcing power and ‘exerting hegemony through 
consent in a way that is perhaps more subtle but no less authoritarian than the exertion 
of dictatorship through coercion’ (Hardt, 1995, p. 31).  
Civil society is defined by Diamond (1999, p. 21) as ‘the realm of organised social life that 
is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, and autonomous 
from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.’ Civil society includes 
NGOs, informal networks and formal organisations engaged in public action, in order to 
bring about social change.  Scholars such as Diamond (1992) and Hadenius (1992) 
postulate that democratic countries tend to be wealthy and enjoy high literacy rates; 
however, if these were the only criteria, then the GCC states (comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) would be democratic, par 
excellence, as the adult literacy rate in this region is over 90 per cent; in addition, their 
GDP has been increasing annually by an average of 5 per cent since 1998. This rate of 
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growth is expected to continue until 2020, thanks to the higher crude oil prices boosting a 
nominal GDP of more than $1 trillion USD (Baabood, 2011). 
The increase in voluntary and civil society organisations does not in itself guarantee a 
higher degree of political freedom, as postulated by Gill (2000); for instance, Egypt has 
witnessed a significant increase in this voluntary sector; in fact, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria 
and Lebanon have the highest number and most active civil societies in the region (Yom, 
2005). 
The reason for this is that regimes, particularly authoritarian ones, can exercise a number 
of methods to restrict civil society organisations; for instance, they can promote them as 
long as the they do not question the power of the state. The state can exercise its 
coercive power if they do so, by shutting down organisations or even imprisoning activists 
such as was the case with the Egyptian-American activist, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who was 
incarcerated in 2001 and his human rights centre was shut down for three years. Other 
methods include imposing robust regulations to control activism before it shows 
threatening signs, or setting up organisations that mimic civil societies such as the 
National Council for Human Rights in Egypt  (Yom, 2005). 
Civil society is also associated with certain virtues such as charity, volunteering, and 
altruism. This could also be seen as an arena for political and social actors who promote 
their own interests and needs. Cohen and Arato (1992) see civil society as the sphere 
between the market and the state, thus free of both market pressures and colonisation. It 
is perhaps for this reason that civil society in the Western tradition is categorised as the 
non-profit sector.  
Giffen et al. (2005) divide previous definitions of civil society into roughly two 
categories: the neo-liberal approach and the alternatives. The neo-liberal approach 
refers to the view of seeing civil society as an instrument in the development of good 
governance, and it sees NGOs and similar organisations as the bedrock of such civil 
society, which aim at strengthening democracy and delivering services to citizens. Here, 
civil society is seen to roll back the position of the state, and civil society associations 
working in partnership with both the market and the state, but are defined in contrast to 
the state. That view also draws on Robert Putnam’s concept of social capital (1993) 
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where associations involve citizens in collective action, thereby contributing to good 
governance as well as a thriving economy. This neo-liberal approach is seen as deeply 
engrained in Western developmental agenda, promoting civil society associations in the 
developing world with the aim of building social capital and facilitating liberal political 
and economic reforms (see also Howell & Pearce, 2001).  
 
The alternative approach, on the other hand, goes beyond seeing civil society as a 
collection of organisations; instead, it sees it as a force of empowerment and change 
through people’s participation. ‘People’ here refers to all categories of citizens, including 
women and marginalised groups, not only associations and organisations. Harmsen 
(2008, p. 19) argues that the revival of this approach emerged during the 1980s and 
1990s when Western donors criticised the idea of state-led modernisation in the 
developing world. This approach was built on the concept of the public sphere as a 
space for rational and critical debate amongst a diverse group of actors, with the aim of 
influencing policy-making. Gaventa (2003) also endorses this alternative definition by 
seeing participation in debate as pivotal to democracy and exercising the right to vote in 
political elections. This view is also based on diving the public sphere into closed space 
(where decisions are made by the elites), invited space (elections in which citizens 
participate through pre-defined processes) and claimed or created space carved out by 
civil society groups (Giffen et al., 2005).  
 
This is not far from Wiktorowicz’s (2000, p. 43) definition of civil society as 
[…] the constellation of associational forms that occupy the terrain between individuals and 
the state. It is viewed as a mechanism of collective empowerment that enhances the ability 
of citizens to protect their interest and rights from arbitrary or capricious state power. 
Wiktorowicz states that in Jordan, for instance, even ‘small talk’ in social gatherings is an 
opportunity to discuss politics (2000, p. 50); despite the proliferation of civil society 
activities in the country, the Jordanian regime has managed to control and closely 
monitor these activities through legal codes and regulation (p. 57).  
Kaldor (2003) distinguishes between three definitions of civil society: (i) activist version: 
engagement in opposing state repression; (ii) neo-liberal version: associated with ideas 
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about the non-profit sector which is located between the state and the market, in order 
to minimise state intervention and based on trust and social interaction; and (iii) post-
modern version: ‘a more culturally sensitive concept which involves various national and 
religious groupings and a contestation of narratives’ (Kaldor, 2003, p. 10). Civil society 
actors are usually seen as non-representative, as their status is not based on public 
nomination and voting (Kaldor, 2003, p. 6). Kaldor provides a typology of civil society 
actors based on four types: social movements, NGOs, social organisations, and nationalist 
or religious groups. The focus of the first type is to emancipate the poor whose activism is 
based on protests, and their organisations are characterised by their loose network 
structure, compared to the other three  types.  
Civil society is based on trust and inclusion, similar to social movements. Public 
communication plays a vital role in fostering civil society as citizens need to communicate 
and debate with one another, either through the use of public media, such as print and 
broadcasting, or alternative media sources (Bratton, 1994, p. 2-3). Wael Ghonim 
illustrated this importance of trust when he recounted his correspondence with an 
activist in Cairo, who was able to identify the whereabouts of Ghonim from his IP address 
in Dubai; although they were co-ordinating ‘Silent Stand’ (‘We are all Khaled Said’) 
demonstrations, they were still cautious; as Ghonim put it:  
the problem was that with my IP address in hand, he could easily locate my home as well. I 
tried to defuse the situation. I sent him a smiley face and told him I was using the software 
Tor: I could have been in Norway, or Iceland, or Switzerland, and the software would hide me. 
He did not believe me and asked me to relax, as he didn’t plan on telling anyone […] the last 
thing I wanted was for someone I did not know to obtain details about my personal life. But 
to my relief, this episode ended in peace (2012, p. 3) 
Trust here refers to the belief that citizens (within the same group) would not aim to 
deliberately harm one another but would join forces in working towards a collective goal, 
in this case, ousting Mubarak. To nurture this trust, it is important that people become 
more involved in voluntary activities to meet each other and learn how to trust one 
another (Newton, 2001, p. 202). Trust then is the ‘main component of social capital and 
social capital is a necessary condition of social integration, economic efficiency, and 
democratic stability’ (Newton, 2001, p. 202). Putnam (1993, p. 176) argues that ‘social 
capital, as embodied in horizontal networks of civic engagement, bolsters the 
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performance of the polity and the economy, rather than the reverse: strong society, 
strong economy; strong society, strong state’. Egyptians’ involvement in voluntary 
organisations, including charitable enterprises, varies, therefore, it is important to take 
the local context and this variation into consideration, before applying Western ideas and 
concepts such as ‘public sphere’ or ‘civil society’, when accounting for the diverse facets 
of public resistance and collective action in Egypt. It is important, therefore to consider all 
types of groupings which could generate collective action and citizen engagement, 
including bowling clubs, for instance.  
Trust has been absent in the Egyptian political sphere, at least prior to 2011, due to the 
wide-spread corruption of Mubarak’s regime. One stark example of this mistrust is of 
Ahmed Ezz, the steel tycoon and confidant of Gamal Mubarak. Ezz had an illegal 
monopoly on steel, according to Egyptian consciousness, based on his relationship with 
the regime and the Mubaraks. Not only did he win this lucrative business monopoly due 
to this  relationship, Ezz also amassed political power, as, it was claimed, he was the 
architect behind the fraudulent 2010 parliamentary elections. Ezz was the leading figure 
in Mubarak’s National Democratic Party and was Secretary for Organisational Affairs. Ezz 
denied any corruption in his interviews with the media, and pointed instead, to the role 
played by businessmen in raising the standard of living in Egypt. One example he 
mentioned in one of his interviews with Al-Masry Al-Youm in 2009 was the rising sales of 
cars in Egypt (from 80,000 in 2003 to 300,000 in 2008) which, for him, was an indication 
of the improving financial conditions of middle-class Egyptians (Schenker, 2011, 82 p. 3); 
indeed, if citizens do not trust their parliament, which is their representative institution, 
then this marks a serious flaw in the process of political participation and a serious breach 
of trust and confidence in such an institution (Newton, 2001: 205). 
Autonomy is another important characteristic of civil society: 
 autonomy from traditional politics seems to be a prerequisite for oppositional advocacy [...] 
civil society is treated as an autonomous sphere of social power within which citizens can 
pressure authoritarians for change, protect themselves from tyranny, and democratise from 
below (Foley & Edwards, 1996,  p. 46). 
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Wael Ghonim’s Facebook page, ‘We are all Khaled Said’, provides an example of 
mobilising young people who need an online presence and visibility as well as a moral 
and political purpose (Gerodimos, 2008, p. 983).  Gerodimos argues: 
The first steps in mobilising young people and building their sense of efficacy should 
include showing the moral importance of an issue, the links of the issue to the 
individual’s everyday life, the existence of participation tools that can really make a 
difference, and the likely outcomes or benefits of that participation (2008, p. 967). 
It is important to highlight that civil society is not synonymous with ‘society’ at large, 
because, in contrast to the latter, civil society consists of citizens who ‘act collectively in a 
public sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas [...] to hold state 
officials accountable’ (Diamond, 1999, p. 221). These citizens (or activists) show 
dedication to their causes, usually centring on relaxing rigid legislation or lifting welfare 
standards, and thus, such civil actions are seen as the cure for many socio-economic ills.  
It is particularly in developing states such as the Arab ones that civil society organisations, 
especially within the political and human rights fields, are seen as playing a pivotal role in 
pushing for democratic reforms and political change in the region. These organisations 
are also seen as helping to improve inadequate state services, particularly charity 
organisations, as will be discussed below.  
Salamon et al. (1999) state that there has been a surge of studies about civil society, 
which is also known as the voluntary sector, third or independent sector, or non-profit 
sector (p. 3). These associations can be defined as those which operate in the private 
realm, are separate and independent from the state, not interested in profit-making, and 
their membership is voluntary (pp. 3-4).  
The advance in communication technology has stimulated this surge as well as the 
expansion of an educated middle-class. Its role has increased in importance as it operates 
in ‘a “middle way” between sole reliance on the market and sole reliance on the state’ (p. 
5). Salamon et al. (1999, p. 21) show the patterns of non-profit structures in twenty-two 
countries around the world, ranging from education-dominant in countries such as the 
U.K., Israel and Mexico, health-dominant in the U.S. and Japan, social services-dominant 
in France and Germany, culture-dominant in Slovakia and Romania, and balanced in 
Finland and Australia. The major source of funding in such structures is the public 
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support, and not private philanthropy, as might be expected (p. 24). Employment levels in 
this sector have also out-paced those in other market-based sectors.  
3.3 Civil society in Egypt –definition and role 
This section begins with the definition of civil society in a country such as Egypt, 
characterised as being a Muslim and developing nation, and is followed by a historical 
overview of the rise of civil society in Egypt. 
 
Civil society is termed as mujtama’ahli (or people’s society) in Muslim societies, such as 
those in the Arab region, and includes, for example, trade unions and awqaf 
(endowments), which aim to help families and individuals (Harmsen, 2008, p. 47). These 
societies, however, are usually barred from expressing political views, which 
consequently confines their work to welfare services. It is remarkable, however, that 
state authoritarianism seems to be mirrored in many of these associations’ 
organisational hierarchy (Harmsen, 2008, p.  414). State control is therefore one of the 
important aspects of civil society’s function in the Arab region; another is the fact that 
the state usually relies on welfare associations, typically religious charities, to provide 
services to marginalised groups, which relieves part of the state’s burden in delivering 
social care (Harmsen, 2008, pp. 74-5).  
 
Several Islamist movements set up civil society organisations in Egypt from students’ 
unions to trade unions and charity associations, drawing on the rhetoric that Islam 
provides guidance and concrete action to develop society from within. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, for instance, the largest Islamist movement in Egypt (and the Arab region) 
managed to dominate several trade unions such as those representing doctors and 
engineers by the early 1990s. This involvement not only helped these movements to gain 
insight into the citizens’ needs, but it also allowed them to build responsive organisations 
(Berman, 2003); more importantly, however, it also helped these movements to avoid 
government crackdowns, because it was difficult for the government to monitor all local 
associations. Berman (2003, p. 266) argues that Egypt does not need stronger civil 
societies, rather, it needs ‘more effective and responsive political institutions.’  
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The last decade has also seen the rise of several youth organisations supported by 
modern Islamic preachers such as Amr Khaled. These organisations combine welfare 
activities with human development, with the aim of  mobilising young people to become 
more involved in local communities (Lei Sparre & Petersen, 2007, p. 90).  
Scholarly interest in civil society was reflected in a symposium about Arab civil society 
arranged by the Centre for Arab Unity Studies in Beirut in 1992, and, in the same year, 
the Ibn Khaldoun Centre for Developmental Studies in Cairo produced a newsletter on 
‘Civil Society: Democratic Transformation in the Arab World’ (Al-Sayyid, 1993, p. 228). 
Civil societies in Egypt include professional syndicates, NGOs working on enhancing 
training and education, human rights activists, women’s movements, and informal groups 
such as youth leagues (Yom, 2005). There are around 23 trade unions in Egypt, of which 
21 are for educated professionals such as lawyers and journalists. Protest activities 
carried out by any association were usually led by dissenting unionists, rather than being 
arranged by the union leadership (Al-Sayyid, 1993, p. 232). The irony in Egypt is that the 
state has allowed the establishment of civil society agents and  actors, yet shows 
intolerance for the practice of freedom of speech (Al-Sayyid, 1993, p. 229). 
Egyptian trade syndicates used to play an important role as a platform for voicing political 
opposition during the 1980s and 1990s. Their elections were relatively fair, and that 
period witnessed the rise of Muslim Brotherhood members into leading roles in several 
syndicates. Syndicates and trade unions also suffered from government interference, 
however, in an attempt to block the Brotherhood members from winning elections in 
various unions. The state’s response was to impose new legislation which placed unions 
under government administration, (particularly during Nasser’s era), if the elections did 
not have high voter turnout. The state facilitated the election of its own supporters on 
other occasions, especially amongst members of the ruling party at the time, The 
National Democratic Party (Langohr, 2004, p. 187). Another law issued in 1992 placed the 
board of syndicate directors under government control, which further diminished civil 
liberties in Egypt (El-Gawhary, 2000, p. 39). State interference continued by the 
imposition of law 156 of 1999 to regulate the NGOs and control the right to form 
associations. The government assigned the task of approving or rejecting the formation 
of associations to the Ministry of Social Affairs, especially those in receipt of foreign 
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donations: foreign funding was important for the NGOs, not only regarding the limited 
state assistance available, but also to ensure independence from government 
institutions. The State, on the other hand, declared in 1999 that the NGOs’ acceptance of 
foreign donations created a channel for outside interference in Egyptian affairs: it would 
allow other nations to disrupt the Egyptian political process, according to the Minister of 
Social Affairs ((Al-Gawhary, 2000, p. 39).  
 
The Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) launched a raid on several 
NGO offices in Cairo on 29 December 2011, following the January 25 uprising, in a 
crackdown on several human rights associations primarily funded by the U.S. and 
European NGOs. The crackdown came after a massive media campaign, particularly in 
state-owned media, accusing them again of allowing foreign donors to meddle in 
Egyptian matters, particularly in the critical times following the uprising (Yerkes, 2012).  
The rise of civil society associations in Egypt came as a result of the deteriorating 
economic and social conditions as well as the lack of political and civil rights, which 
culminated in the 1980s with the rise of violent Islamic jihad groups. These groups carried 
out many assassinations, including that of former President Sadat in 1980, harming the 
tourism industry and decimating Egyptian revenues for at least a decade. The economic 
reforms imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also led to harsh privatisation 
programmes, the massive lay-off of workers coupled with considerable price rises. This 
situation resulted in the poverty rate of the population in Egypt to increase from 21 per 
cent to 44 per cent between 1990 and 1996 (Langohr, 2004, p. 186).   
Women’s groups also appeared, such as Arab Women’s Solidarity Association, founded in 
1982 by the famous activist, Nawal Al-Saadawi. A year later, the Arab Organisation of 
Human Rights was set up in Cairo, thereby becoming the first human rights group in 
Egypt. The number of such groups has increased significantly since then, including 
associations that focus on prisoners’ rights and torture, and, after the revolution, new 
groups surfaced that  focused on the legitimacy of putting the revolutionaries on military 
trial. 
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The voluntary sector in Egypt reached its peak  during the period beginning in 1920 until 
the Free Officers’ coup d’état in 1952; many associations were closed under Nasser’s 
regime, after the state imposed several restrictions on them, such as Law 32 of 1964 to 
regulate them. Some associations managed to operate under these legislative conditions 
by changing the ‘label’ of their activities. Associations were normally required to apply for 
permission to operate, which could be denied without good reason; even if the 
permission were granted, the associations would have to inform the Ministry of Social 
Affairs of all activities, including meetings, minutes of meetings and fund-raising activities 
but excluding membership dues. Religious (Islamic) voluntary associations were generally 
allowed to work, and the state was reluctant to hamper them, mainly because their work 
centred on providing social services to the deprived population (Langohr, 2004, p. 193).  
Those hit by the state laws were the human rights and advocacy associations, but some 
of them re-registered themselves as civil companies (Langohr, 2004, p. 193). Foreign 
donors such as the American Agency for International Development (USAID), the major 
donor for Egypt, called for less restrictive legislation and offered the government a 
package of several million dollars dedicated to the purpose of revamping the law, but the 
state declined it. Other European donors such as the Netherland Organisation for 
International Development Cooperation, expressed similar concerns with the restrictive 
legislations, but the government responded by only allowing NGOs more freedom in 
raising money within Egypt (Langhor, 2004, p. 194).  
The NGOs reacted to the restrictive laws by forming an alliance with other similar 
organisations from twelve governorates entitled the Civic Forum. Their meetings were 
attended by a few members of parliament in 1998, who promised to discuss Law 32 in 
the People’s Assembly, and in 1999, Law 153 was issued in its place.  This replacement 
law, known as the Law on Civil Associations and Institutions, recognised the freedom of 
association while balancing it with the state’s right to monitor the NGOs. The then 
Minister of Social Affairs, Mirvat Al-Tilawi, announced that Law 153 abolished 22 clauses 
of Law 32, such as the requirement that NGOs should seek governmental permission to 
own real estate outside of their geographical areas, as well as reducing the state’s power 
to appoint board members (Alexander, 2000). What also contributed to this change was 
the campaign that delegitimised the state’s power to reject the establishment of NGOs, 
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on the grounds that they were politically active (Langohr, 2004, p. 195). The revised law, 
however, was a matter of concern for human rights organisations, such as the Egyptian 
Organisation for Human Rights and Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, pointing in 
particular to article 8 of the law which gave the government powers to ‘harass’ NGOs that 
criticised state policies on the pretext that these organisations may be violating public 
order, and also the vague interpretation of what constituted such an order (Alexander, 
2000).  
Women’s and human rights groups also threatened to move their offices to Geneva, as 
the laws made it difficult to operate within Egypt (Langohr, 2004, p. 196).  The Egyptian 
government issued Law 84 in 2002 to release some of the restrictions contained in Law 
132. The new law gave the state the power to dissolve NGOs if their activities were 
considered to interfere with public morals (Hassan, 2011); thus, the law maintained the 
powers of the state to dissolve NGOs and to scrutinise their leaders and funding (Human 
Rights Watch, 2005). The grounds for such interference were the ‘protection of public 
order’, a popular and ambiguous term often used by the state. The government therefore 
upheld its power, not only to approve or reject NGOs, but also to monitor activities and 
detain leaders; for instance, in April 2003, Ashraf Ibrahim Marzuq was detained for three 
and half months, before appearing in front of the Emergency Higher State Security Court, 
accused of being on the steering committee of a revolutionary socialist group, and 
sending false information to overseas organisations; he was jailed and released in March 
2004 (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Some scholars (Ottaway, 2003, p. 3) called the former 
regime ‘semi-authoritarian’, in that it was able to consolidate its authoritarianism while 
simultaneously applying liberal measures such as allowing NGOs to operate in Egypt.  It is 
generally argued that Islamic organisations, which are usually excluded from Western 
funding, have a stronger base compared to secular ones (Mustapha, 2000). Other 
scholars (Hassan, 2011, p. 3) postulate that Egypt is a soft state where laws do not apply 
because wealthy people can escape criticism and punishment owing to their money and 
power. Hassan (2011, p. 3) gives an example of the earthquake of 1992 which paralysed 
the state and exposed its failure to deal with the resulting severe housing problems, 
leaving ample opportunity for the Muslim Brotherhood to open shelters and provide 
medical aid for the victims.  
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Egypt has a large number of civil society organisations, estimated to have reached more 
than 27,000 in 2007, and it is assumed by the Egypt 2008 Human Development report 
that 70 per cent of these associations were concentrated in urban governorates such as 
Cairo and Alexandria, while poorer regions had far fewer. There were more than 30,000 
civil society organisations in Egypt by 2008, or one for every 2,800 Egyptians, and  
religious and development associations made up roughly half of that number.  There 
were about 138 human rights associations concentrated in Cairo and Giza, which is why 
they were seen as elitist and incapable of representing the widest societal base. They 
usually depended on funding from foreign donors, which cast doubt on their 
independence (Hassan, 2011).  
The majority of associations are classified as service and welfare organisations, and 
include religious associations such as the Coptic Evangelic Organisation, Al-Resala 
(‘Message’), and Friends of Cancer Patients. Islamic civil society in Egypt has witnessed 
dramatic growth in the last decade, such as Al-Resala which depended on young people 
as volunteers (Sparre, 2008). One of the most important religious groups was the Muslim 
Brotherhood which was active across Egypt. There were also a steady increase in the 
number of philanthropic establishments such as Sawiras Foundation, set up by the 
Egyptian businessman, Naguib Sawiras, Vodafone Foundation and EFG-Hermes 
Foundation. Other organisations included women’s associations as well as human rights 
groups which promoted knowledge and awareness about women and human rights. 
There were more than 60 Human Rights groups in Egypt, according to the figures of 2007, 
including the Egyptian Association for Personal Rights and the Egyptian Organisation for 
Human Rights; in addition, there were associations concerned with environmental and 
consumer protection issues, trade and industry groups to support businesses and private 
enterprise such as the Businessmen’s Association, Businesswomen’s Association and 
Chapter of Commerce. There were also a number of youth centres and associations 
managed by the National Council for Youth, such as the Youth Association for Population 
and Development. This provided opportunities and venues for young people to socialise. 
Federations existed to ensure collaborative and collective work among NGOs, such as the 
Egyptian Youth Federation and the General Federation of NGOs. Professional syndicates 
also constituted one of the well-established types of NGOs, serving a number of 
73 
 
professionals and workers including the Bar Association (founded in 1912), Judges Club 
(founded in 1939), Journalists Syndicate (founded in 1941), Engineers syndicate (founded 
in 1946), Dentists, Pharmacists and Veterinarians (founded in 1949), Actors and Artists 
(founded in 1955), Accountants and Auditors syndicate (founded in 1955), Nursing 
Professionals (founded in 1976), Tour Guides syndicate (founded in 1983), Sports 
professionals (founded in 1987), and so on.  
A report by the World Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS) stated that nearly half of 
the civil society associations registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs in 2004 was 
inactive. CIVICUS also acknowledged the spread of religious associations and their 
contributions (whether monetary or goods and services) to charity. It also stated that 
many associations lacked not only financial resources but also technical and human 
resources (CIVICUS, 2004, p. 7). CIVICUS defines civil society as ‘the arena, outside of the 
family, the state and the market, where people associate to advance common interests’ 
(CIVICUS 2004) and as per this definition, the organisation provides the following types of 
associations as examples of civil society in Egypt:  
1. Philanthropic Organisations 
2. Development Organisations 
3. Human Rights Organisations 
4. Business Associations 
5. Chambers of Commerce 
6. Co-operatives 
7. Professional Syndicates 
8. Trade Unions 
9. Youth Centres 
10. Sports Clubs 
11. Women’s Organisations 
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12. Faith-based Organisations 
13. Churches and Mosques 
14. Other organisations registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs 
Some of these associations are also claimed to be elitist in terms of their membership and 
leadership, which exclude the poor and women (CIVICUS, 2004, p. 80).  Many of them try 
to deal with immediate and practical problems, rather than seeking solutions to acute 
structural causes behind these problems (ibid.). Civil society institutions in Egypt 
generally aim to fulfil certain objectives: (i) to contribute to democratic reform; (ii) to 
contribute to combating poverty; and (iii) to empower women and promote their 
economic and political participation (Kandil, 2010, pp. 8-9). 
Hassan (2011) provides a historical account of the evolution of civil society in Egypt, 
dividing it into five stages: (i) (1821-1881) the working and middle-class demanding their 
right to form associations;  (ii) the ‘colonial phase’ (1882-1922) in which associations, 
trade unions, cooperatives and political parties allied in order to defend the interests of 
Egyptian citizens; (iii) the liberal phase (1922-1952) following the adoption of the 
constitution of 1923 guaranteeing basic freedoms; during that time, more than 80 
newspapers appeared, and civil society called for the government to introduce more 
democratic reforms such as free elections and transparency. This phase was ended by the 
Free Officers seizing power in 1952; (iv) the Nasserite phase (1952-197) marked the 
state’s forceful intervention, concentrating power in the hands of the governing elite. The 
trade unions were grouped into a Federation of Trade Unions, and a new law was 
imposed in 1964, giving the state the right to disband or refuse the creation of any civil 
society associations; and (v) the ‘Open Door’ policies which started in 1974 and were still 
current at the time of writing this thesis (2015); although many more organisations have 
been set up since the mid-1970s, the state has continued to impose its control via various 
laws and means (Hassan, 2011).  
The Egyptian defeat in the 1967 war with Israel unleashed massive public discontent, 
particularly among the Marxist left, shown in the series of outbursts by students and 
workers in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Some of this movement’s leaders came from 
the Nasserite establishment, the Arab Socialist Union and the Organisation of Socialist 
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Youth. They showed sympathy towards the old communist groups, such as the Egyptian 
Communist Party and the Democratic Movement of National Liberation which were 
persecuted under Nasser. The majority of the Marxist movement, however, included 
young workers, professionals and students who did not belong to the Nasserite 
establishment or to the old communist movement; in fact, they were critical of the Soviet 
Union’s role in the Middle East (Lachine, 1977, p. 4). The protests continued well after the 
1973 war, despite the partial victory of the Egyptian army, and were largely due to 
corruption and deteriorating economic and living conditions. There was also widespread 
discontent with the security forces and their ruthless approach to protests and 
gatherings. The year 1975 witnessed massive riots, after the government refused to 
consider the demands of the workers in Helwan region via their trade unions. The regime 
accused the communist movement of triggering the riots, especially since the Communist 
Party announced its comeback in the same year, which also coincided with a two-week 
strike by textile workers. This followed a strike by transport workers in Cairo, which was 
aggressively stopped by the security forces, resulting in the killing of many workers and 
the arrest of several more. University students also led a peaceful march to the People’s 
Assembly to demand an end to the rigid legislation on human and individual rights, 
including the right to demonstrate and strike. They also wanted the regime to stop 
interfering in trade unions and other professional associations, but again, the security 
forces intervened and ended the march; meanwhile, the state-controlled media 
broadcast claims that the strikes and events were caused by gangs of criminals (Lachine, 
1977, p. 5).  
The state’s imposition of new legislation not only affected NGOs, but also civil society 
associations calling for radical political, economic, and social change. 
3.4 Cases of civil society associations 
Examples and a discussion of other movements and civil societies in Egypt - most of 
which were centralised in the capital and Alexandria – are presented below.  
20 March for Change movement: founded in 2003, following the American war in Iraq. 
Egypt witnessed massive demonstrations in Tahrir Square prior to the war, and the 
square was used as a platform for one day, 20 March 2003. The movement made the 
following demands: end oppression and dictatorship, end corruption, fight Zionism.  
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Workers for Change: founded in 2006 as a protest against the massive privatisation plans, 
following the prescription of the IMF, resulting in the laying- off of thousands of workers 
or forcing them into early retirement. Their demands were to increase the minimum 
wage, commit the state to employing university graduates, penalise the use of child 
labour for children under 16, increase safety measures in factories, and ensure the 
workers’ rights to form or join unions.  
The Egyptian Campaign for Change: founded in 2004, embraced diverse national parties 
and associations from all walks of life such as the Socialists, Muslim Brotherhood, 20 
March movement, Communist Party, Ayman Nour, the National Arab Women Solidarity 
Association, Islamic Media Watch London, a number of human rights centres, and 
individual journalists, lawyers, university professors and actors. Their main demands were 
to force political reforms and end the plan to pass on the presidency to Mubarak’s son.  
Doctors for Change: founded in 2005, demanding the lifting of the emergency laws, 
ending torture in prisons and also ending Mubarak’s rule at the next elections.  
The National Association to Defend Egypt’s Wealth: founded in 2008, calling for an 
assessment of Egypt’s resources and to stop exploiting them for the benefit of the ruling 
elite. Chief among their demands was to stop the export of natural gas to Israel which 
was said to be sold for a fraction of its market price. One leading figure in this movement 
was Abou Al-Ezz Al-Hariri, MP and former presidential candidate in 2012.  
Solidarity with Asbestos workers: founded in 2004, embracing workers in the factories of 
‘10th Ramadan’ city, where many workers opposed the use of asbestos, which was 
banned in Egypt, but was still imported for manufacturing purposes, and was claimed to 
cause major side effects when inhaling airborne asbestos fibres. The movement 
demanded the release of their salaries which were withheld by the employers and the 
introduction of health and safety measures in the factories, especially after 46 workers 
were diagnosed with cancer.  
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3.5 Civic engagement and social media 
One key question for this project is how new and social media have transformed 
collective action in Egypt, and whether they have equipped social movements to 
challenge the Egyptian authoritarian regime. The internet has the capacity to create more 
networking opportunities for activists and citizens, in general, as well as to form alliances 
and groups more visible to the general public. The significance of new and particularly 
social media, is the fact that they do not need to be run by professionals, amateurs are 
equally capable, thereby challenging the typical role of gatekeepers (Mehanna, 2010).  
Bloggers, for instance, have attracted a great deal of attention from regional and global 
media since 2006; for example, Al-Jazeera channel ran an episode about Egyptian 
bloggers in May 2006, by interviewing the veteran journalist, Mohamed Hassanien Heikal, 
who admitted to avidly following one of those bloggers much more than he had ever 
followed known journalists (Mehanna, 2010). The state responded with robust 
prosecution of these bloggers by arresting and imprisoning many of them; one example is 
the blogger, Kareem Amer, who was sentenced to four years in prison for insulting Islam 
and defaming the president, in his blog (Mehanna, 2010). The government was able to 
block IP addresses as well as introduce a new registration process in which each visitor to 
an internet café had to scratch a card to obtain access, and also had to fill out a form with 
personal information. This mainly applied to cafés in less privileged neighbourhoods and 
was introduced in 2008, while coffee shops used by the upper and middle-class were left 
unmonitored (Mehanna, 2010).  
Wolfsfeld et al. (2013) have assessed the role of social media in collective action, focusing 
on the recent ‘Arab Spring’. They argue that understanding the overall political context is 
pivotal in this assessment, and that the use of new and social media in protests follows, 
rather than precedes, offline protest activities; in this sense, politics comes first, they 
argue, in that it has to be included in the analytical framework, in order to understand 
collective action, rather than claiming that the media sphere is separate from the political 
process. They give the example of the so-called ‘Twitter revolution’ in Iran in 2009, as it 
was depicted by Western media, although Twitter was only used by fewer than 9,000 
Iranians out of a population of seventy million. Some scholars and others are also 
optimistic about the role of new and social media mobilisation (Shirky, 2011), while there 
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are those who downplay the significance of technology in political mobilisation (Morozov, 
2011). The important factor then is not technology, as shown by the Gulf States, which 
are ‘high-tech’ societies but have low levels of protest (Howard, 2011). Norris (2004) 
argues that social networking played a crucial role in facilitating collective action, long 
before social media were created. People can join in sporadic protests as a manifestation 
of their anger, while those joining in systematic collective action often share similar 
interests and can be more organised in their protests (Tilly, 2011). Societies with stronger 
network ties are claimed to experience collective action more than those with weaker 
ties; thus, a citizen is likely to participate in an organised protest if he or she resides 
within the same area of like-minded friends who encourage his or her participation 
(McAdam & Paulsen, 1993). Weak ties can help to spread the message across diffuse 
networks, while strong ties benefit from the bond created within the groups (McAdam & 
Paulsen, 1993); furthermore, Lerner (2010) argues that the use of the internet does not 
necessarily result in producing sufficient social capital or stronger ties needed for 
sustained social action; on the contrary, she adds that the abundance of uncontrolled 
information online may end up confusing the public and even providing inaccurate or 
misleading data (2010, p. 557). There is no replacement for face-to-face communication, 
therefore, in order to ensure a certain degree of solidarity, the bedrock for social action. 
Lerner also argues that a combination of both online and offline action can prove very 
effective in collective action, especially in authoritarian regimes in which the internet can 
provide an alternative media platform.  
Perez (2004) also argues that the internet can provide multiple forms of deliberation, 
thereby catering for different individual needs, and Witschge (2004, 110) regards the role 
of the internet as essential for promoting deliberation and encouraging dialogue amongst 
citizens. Deuze (2003, p. 211) argues that the internet provides ‘netizens’, or active users, 
with new platforms on which to communicate and exchange views with less censorship. 
This view is shared by Agre (2004), who also sees a new venue for political interaction in 
the internet. Citizens then can practice so-called ‘citizen journalism’ which is a challenge 
to traditional gatekeepers such as professional journalists, and which can develop 
citizens’ ability to communicate and deliberate (Leonard 1999; Nip 2006). The term 
usually refers to media content which is created by unpaid citizens and published in any 
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format on the internet, and it is sometimes referred to as ‘user-generated content' or 
‘participatory journalism’ (Gillmor, 2004); according to Hall (2006, p. 6): ‘[Cyber activism] 
today has become an alternative platform that offers voice and contact to those outside 
the mainstream media’. 
One example of a cyber activist is the Egyptian, Esraa Abdel Fattah, who started a 
Facebook group, not only in solidarity with the ‘April 6’ movement but also to mobilise 
support for the January 25 revolution. She expressed her views as follows:  
I wanted to do something positive for my country, and I thought of using Facebook 
because I got tired of participating in the civil society in the physical world given the 
restrictions that were put on it by the Mubarak regime. So, I thought the virtual 
world was more open and more conducive for political activism. I started a Facebook 
group on April 6, 2008, and I was calling for a general one-day strike as a sign of 
complaint about the high prices of basic goods. My idea coincided with the laborers' 
strike to complain about their poor living conditions. I joined efforts with Ahmed 
Maher, another political activist, and we formed the Facebook group that called for 
the strike. We chose April 6 because there was another strike that was organised by 
the laborers on December 6 of the previous year, and it was successful, and so we 
chose the sixth of the month as a good omen. Through the group, I called on people 
not to go to work on April 6 and to stay at home. I also called on people to do other 
things on that day, such as wearing black, hanging the Egyptian flag on their 
balconies and abstain from buying products (cited in El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2012). 
Abdel Fattah’s group attracted more than 77 thousand followers and Abdel Fattah, or The 
Facebook Girl, as she was known then, was arrested on charges of disrupting public life, 
and spent 18 days in prison. El-Nawawy & Khamis (2012) provide another example of 
female cyber activists, namely Asmaa Mahfouz, who posted a video on YouTube and 
Facebook, urging people to join the mass protests on 25 January 2011. She commented 
on her role as follows:  
The idea of the video originated when four Egyptians set themselves on fire on 
January 18, 2011 to complain about their deteriorating economic situations. And 
when one of them died, several people started calling on taking action to change 
the situation on the ground and break the political status quo. So, I announced on 
my Facebook page that I was going out to Tahrir Square to demonstrate and I 
called on people to join me and posted my cell phone number. Then, I went out 
to Tahrir Square on 18 January 2011, and I was joined by just three of my friends. 
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I carried a banner saying: 'Four Egyptians set themselves on fire because of 
poverty, humiliation and hunger.' And I started yelling at people and saying: 
'Come on Egyptians, join me and demonstrate against the suppression. When will 
you move? When will you take action?' Then, the state security started chasing 
and harassing me and they threatened to lock me up. In the course of all this 
action, I had to leave and headed straight to a human rights centre in downtown 
Cairo. Over there, I took my video camera out and said the same things that I was 
saying at Tahrir Square on the video. Then, I uploaded the video on Facebook and 
it started to get so much public attention, which I did not expect. On the video, I 
also called on people to protest on 25 January 2011. On the video, I did not 
specify demands, but I made it general by calling on people to go out asking for 
their rights and to regain their dignity. Since I posted the video, my mobile phone 
did not stop ringing. I posted my cell phone number in the video as well. I was 
also surprised that pamphlets were disseminated on the streets using my slogan 
of 'Go out and ask for your rights.'2 
 
3.5 Chapter summary  
The above discussion shows there are several definitions of civil society and how it 
functions in modern states. This research will adopt the so-called ‘alternative’ approach 
to civil society, namely, the way of seeing it as a realm of deliberation amongst 
individuals and groups, and not only of formal associations, aiming at empowering 
citizens and achieve genuine civic engagement. This approach seems relevant to the 
Egyptian context; although Egypt has a high number of NGOs and civil society 
associations, these are still very much under the control and monitoring of the state, 
which makes it imperative to include other forms of deliberation and civic engagement 
challenging this form of censorship.  
 
The 2011-uprising will be remembered for its theme of liberation from state-controlled 
media and propaganda, providing new forms of communication and deliberation 
(namely social and new media), if nothing else. This researcher sees new and social 
media as a created space for deliberation, and this approach will be a key theme in the 
fieldwork between interviews and youth. It is important to remember that the issue of 
                                                          
2 It is not possible to cite the page number, as this is an online article. 
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control and monitoring did not disappear after the uprising, however. The Foundation 
for the Future (2011) argues in its survey of a number of civil society organisations in 
Egypt post-2011, that such organisations are cautiously positive about the transition in 
Egypt, with many of them not having seen much improvement in the situation of civil 
society organisations, as censorship still prevailed. The main issues facing civil society 
and civic engagement in general, are therefore the lack of apparent leadership  in 
avoiding divisions between them, and also the fact that they have not provided a new 
model for change or a new roadmap for the future of Egypt, apart from toppling a 
regime or demanding the end of corruption.  
 
It is also important to state that this research does not take a deterministic view of new 
and social media as the main cause of collective action, nor does it deny the role of such 
media. The above discussion aimed at providing a fair and balanced assessment of the 
role this media has in political deliberation. The following chapters aim to illustrate the 
role of new and social media in facilitating discussions amongst citizens and, above all, in 
increasing visibility of groups and topics. The internet then is one variable that has to be 
seen in combination with the overall political, social and cultural context. It may be true 
that social media have facilitated new forms of interaction and dialogue amongst citizens, 
but scholars suggest there is no consistent correlation between the use of social media 
and successful collective action (Howard & Hussain, 2010; Faris, 2010). One important 
advantage of using social media maybe that it can easily attract the attention of 
international and regional media, especially if these outlets are unable to access the 
region, which can help boost the profiles of active users such as regular bloggers.  Korany 
and El-Mahdi (2012, pp. 10-12) argue that social media create a new political opportunity 
structure that attracts a large number of protesters at certain points in time, sharing 
certain objectives. Drawing on Assef Bayat’s notion of ‘quiet encroachment’ (Bayat, 
2009), Korany and El-Mahdy (2012) argue that analysing political movements in the 
region should not emphasise the politics of the elite but politics from below, or at 
grassroots level. Bayat (2009, p. 14) continues his argument by stating that young 
Egyptians can be mobilised to join protests when they are excluded from formal 
autocratic institutions, dominated by the political elites. This is an interesting perspective 
when applying it to the Egyptian context, as many of those joining the massive protests of 
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2011 did not have prior experience in political parties or movements, nor were they 
active as bloggers or social media activists.  
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Chapter Four 
Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned previously, this project deals with the impact of social media on political 
activism and social movements in Egypt. The preceding two chapters discussed the 
soaring number of blogs recorded over the past decade which led many communication 
scholars to analyse the new and social media through the lens of the public sphere theory 
(Castells, 2008, 90). Blogs from the Middle East have particularly received considerable 
notice (Fares, 2010).  
The Iranian citizen, Neda Agha-Soltan, for instance, caught the attention of global media 
with footage showing her collapsing to the ground during the post-election protests in 
Iran in 2009, especially after the footage went viral on YouTube (Mayfield, 2011), and 
similarly, the Lebanese Hezbollah’s use of social media during its fight against Israel in 
2006, helped to stir public opinion against Israel (Mayfield, 2011, p. 80).  It has been 
argued that blogging in China could be used as a weapon against the authoritarian regime 
which continues to find new ways to ban online political opposition (MacKinnon, 2008). 
The penetration of mobile phones, the internet, and social media across the Arab region 
has highlighted popular dissatisfaction with the authoritarian regimes, as well as the rise 
of so-called ‘cyber activism’, or ‘the act of using the internet to advance a political case 
that is difficult to advance offline [...] the goal [...] is often to create intellectually and 
emotionally compelling digital artefacts that tell stories of injustice, interpret history, and 
advocate for particular political outcomes’ (Howard, 2011, p. 145).  The recent uprisings 
since 2011 have sent shockwaves across the region, with protests in Algeria, Jordan and 
Bahrain during 2010 and 2011, and the continuing unrest in Syria and Yemen. It is here 
that the role of social media has received much attention in Western scholarship (as 
illustrated in the literature review chapter). The importance of new technology, it is 
argued, is not only in measuring the number of wired citizenry, but, more importantly, in 
revealing how citizens (activists or not) actually use such technology in the political 
process.  
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This project aims to propose answers to the following questions:  
(i) to what extent has the internet changed the political sphere in Egypt, 
allowing a more democratic environment?  
(ii) to what extent has the use of social media led to more collective action in 
Egypt?  
(iii) have social media facilitated the transformation of online activities into 
offline activism?  
(iv) how have social media contributed to attract the socially or politically 
marginalised groups in Egyptian society?  
This chapter discusses the methods of analysis adopted in this research which combines 
descriptive and analytical tools, based primarily on qualitative methodologies. Table 4.1 
maps the research questions onto methods and themes of analysis.  
This research adopts an integrative approach of inductive and deductive research. 
Inductive approach is defined as moving from the specific to the general and based on 
observations (a priori experience) (Trochim, 2006, p. 1); conversely, a deductive approach 
will move from the general to the specific and is best suited as a top-down approach in 
which the researcher works from a hypothesis to data (Creswell & Clark, 2007, p. 23). The 
inductive approach typically characterises qualitative research while deductive 
characterises quantitative research; in line with Creswell (2005), the approaches and 
methods have been adopted which are considered appropriate for this particular 
research, relevant to the research questions and relevant to this researcher’s experience 
and training. The analysis begins with a priori themes (or constructs) to guide the 
qualitative research, however, using existing constructs may compromise the ability to 
observe new emerging themes in the interviews and focus groups, thereby limiting the 
research findings; an integrative approach is therefore adopted, in which an examination 
is made for pre-identified themes in the fieldwork. Some flexibility is required regarding 
the semi-structured interviews for integrating additional emerging themes and constructs 
(such as the findings on alternative media in Chapter Seven). There is consensus with 
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Duneier in this respect, as he does not see a research approach as being strictly inductive 
or deductive, considering that some questions are ‘brought to the site from the 
beginning’, while others are ‘discovered through various routes’ (2002, p. 1566).  
The literature review identified three themes, explained in the previous chapter, which 
are relevant here: cyber activism, virtual public sphere, and the relationship between 
mainstream and social media; by using these themes as points of departure, the research 
hypotheses are presented  in table 4.1; it is important to mention, however, that these 
themes are combined with the themes that emerge in the fieldwork,  as explained in the 
discussion chapter.  
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Overall theme Sub themes 
 
Operationalized questions Method 
 
Cyber-activism  
 
 
Virtual public 
sphere  
 
Mainstream versus 
social media  
• Activism 
• Mobilisation 
• Political process 
• Knowledge 
How have social media changed the political sphere in Egypt? 
How have social media helped create new opportunities for political 
activity while avoiding political oppression? 
How have social media facilitated the mobilisation of collective action 
online and offline? 
 
Qualitative interviews   
 
Focus groups  
• Gatekeepers 
• Visibility 
• Centralised political 
process 
• Knowledge  
How have social media contributed to attract socially or politically 
marginalised groups in Egyptian society? 
 
In what way have social media helped generate coverage of marginalised 
topics and groups?  
 
Web content 
analysis  
 
Focus groups   
Table 4.1 mapping research questions against methods of analysis  
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•  
An attempt to propose answers to the above research questions by relying on 
triangulation which Norris recommends: ‘no single methodology can hope to capture 
the rich complexities of life on the Internet’ (2001. p. 36). A qualitative analysis has 
been the main research method for interviews and focus groups as they are both 
useful tools, not only to uncover social change but also the motivation of different 
social groups pioneering such change (Blee & Taylor, 2002, 96).  
 
4.2 Qualitative research 
Quantitative research is concerned with measuring instances of human behaviour or 
attitudes, and aims to document them from the point of view of the people concerned 
with this research (Hammersley, 1992, p. 166). Qualitative methods tend to be used 
‘to explore and assess things that cannot easily be summarised numerically’ (Priest, 
1996, p. 5), thereby challenging the view that quantitative techniques are the only 
tools that should be used to establish research validity because it can be based on a 
large sampling and statistics (Silverman, 2001, p. 7). This is not to say that qualitative 
research implies a higher ‘quality’ than quantitative research; in fact, combing 
different techniques can strengthen research methodology and reliability (Jensen, 
2002, p. 207). The choice between quantitative and qualitative methods, or the choice 
of combining them, should ‘depend upon what you are trying to find out at the end of 
your research’ (Silverman, 2001, p. 11).  
There is no doubt that quantitative research (or the positivist paradigm) dominated 
social science research during the 1950s and 1960s, which saw the world as a 
measurable objective sphere, but it failed to provide an in-depth understanding of 
human experience (McPherson & Leydon, 2002). The constructivist paradigm has 
gained a foothold since the late 1970s due to its emphasis on the need for new 
methods to explore problems about which very little is known, or where there is  a 
need to explore the wider context of the research topic, and where substantial 
88 
 
interaction is required between the researcher and research participants (Rodwell, 
1998). 
This research adopts a complementary use of qualitative and quantitative research 
methods, currently prevalent in media and communication research (Jensen, 2002, p. 
254), combining web content analysis with interviews and focus groups. The use of 
multiple data is deemed  to be a research technique ‘in which more than one method 
or more than one worldview is used’ (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003, p. 11) and 
contributes to improving the research findings. It is believed that this triangulation 
method of research could enhance the rigour of this project. Web content analysis 
provides more descriptive data and overall themes which are then explored in more 
depth in the interview and focus group methods. Multiple methods could help elicit an 
in-depth understating of the research topic (Denzin, 1994) and it could also add 
breadth to the investigation.  The following section elaborates on the use of interviews 
and focus groups as the selected qualitative method, and this is augmented with the 
use of web content analysis of a selected sample of Facebook groups. It is important to 
mention here, that the fieldwork was conducted over the course of three years (from 
2011 to 2014) and to bear in mind that this is a field in flux, as will be argued in the last 
part of this chapter. The interviews were carried out mostly in 2011 and a few in 2013 
and 2014, while the focus group discussions were conducted in 2014. This is mainly 
because this researcher mistakenly thought that these would be easier to arrange 
post-2011, given the euphoria felt among many Egyptians who would be happy to 
engage in political conversations; the fast-paced changes in the country, however, 
made people more suspicious of research (as explained later in this chapter). The web 
content analysis was carried out between 2013 and 2014, relying on historical archives 
of the selected Facebook groups.  
 
4.3 Interviews as a research tool 
Interviews can be defined as a method of collecting information from persons based 
on their background and focusing on their experiences and views (Busha and Harter, 
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1980). They can be carried out face-to-face, by telephone or other communication 
tools such as Skype. There are different types of interviews: structured, semi-
structured or unstructured (Saunders, 1997). The choice between these types would 
very much depend on the research topic under investigation and what the researcher 
seeks to obtain from the interviews. One advantage of using interviews, in contrast to 
quantitative surveys, is that researchers can usually eliminate answers such as ‘don’t 
know’, and interviews also give the researcher the chance to observe their 
interviewees while they respond to the questions. The disadvantage clearly lies in the 
fact that interviewing is usually time-consuming and can be costly if conducted in 
other geographical locations than where the researcher is based.  
Interviews conducted for this research can be classified as ethnographic interviews in 
that they aimed to immerse the researcher in the field, while directly observing the 
particular groups being studied (Rubin & Piele, 2005; Bentz & Shapiro, 1998). 
Interviews here were carried out as casual conversations with the participants, rather 
than a systematic interview with a pre-defined set of questions. A set of questions had 
been prepared by this researcher, but he was more concerned with maintaining the 
informality of the conversation than asking the informants pre-determined questions. 
It is this rapport between the researcher and informant which eases the conversation, 
especially about sensitive issues such as opposing authoritarian regimes, activism, or 
the informant’s views about the involvement of the military in Egypt.  This type of 
interview, therefore, can help uncover the way participants assess their experiences 
(Ortiz, 2003, p. 37), and as such, it can help the researcher to gain a better insight into 
the research topic while keeping control of the order of interview questions (Stacks, 
2011); it is also important to remember however, that such interviews may not 
necessarily reveal the informants’ values or unearth their ideologies (Silverman, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
20 interviews were arranged and recorded: 5 female and 15 male activists, all residing 
in Cairo, tabulated as follows: 
Name Gender 
 
Age Date of interview 
Tariq Male 41 15 June 2011 
Mustafa Male 29 15 June 2011 
Mona Female 34 1 July 2011 
Kholoud Female 36 1 July 2011 
Hala Female 43 17 June 2011 
Omar Male 33 17 June 2011 
Essam Male 32 16 Nov. 2012 
Ahmed Male 27 16 Nov. 2012 
Amr Male 28 8 Oct. 2012 
Ibrahim Male 56 8 Oct. 2012 
Ziad Male 37 14 Nov. 2012 
Sherine Female 43 19 Nov. 2013 
Taher Male 56 19 Nov. 2013 
Said Male 32 1 Dec. 2013 
Khaled Male 28 7 Dec. 2013 
Manal Female  28 7 Dec. 2013 
Karim Male 28 7 Dec. 2013 
Yasser Male 56 1 Dec. 2013 
Hosam Male 34 9 Feb. 2014 
Eyad Male 58 9 Feb. 2014 
 
The majority of interviewees were between 28 and 40 (13 informants) and the rest 
Xwere between 41 and 50+ (7 informants).  
The interviews were analysed as narratives constructed through interaction with 
participants and their views on the political process in Egypt, at a time of turbulent 
change (Berger 1997). Narrative analysis is an inherently inter-disciplinary approach, 
drawing on humanities and social sciences, borrowing from structural to thematic 
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analyses of information (Cortazzi, 1993). Narratives are stories, according to  Clandinin 
and Connelly (1994: 415) who state: ‘Stories are the closest we can come to 
experience as we and others tell our experiences […] is the stories people live. People 
live stories and in the telling of them reaffirm them, modify them, and create new 
ones’. The choice to analyse these narratives thematically has been made by probing 
the overall thematic categories shown in table 4.1 above. 
The process began by contacting a number of activists who were personally known to 
this researcher, and through a snowball technique, new contacts were accumulated 
from each of those activists. All interviewees and focus group participants were asked 
to give their consent. Their voluntary participation was clearly stated and there was no 
coercion to take part. The interviewees were informed about the research aims, 
methods and storage of data and their right to decline to participate in this research.  
Research ethics clearance was obtained for this project3. All interviews were 
conducted in Arabic and were transcribed. The transcripts were coded into broad 
themes based on the research objectives and interview questions.  The following 
chapters will elaborate on these themes. 
 
4.4 Focus groups as a research tool 
A focus group is defined as participants in a ‘carefully planned discussion designed to 
obtain perceptions in a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-threatening 
environment (Kreuger, 1998, p. 18). Each group discussion typically lasted for around 
one to two hours of conversation involving between six to twelve participants (Stewart 
& Shamdasani, 1990).  The number of groups can vary from one project to another, 
although some scholars recommend three groups, while others recommend only one 
group, in order to allow more time to observe the group dynamics (Moran, 1988, p. 
42). Three groups were chosen for the purposes of this project, based on the 
recommendations received from this researcher’s doctoral transfer seminar in 2013.  
                                                          
3 from two universities:  I requested to be transferred with my supervisor to a new university 
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The choice of focus group discussions as a method of analysis also reflects a belief in 
the constructivist paradigm, and its commitment to a human-centred approach which 
concentrates on how participants really perceive particular problems and their 
surrounding circumstances.  Focus group discussions therefore, supplement individual 
interviews, as group discussions provide a more active sociable conversation, inviting 
agreements and disagreements within a group, which is not possible to capture in one-
to-one interviews.  
There were three groups in total, and each group had six participants. Two of the 
groups (Groups A & B) belonged to the middle-class and upper-class and the last group 
(Group C) belonged to the lower middle-class. Group A had six male participants aged 
from 18 to 19, and all were private secondary school or private university students. 
Group B had six female participants aged 26 to 35, all of whom had had a university 
education but were not working, except one, who had a job in administration. Group C 
had six female participants aged between 18 to 21, and were all either state school or 
state university students.  
A note is due here about the Egyptian social class system: usually the middle-class is 
defined as those who have a greater social mobility compared to other social groups, 
and they are likely to demand more rights such as freedom of expression. The middle-
class is inclined to spend a large part of its income on education, especially foreign 
language schooling (Booz & Co, 2012). These classes also express less trust in the 
media and in state services which makes them ‘unable to act as a stabilising factor 
against external economic shocks’ (Booz & Co, 2012, p. 11). It may be difficult to 
differentiate The Egyptian middle-class from the Marxist tradition of an exploiting 
bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie (Kandil, 2012, p. 199). The groups included here 
who are defined as belonging to the upper middle-class have certain things in 
common: their affiliation with English colleges or universities in Cairo and they live in 
upper middle-class neighbourhoods (Mellor, 2015, ch. 3), while the participants in the 
last focus group attended state schools and state universities and lived in more 
modest neighbourhoods than the previous groups.  
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Careful attention was paid to the group consensus in analysing the data, as well as to 
latent disagreements expressed within each group (Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999). A 
choice was made to analyse this data thematically, reading through each group script 
several times before mapping the data onto emerging themes. Several participants 
were quoted in each extract in order to provide a broader context for the analysis and 
choice of themes, instead of merely focusing on isolated individual comments. Each 
group discussion was transcribed verbatim and read through many times to ensure the 
understanding of the dynamics of discussion (Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999).  Notes 
were then taken about each manuscript in order to identify emerging themes, and 
each reading would help to narrow down the number of themes (tabularised above).  
It only remains to say that both interviews and focus group discussions were 
accompanied by field notes and observations, which, according to Myers, have the 
advantage of leading to a more nuanced interpretation of the collected data (1999, p. 
2). Observations helped this researcher to become even more familiar with his field of 
research and the relationships participants form as activists and citizens (Grills, 1998, 
3). The number of interviewees and focus group participants is limited, as is the case 
with many qualitative methods. This can raise some doubts about the 
representativeness of the sample (Brewer & Hunter, 1989, p. 45), however, it is 
believed that one important advantage for this researcher is that he had easier access 
to the field of research as members of his family lived in Egypt, which helped with his 
personal immersion in the on-going discussions about the political process in that 
country: not only amongst the informants but also amongst many other Egyptians, in 
general. These methods can be time-consuming and costly, as previously mentioned, 
but in this case, and given the duration of the doctoral project, extra time could be 
taken in the field in order to understand the overall cultural context. These methods 
can arguably lead to more interesting insights unavailable via quicker methods such as 
surveys or short Skype interviews.  
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4.5 Web feature analysis  
The intention at the beginning of this project was to select only two case studies from 
current websites or blogs such as Revolutionary Socialists (http://revsoc.me/) and 
Tamaroud (http://www.tamarud.net). The first site was chosen because it is directly 
linked to the British Revolutionary Socialists and has connections with other similar 
groups in Europe; additionally, many activists from this group, such as Hossam Al-
Hamalawy and Gigi Ibrahim were very visible in the global media during and after the  
January 25th revolution. The second site was selected because it was launched as a 
campaign to collect 20 million signatures from supporters of the end of former 
President Morsi’s rule. The campaign was successful, thanks to the military 
intervention on 3 July 2013, and the site recently announced the intention of its 
administrators to launch what they called an ‘alternative media service’. Given the 
continuous changes in Egypt since 2011, to streamline the selected sample and 
enlarge it to include more than one movement; consequently, four groups have been 
selected:  
We are all Khaled Said: The group began with the death of a young Egyptian man 
called Khaled Said, who died in police custody in Alexandria, in June 2010. The police 
was accused of using brutal force on Said and a picture showing his battered face went 
viral on the internet. A Facebook group was set up in his name by the activist, Wael 
Ghonim, who was then an executive at Google Arabia, based in Dubai. Khaled’s story 
became the rallying point for many protestors in 2011. The police denied charges of 
brutality, although the use of force and torture by policemen in Egypt is not 
uncommon.  
Tamaroud: (‘Rebellion’) movement founded by five activists in April 2013 who aimed 
to collect millions of signatures calling for the end of the rule of Mohamed Morsi, a key 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement announced that they had 
collected more than 22 million signatures at the end of June 2013; this figure was later 
contested by other members who split from the movement and set up their own 
group. There were also claims that Tamaroud was supported by the police force who 
helped distribute the petition for signatures. Tamaroud called for a massive 
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demonstration on 30 June 2013, marking the first anniversary of Morsi’s rule; the 
Armed Forces gave the president until 3 July 2013 to solve the crisis, but Morsi refused 
to resign. The Armed Forces removed him by force, offered a strategic road map, and 
appointed the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court as an interim president.  
Dar Essalam: set up by a group of young people residing in the neighbourhood of Dar 
Essalam and Maadi in Cairo, in the wake of the 2011 revolution. The group’s aim was 
to discuss local issues; they also used their Facebook group to raise national issues 
such as the referendum on the constitution, elections and other matters. 
April 6 Youth movement: The group was set up in 2008 to support the workers in a 
factory in the city of Mahalla, who were planning to strike on 6 April. Bloggers used 
social media to report on that strike and they managed to draw national and 
international attention to the campaign. The group used the ‘raised fist’ symbol as 
their slogan. The group had a Facebook page but because of the rise of opposition 
within the group, some members formed another Facebook group with the same 
name, but with different leading activists; in 2014, a famous TV talk show claimed that 
the group was funded by foreign donors to stabilise the system in Egypt and the group 
received a court banning order in April 2014.  
 
Scrutiny of websites draws on descriptive textual analysis, socio-cultural analysis or 
feature analysis (Schneider and Foot, 2004, p. 117). The first is a discursive analysis of 
website content; the second can be an analysis of the site’s links on the web; and 
feature analysis, on the other hand, can draw on both quantitative and qualitative 
methods to systemically analyse web features available on the homepage. The 
intention here is to use feature analysis by focusing on the following five categories 
(explained in more detail in Chapter 7): 
• focus: national or local 
• updates 
• characters 
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• links 
• mobilisation 
 
The analysis of this social media content could draw on features from established 
techniques such as content analysis, which can efficiently be used to investigate media 
content (Wimmer & Dominick, 2006, p. 150). It is possible to draw on the advantages 
of content analysis in that it allows messages to be analysed separately from senders 
and receivers, especially if examined within a strong theoretical framework (Riffe et al. 
2005, 38). This technique also allows the analysis of a large quantity of data, not to 
mention its availability, and has fewer constraints in accessing such social media sites, 
without being bound by certain timeframes, as is the case with interviews or focus 
group participants. Reliance was placed on the above categories for describing the 
content of the selected Facebook groups by concentrating on ‘the messages or 
communications actually produced in practice and in that regard [web content 
analysis] may be considered a major methodological tool that bridges research 
methods’ (Stacks, 2011, p.120). It is important however, to stress the limitations of 
such an analysis which is inherently descriptive, and cannot provide the basis for 
statements about citizens’ or users’ perceptions of participating in a Facebook group; 
it is mainly used to explore interactive features and show how the researcher 
interprets and links these features with the themes of mobilisation and visibility.  
 
4.6 Ethical considerations  
This researcher has had valuable access to the field as an Egyptian-Saudi, the 
advantage of speaking the language (two dialects: Saudi and Egyptian) and being 
conversant with the culture. This advantage facilitated a great deal of the fieldwork 
and enabled the recruitment of participants to the interviews and focus groups, who 
treated him as one of them, once they saw that he was able to converse in Egyptian 
dialect; on the other hand, the fact that this researcher resides in the U.K., could 
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trigger suspicion or doubt (Clark, 2006). The fact that there are family connections in 
Cairo has greatly helped to maintain that link with Egypt, and has indeed, made many 
informants feel at ease in the interviews and discussions (Clifford & Marcus, 1986). 
Being able to converse in two different Arabic dialects was believed to be an 
advantage, however, it was considered prudent to tailor the use of the Saudi dialect 
according to the changing political scene in Egypt; for instance, in 2011, immediately 
after the fall of Mubarak, many activists saw Saudi Arabians as the greatest supporters 
of Mubarak and it was claimed that Saudi Arabia had pressurised the Egyptian 
government not to charge Mubarak and his family. Saudi Arabia was regarded as an 
unlikely ally of the Muslim Brotherhood during Morsi’s rule in 2012, and many liberal 
activists were open to discussing the role of Saudi Arabia in Egyptian internal and 
external policies; by 2013, with the toppling of Morsi, Saudi Arabia had become a 
favourite ally of Egypt, especially after the generous financial support it offered to the 
military council in 2013 and 2014. This change of attitude towards Saudi Arabia 
illustrates the fast-paced changes in this field, which is further discussed below. It 
became less problematic therefore, to converse in the Egyptian dialect, while down-
playing any Saudi connections. It is not unusual that students In Egypt and many other 
Arab countries, seek postgraduate courses at MA and Ph.D. level abroad, particularly 
in Europe and the U.S.A., albeit a privilege of well-off families who can afford foreign 
university fees, or those who can access the few state bursaries available. A large part 
of this researcher’s studies were undertaken in Europe, therefore, he could be seen as 
both an insider and outsider (Henry, 2003), indeed, many informants enquired about 
life in London, and, on many occasions,  justification for the British government’s 
policy in the Middle East was demanded. 
Being a ‘native’ does not mean that this analysis will be more insightful than a non-
native researcher, as, according to Bolak:  an ‘indigenous researcher runs the risk of 
being blinded by the familiar’ (1996, 109). An attempt has been made to secure a 
balance of the interpretation of the data by consulting the relevant supervisor and 
talking to various academics in the field. No claim to complete objectivity and 
neutrality is made, as this researcher’s personal identity must have had some impact 
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on this project (Henry, 2003), however, as Miraftab (2004) argues, fieldwork is 
generally characterised by reflexivity rather than the presumption of objectivity as a 
meta-narrative (Sherif, 2001). Being native did not necessarily mean that it was 
possible to exercise more power in the field, as some informants can also attempt to 
use research as a communication forum by treating the researcher as a messenger 
between them and the West (Sulieman & Anderson, 2008).  
Given the fast changes occurring in Egypt over the course of the past three years, the 
field accessibility also changed, accordingly; for instance, in 2011 and in the wake of 
toppling Mubarak, there was a marked euphoria in public spaces such as cafes and 
universities. At that time, it was not unusual to find someone, from any walk of life, 
willing to talk about politics, activism, and even foreign policy. It was then much easier 
to approach informants, even without common contacts, as everyone was happy to 
discuss the 2011 revolution, regarded as the first public revolution in the modern 
history of Egypt. This situation, however, had changed drastically by 2013, when many 
people were reluctant to speak or reveal their political inclinations or affiliation. Many 
supporters of the MB attempted to conceal this support and it was not easy to 
approach new informants without prior arrangement via common acquaintances. The 
situation became worse in 2014; even when interviews with informants, via 
acquaintances, were arranged, many of them did not show up. It was particularly 
challenging to arrange the focus group meetings conducted in 2014, a female 
acquaintance had to be present in order to  speak to selected female participants. This 
fieldwork spanned over three years, due to the hazardous security situation in the 
country during that time, which forced this researcher to stay in London for a major 
part of the year.  
A famous talk show, ‘Black Box’, featured on the Qahera wel Nas channel, dedicated 
several episodes to discussing what the host claimed to be a conspiracy against the 
Egyptian regime. He broadcast intercepted telephone calls between key activists such 
as Wael Ghonim, Mostafa Naggar and Israa Abdel Fattah, claiming that they were 
referring to foreign donors (from the U.S.A. or Europe) in their calls, and those 
donations were aimed at using the activists to disrupt the political scene in Egypt, in 
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order to prolong the chaos and disorder. Such media messages impacted indirectly on 
the fieldwork, in that many informants (Egyptians in general) had become suspicious 
of Arabs and Egyptians living in Western countries, in case they also had a hidden 
agenda to disrupt the stability in Egypt.  
Another major challenge in the field was the fast-changing political map in Egypt. 
Many new parties and movements have emerged since 2011,  to the extent that often 
voters can no longer differentiate between these parties and movements (see Chapter 
7). Some of the informants, for instance, joined one movement in 2011 only to shift to 
another, a year or two later. Shifting was not necessarily a decision based on the new 
group’s ideology, but rather on other considerations such as whether the new 
movement would support social justice or better health care or improve education 
policies. Many informants had also become rather suspicious of political parties and 
preferred to join and form loose movements (see Chapter 7).  
A note summarising the challenges in such a dynamic field as Egypt post-2011 is 
presented in the conclusion: on 5 February 2013, the Frontline Club in London 
arranged an event to discuss the transformation in Egyptian journalism. One of the 
participants, Dr Walter Armbrust of Oxford University, said that writing a book about 
the Egyptian revolution at that stage was like fixing a bike while riding it. That 
comment indirectly summarises the challenges in a field in flux.  
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Chapter Five  
Web Content Aanalysis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The internet provides a vast range of opportunities for its users to interact and 
exchange content, and thus users can participate in collaborative debates in order to 
express their views via media such as blogs and chatrooms (O’Reilly, 2005). It is this 
exchange of views and information that gave rise to the so-called ‘citizen journalist’, 
which refers to any user who can establish a dialogue with others by reacting to their 
information and sharing their own; as such, online communities can reinforce social 
networks, while allowing for a debate with others who may hold opposing views 
(Ward, 2008, p. 43). The internet can therefore provide ‘an online structure as a way 
of communicating a particular stance on citizenship’ (Ward, 2008, p. 43).  The power of 
the internet lies in facilitating the exchange of information, not only augmenting 
participants’ understanding of political and social issues, but also increasing their 
participation (Garrett, 2007, p. 206). It is this debate that gave rise to the argument 
that the internet could provide a virtual platform for participation and thus become a 
virtual public sphere. The flow of conversation online, as Goode (2009) argues, 
provides the potential for virtual democratic participation through citizens’ active 
engagement via blogs, chats, comments, and so on. This conversation is underpinned 
by the citizens’ online debates, deliberating with each other and discussing social and 
political issues in a transparent environment. The online conversation is consequently 
facilitated by a range of interactive features.  
Any political or social movement will depend on the ability of its members to unite 
around one coherent and collective identity as well as to define the aims of the 
movement (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). It is this collective identity that helps the group 
to mobilise, and this mobilisation is achieved through rhetorical and ideological 
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strategies.  It is the aim of the following analysis to identify such strategies and 
examine how they help to achieve the goals of the selected online political 
movements.  
An examination of specific measures taken in each Facebook group shall be made, in 
order to identify these strategies. Previous studies (Ben Moussa, 2011) identified 
selected features for such an analysis, including the frequency of updating, 
mobilisation messages, hyperlinks, interactivity, types of information and whether it is 
local or national. The frequency of updating sheds some light on the use of portals to 
attract new users and motivate existing users to return to the page (Gibsom & Ward, 
2000). Mobilisation can be directly accomplished via disseminating requests to join a 
network, donate, volunteer or sign a petition (Downey & Fenton, 2003). Examining the 
links on the page, moreover, could illustrate the motivation of the group and whether 
it is to encourage civil participation, in civil society association, for example, or linking 
to alternative media affiliated with such associations. Types of information can also 
illustrate the objectives of the group in informing their users, whether it is local or 
national news and whether this information is little or extensive.  
The following features were examined, after reading the Facebook posts in each 
selected group below, based on the recurrent themes in each group; these features 
shed light on the interactive characteristics expected within such political groups, and 
they also helped to identify the resources available to each group, in terms of hiring 
someone to regularly update the site: 
• Focus of the campaigns and whether this was national or local. 
• Updating of the webpage and whether this happened frequently: daily, 
weekly or monthly. 
• Characters often cited or referred to in the groups. 
• Links to other sites, particularly mainstream or alternative media or civil 
society associations. 
• Mobilisation activities such as urging users to join an event or a protest. 
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5.2 Web feature analysis 
Interactivity is crucial for a website’s credibility and to attract new participants to 
engage in a conversation (Sundar, Kalyanaraman & Brown, 2003).  Stromer-Galley 
(2004) differentiates between computer-mediated and person-to-person interactivity, 
or the interactivity as process (human interaction) and interactivity as product 
(interaction with technology), and the two approaches require different research foci, 
therefore, having interactive features on a website does not inevitably mean an 
increase in users’ participation. There is some research that supports the thesis that 
more interactive features could lead to higher participation, such as Tedesco (2007). 
Other studies such as those of Sundar, Hesser, Kalyanaraman, and Brown (1998) as 
well as Kiousis and Dimitrova (2006) argue that interactive features and graphics could 
influence users’ trustworthiness towards, and perception of, the credibility of a 
website. It is therefore important to consider the influence of interactivity on users’ 
political participation.  Interactivity often refers to the users’ ability to participate in 
generating information and not just as passive recipients of content; consequently, 
interactivity requires a two-way communication between users and producers of 
information.  
 
The success of a social movement depends on its repertoire of contention which in 
turn is tied to three factors: mobilising structures, political opportunity structures, and 
collective action or a ‘cultural frame’ (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Davenport 
2005). The first factor refers to the formal organisation and leadership as well as a 
connection between the members of the movement or group and how they manage 
and coordinate their action. The second factor refers to the events that trigger social 
networks, and hence collective identity, and mobilise action around commonly defined 
themes and symbols (such as Khaled Said’s death). The third factor refers to the frame 
that provides ideology and motivation for the group (Tarrow 1998). Members of a 
movement, especially in a coercive state, need to share a common understanding of 
injustice, and a trust in the group and its goals, so that they can stand up to state 
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representation. This shared culture functions as the glue that binds the movement’s 
members together and helps them identify and articulate their contention (McAdam 
and Tarrow 1998; Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Another crucial factor for the success of 
social movements is the flow of information and the way in which they manage to 
communicate both amongst themselves and with potential new participants. 
 
There are different kinds of repertoire in relation to political action; for instance, the 
action can depend on the time and risk required to engage in a political movement 
(Klandermans, 2004). An example of an action that requires little time and little risk is 
signing a petition; on the other hand, taking part in a strike can require substantial risk 
but little time to plan and implement; moreover, joining an organisation can require 
substantial time and risk. Engagement with political action also requires different kinds 
of resources: for instance, financial resources from donations to a movement or 
rhetorical skills if the group member wishes to represent the group (Verba et al. 1995). 
Time is also a resource in order that members of the group can dedicate part of their 
spare time to meet with each other. Norris (2002) refers to two types of resources (or 
predispositions) needed for political participation: individual resources including 
education and money, and political motivation. As resources are unevenly distributed 
in a society, people’s engagement differs: those who have enough time, money and 
education tend to dedicate more resources to political participation simply because 
they can afford to do so (Rosenstone and Hansen, 2003, 12; Verba et al. 1995).  
 
Traditional mass communication media such as newspapers and magazines as well as 
television and radio, have helped diffuse information across vast geographical areas, 
linking, for instance, cities with remote towns and villages, thus, such media helped 
move previously localised and small-scale action to a broader national action (Tarrow 
1998; Rucht 2004). The new media such as the internet have provided greater 
opportunities to turn a national movement into a global action and helped reduce the 
cost of movements, serving as a rapid and inexpensive ‘architecture of participation 
that challenges or alters dominant, expected or accepted ways of doing society, 
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culture and politics’ (Atton 2004, p. 19). This technology makes the internet an ideal 
platform for political action and social movement, as users can connect to the internet 
via different systems such as cell phones or laptops. They can also communicate in real 
time and their communication can take a range of forms, such as email, text message 
and audio-visual messaging, and so on.  It is also onerous for states to control this flow 
of information as it requires control of various media, such as cell phones. This, 
however, has not prevented some states (such as Iran, China and Egypt, during the 
early days of the 2011 revolution) from switching off the internet and penalising online 
activists as well as attempting to filter its content (Neuman 2011).   
 
A total of four groups have been chosen (see Methodology chapter). One of them is a 
local group (Dar Essalam  and Maadi Youth group) and this is to align it with other 
national groups such as the ‘April 6’ movement and Tamarod. ‘We are all Khaled Said’ 
group has also been included, which can be classified as national, because it did not 
target one neighbourhood, and yet it dealt with one specific topic and was largely 
confined to large cities, particularly Cairo and Alexandria. The discussion begins with 
the Dar Essalam and Maadi group which started, as the name suggests, in one of 
Cairo’s neighbourhoods.  
 
5.3 Dar Essalam and Maadi group 
The group was set up on 24 February 2011,  nearly two weeks after Mubarak stepped 
down. There are no names of administrators for this page but there are at least three 
phone numbers given for users to contact if they seek more information about the 
group. A post on the FB page dated 1 March 2011 regarding its rationale,  stated that 
the group met after the 2011 revolution to debate the situation in Egypt in general, 
and in their neighbourhood in particular, and to ask themselves, ‘what do we want to 
happen after 25 January?’  There were many answers posted such as eradicating 
illiteracy, raising political awareness, knowing the difference between the local council 
and the parliament, cleaning the neighbourhood, price monitoring in the area, 
monitoring the performance of local hospitals and councils, requesting that  the police 
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service improve (it was interrupted shortly after February 2011), monitoring the 
performance of police forces (implicitly referring to previous incidents of torture and 
killings during Mubarak’s regime and during the 2011 revolution).  
The page introduces itself as follows: 
The Committee of Dar Essalam and Hadaieq Maadi Youth is a group of 
young people who wish to make their neighbourhood better and we are 
very focused on developing our neighbourhood. We believe if the youth in 
every neighbourhood wish to develop it, and eradicate illiteracy amongst its 
residents, all of Egypt will develop and will be much better. By the way, 
illiteracy is not just about reading and writing. Eradicating illiteracy also 
means eradicating political and cultural illiteracy so that we know our rights 
and duties, and learn to dream of a better tomorrow. While meeting, we 
have found common goals such as ensuring security, cleaning our 
neighbourhood, and ensuring transparent elections, having better hospitals, 
eradicating corruption from the local councils, so we decided to organise 
pressure campaigns to get our rights and raise awareness. This is the 
beginning and God willing there will be no end.  
The group then decided to agree on one single objective to launch their committee: a 
campaign to make Dar Essalam a safe and clean neighbourhood. The campaign was 
for one month - from 25 February to 25 March 2011. The agreed steps were to 
continue with cleaning campaigns, to launch a number of workshops in order to raise 
awareness among residents, launch a weekly bulletin to distribute locally about the 
campaign, visit the families of ‘martyrs’, and to call for a conference on 25 March 
2011 inviting police and local authorities to attend.  
A few of these goals seemed to have been achieved, according to what was posted 
on their FB page. There were several calls for meetings, for instance, to discuss the 
problems in this particular neighbourhood, and there was one reference to a 
meeting with the local Councillor of Dar Essalam on 3 March 2011, to discuss possible 
projects for the development of the neighbourhood. A photograph of the meeting 
was posted on the page, however, the conference planned on 25 March 2011 did not 
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seem to materialise as there were no references to it. One possible explanation is 
that the period following Mubarak’s toppling witnessed numerous protests and 
demonstrations against the military council, and young people in Dar Essalam might 
have been more occupied with these national events. The group did, however, 
attempt to raise the residents’ political awareness - for instance, there were many 
calls to attend meetings and workshops such as the following:  
• a call to a meeting on 7 March 2011 at 11pm at a local café 
• a calendar posted on 8 March 2011 of 6 meetings within the campaign 
to clean up the area 
• a call to a meeting on 13 March 2011 
• a series of meetings on 28, 30 and 31 March 2011.  
What is notable on the page is the infrequency of its posts: it began with a weekly 
update from February until April 2011, then a monthly update in June and July 
followed by infrequent posts in November 2011, January 2012, March 2012, June 
2012, a few posts in 2013 (April, August and November) and only two posts in 2014 
(January and April). 
The frequency of updating can provide an important signpost on the FB page’s 
potential to serve as an information source. It also reflects the administrators’ ability 
to coordinate their sources, and use the page to attract new users and encourage 
existing users to return to the page (Gibson & Ward, 2000). The low frequency of 
updating Dar Essalam’s page reflects the group’s incapacity to use Facebook as a tool 
of organised action: although they did use it to call for sporadic meetings. Except for 
the series of meetings to clean the streets, there was no planned action calendar 
showing a series of meetings for a particular goal. This could perhaps impact on the 
group’s sustainability and capacity to continue updating their site if, for instance, the 
time and effort of its members were rather limited; moreover, the page does not 
provide a large number of documents or information, although it began with a strong 
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ambition to serve as a grassroots activity and a hub for communications about local 
campaigns and initiatives.  
The original aim was to serve the local community, but the group did not use the site 
to post several news items germane to the neighbourhood, save for one or two 
items, such as one headline about an explosion posted on 6 July 2011. The remaining 
comments were made about national politics such as the constitution referendum in 
2011, the presidential election of 2012, and attempts by members of Mubarak’s 
party to join the parliamentary elections: 
 
The page did not involve users in mobilisation activities (apart from announcements 
for local meetings)  such as asking for volunteers, donations, petitions or boycotts; the 
exception was the implicit call not to vote for Ahmed Shafiq (standing against the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi) in the presidential elections of 2012. The 
page did not explicitly ask the users not to vote but used a few images imported from 
other sites to emphasise the same point: 
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The posters said:  
Share. When you see a shop hanging a photo of Shafiq, pretend that you wanted to 
buy an item, and just before paying, look at the photo and return the item and say, “I 
do not buy from anyone who wants to elect a thief and killer”. 
If you lived in Mubarak’s age, and did not die on a ferry, or get burned on a train, or 
were diagnosed with Virus C, cancer or kidney problems, and if you want to fail in 
your studies or work, you still have a chance with Shafiq. 
 
The calls were sporadic, although the group indirectly made them to users to boycott 
Shafiq’s campaign. During the period from 2011-2013, the group did not issue a call for 
users to volunteer or donate in support of its initiatives. Only in April 2014 did the 
group post a volunteer form, but this form was for the Al-Hak Centre for Human Rights 
and Democracy, which was the primary link on the page. 
A similar example of this link to the Al-Hak Centre for Human Rights and Democracy 
was a post published on 17 August 2013 announcing telephone numbers for 
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journalists to use if they wished to complain about attacks by police forces. Another 
post was published in November 2013 which was a scanned news item about the 
arrest of Al-Alem TV’s manager in Cairo (Al-Alem is a channel subsidised by Iran) and 
the intervention of the Al-Hak Centre to release the manager: 
 
 
There were no links to either mainstream or alternative media except for a post with a 
scanned front page from the daily Al-Ahram, dated 4 March 2003, about Mohammed 
Al-Baradei, who was the current Head of International Atomic Energy Agency (AEA), 
and his statement that Iraq did not possess nuclear weapons in 2003. The post was 
preceded by a rhetorical question: ‘to all those who wonder if Al-Baradei is a spy’, as 
an indication that he had shown integrity in his previous role in an international 
organisation.  
To sum up, the group began with a clear local focus on the community of Dar Essalam 
and Maadi neighbourhood in Cairo, but at times it reported on other national events 
such as constitutional referenda and elections. The updating was infrequent which 
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shows that the group lacked resources for a dedicated administrator to regularly 
update the page. Links were usually to national mainstream media although there 
were also some to a human rights association. There were no key figures behind the 
group, consequently, the group can be characterised by its moderate mobilisation 
efforts in that it urged users to join a campaign or a meeting even if organised by 
another movement or a party. The group began with a modest action calendar such as 
planning meetings in the neighbourhood, but such announcements faded a year after 
the revolution. 
 
5.4 The April 6 Youth Movement 
The group was set up on Facebook on 30 August 2008. It introduced itself as ‘The 
Egyptian resistance movement: April 6 Youth’, with its motto: ‘Patriotism above 
politics, and principles above interests’. It was also declared as a group of young 
Egyptians who gathered around their love for their country and their goal to reform it: 
‘We do not call for a new movement, or a new party, but we call on all Egyptians 
(whether individuals, groups, parties) to join us around one project which is to awaken 
these people and to stop injustice, and to remove corruption’. The group clearly stated 
that ‘reforming Egypt [would] not be the result of rhetoric but of real action and 
offer[…] alternative and feasible solutions’.  They introduced their occupation as being 
employed by the ‘Egyptian people’.  The group identified their code of ethics in the 
first posts with instructions for users not to engage in either heated religious or 
sectarian debates or ideological debates to prove the other party wrong, by using 
party propaganda.  
There were only 4 posts in 2008, and the Facebook page was not updated daily but 
monthly. There was not much activity in 2009, but in 2010 the group marked its 
presence on Facebook with frequent updates, and that presence was strengthened in 
2011 when the site was updated weekly. This could be a sign that the group was 
receiving increased financial support and resources such as the number of people who 
could update the site. The 2011 uprising inevitably boosted  traffic, as did the activity 
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of the group which began linking with sister groups (such as those in governorates or 
to Tollab April 6 (students in the April 6 movement), the Information Committee of 
April 6, Students and Reform and April 6 in Al-Maasara, Al- Haram, and Al-Zaytoun 
neighbourhoods, among others.  
The first posts in 2008 were pictures of youth meetings with people from Abu Regala 
farm: residents were asked to evacuate their farm, and the April 6 movement offered 
its moral support. There were several posts about the various conferences and 
Ramadan meals in which members of the movement participated.  
The movement called for civil disobedience in 2010, in order to force the government 
to raise the minimum wage:  
 
They also posted photographs of graffiti which referred to 6 April such as the one 
posted on 3 May 2010 saying: ‘Down with Mubarak. 6 April’. 
3 May 2010  
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Other media links were primarily to mainstream media, particularly with regard to 
their coverage of the 6 April movement as well as of other sister groups. The 
photographs inserted were usually of leading figures within the movement.  The group 
called for a massive protest on 26 November 2010,  in what they called ‘Friday of 
Wrath’ against Habib Al-Adly (former Minister of Interior) and his practice of torture: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There were also posters about 6 April supporters in Europe in 2010 aiming to link with 
Egyptians in Europe. Mobilisation activities such as polls began in 2011, for instance, a 
poll on 20 June 2011 asking users if they were ready to go out on the streets again to 
complete the revolution, and the majority affirmed their intention to join new 
protests. There were also polls about the constitutional referendum with a link to a 
video campaign which ran on national television but with no mention of subsequent 
offline activities. There were no calls to donate or to ask users to join the movement 
and become members: the only calls were to a few conferences without directly 
urging users to join them. This could mean that the group was more interested in 
making itself visible to other users, and perhaps donors, rather than using social media 
to recruit new members.   
There was a temporary shift in early 2011 towards mentioning regional events, 
although the group was focused on the local and national activities of its leading 
figures. One example was the picture of the Palestinian leaders from Fatah and Hamas 
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holding hands with a caption that read: ‘See what the [Egyptian] revolution did. Long 
live the Egyptian revolution […] long live Palestinian unity […] Long live the Arab 
nation. 
Another example was an image of graffiti in Libya with a caption attributing it to those 
who ‘commemorate the great Libyan revolution, which brings hope for freedom, 
patience in the face of corruption, and young determination to challenge a ‘crazy’ 
dictator who reigned for 40 years until people rebelled against him. 
 
There were a few links to Mubasher 6 April, a news agency on Facebook which sends 
frequent posts about the group’s news, particularly focusing on incidents of arrest and 
calls to free imprisoned members such as Ahmed Maher, in addition to references to 
Egyptian mainstream media and their coverage of the movement.  
The group was launched in late 2010 and intensified its activities in 2011. The coverage 
of the group was national in that it announced activities in branches across Egyptian 
governorates. The key events highlighted on the group’s Facebook page were 
however, still concerned with national and not local politics. Key figures profiled on 
the page were the heads of steering committees in Cairo and Alexandra. The group’s 
updating accelerated in 2011 which may indicate an increase of funding or resources, 
following the 25 January revolution. The group generally established links to 
mainstream media and selected civil society organisations but had fewer links to 
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alternative media. The group highlighted activities pertaining to their campaigning, in 
terms of mobilisation, by urging users to join those activities. 
 
5.5 ‘We are all Khaled Said’: 
 
The page has the Egyptian flag as its symbol 
It was created on 10 June 2010 and introduced its aim as to be ‘dreaming of an Egypt 
that respects human rights, of an authority that is rightly elected and of a state that is 
sovereign and respected around the world’. It stated that it was ‘set up to defend 
Khaled Said and what injustice [he faced], and God willing, the page will turn into a 
platform to defend every Egyptian’s right to a decent life’. As Facebook asks for 
information about aims and interests, the page administration added: ‘the page is for 
all Egyptians regardless of their religion, age, gender, education, social class or political 
ideology. We have gathered because we want our country to be better and because 
we [also] want Khaled Said’s rights [to be observed], as a symbol which awakened all 
Egyptians. We want to tell about Egyptians’ problems, especially with regards to 
breaches of human rights provided for in the constitution’. The page ‘admin’ refers to 
a Google email (elshaheed@gmail.com) and it is noted that there is a webpage called 
elshaheed.com (‘martyr’) which is dedicated to the case of Khaled Said.  
There are several calls to take part in a protest or even click ‘like’ to show support for a 
view or a protest. There was a call, for instance, to a protest on 18 June 2010 at 5 p.m. 
on which more than 3,000 people clicked that they would attend, and on the same day 
there were calls to a similar protest in Alexandra; for those who could not attend 
because they had college or university examinations, the page asked them to wear 
black as a symbolic contribution and to show moral support to those who took to the 
streets. 
The group aimed to mobilise action but not necessarily to build up a network. There 
were calls to stand in a square in Cairo wearing a black T-shirt and remain silent, 
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without necessarily interacting with the others in the street or attempting to identify 
them. There was a photograph of such an action in June 2010:  
 
 
 
 
The group posted a call to all users on 4 July 2010, urging them to ‘like’ the post and 
proposing the idea of sending a message to police officers as a Facebook post. The 
post read: ‘We’ll do something important which will be picked up by the mass media 
and will influence police officers […] please take part. Give some of your time, from 
half an hour to two hours […] details will be posted within an hour […] this is the least 
we can do for Khaled’. Another post included a screenshot of some of the users’ 
messages, and the administrator posted that he had entered the group with a fake 
account and some users had sent him polite messages, thinking he was a police 
officer: 
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Another example of virtual mobilisation was a call on 14 July 2010 to obtain a copy of 
the Egyptian Constitution, read it and make copies of article 54 which allows the right 
to demonstrate.  
 
  
The administrator (Wael Ghonim) inserted a very long post on 30 August 2010, 
entitled ‘Facebookian dialogues, we’re now half a million users’. Ghonim boasted 
about the number of users in this post, which exceeded the number of readers of all 
state-owned newspapers (at the time). He claimed that some of the users sent videos 
and images and took part in protests and sit-ins, whereas others ‘just observe[d] from 
a distance, although deep inside they might be supporting us and others who use[d] 
the page to ruin our efforts because their interest [was] not to have independent 
media out of the state’s control’. The administrator further stated that it is no bad 
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  ﺻﺒﺎﺣﺎ ً  25:90، اﻟﺴﺎﻋﺔ 0102أﻏﺴﻄﺲ،  03
أﻏﻠﺒﮭﻢ ﺑﯿﺸﻮف اﻟﺘﺤﺪﯾﺜﺎت اﻟﻠﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺼﻔﺤﺔ  اﻟﺤﻤﺪ  .. ﺑﻘﯿﻨﺎ رﺑﻊ ﻣﻠﯿﻮن ﻣﺸﺘﺮك 
ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﯾﻮﻣﻲ وﺑﺼﻔﺔ دورﯾﺔ ﯾﻌﻨﻲ اﺣﻨﺎ ﺑﺎﺧﺘﺼﺎر ﺑﻨﻮﺻﻞ ﻟﻘﺮاء ﺑﯿﺰﯾﺪ ﻋﺪدھﻢ ﻋﻦ ﻗﺮاء 
  ﯿﻦ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﻌﺾ .. وده ﻓﻲ ﺣﺪ ذاﺗﮫ ﺗﺤﺪي ﻛﺒﯿﺮ ﺟﺪا.ﻛﻞ اﻟﺠﺮاﺋﺪ ﻏﯿﺮ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﯿﺔ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋ
وﺑﯿﻨﺰل  رﺑﻊ ﻣﻠﯿﻮن ﻣﺸﺘﺮك ﻣﺶ ﺑﺲ ﺑﯿﻘﺮوا اﻻﺧﺒﺎر ﻟﻜﻦ ﺑﻌﻀﮭﻢ ﺑﯿﺸﺎرك ﻓﻲ ﺻﻨﻌﮭﺎ - 
أﺧﺒﺎرھﻢ ﻣﺶ ﺑﺲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﺮاﺋﺪ اﻟﻤﺤﻠﯿﺔ ﻻ واﻟﻌﺮﺑﯿﺔ واﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﯿﺔ ﻛﻤﺎن .. ﻣﻨﮭﻢ ﻧﺎس 
واﻟﻮﻗﻔﺔ  ﺮةﺑﯿﺼﻮروا اﻟﺼﻮرة واﻟﻔﯿﺪﯾﻮ وﯾﻜﺘﺒﻮا اﻟﻘﺼﯿﺪة واﻟﻤﻘﺎﻟﺔ وﯾﺸﺎرﻛﻮا ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻈﺎھ
ﻣﻨﮭﻢ اﻟﻠﻲ .. وﻣﻨﮭﻢ اﻟﻠﻲ ﺑﯿﺘﻔﺮج وﺑﯿﺘﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﯿﺪ وھﻮ ﻟﺴﺎن ﺣﺎﻟﮫ ﺑﯿﻘﻮل رﺑﻨﺎ ﻣﻌﺎﻛﻮا .. و
م داﺧﻞ ﻋﺸﺎن ﯾﺤﺎول ﯾﺒﻮظ اﻟﺠﮭﻮد دي ﻋﺸﺎن ﻣﺼﻠﺤﺘﮫ ان ﻣﯿﺒﻘﺎش ﻓﯿﮫ اي ﺣﺪ ﻣﻌﺎه اﻋﻼ
 ﺣﺮ ﻣﺶ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺳﯿﻄﺮة اﺟﮭﺰة اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ.
  ﺑﺘﺠﯿﻨﻲ: ﻤﯿﻼت اﻟﻠﻲﺧﻠﯿﻨﺎ أﺣﻜﯿﻠﻜﻢ ﻧﻤﻮذج ﻟﻠﻲ ﺑﯿﺤﺼﻞ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺼﻔﺤﺔ واﻟﻜﻮﻣﻨﺘﺎت واﻻﯾ  
  ﺶﻧﺸﺮ اﻗﺘﺮاح ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻋﯿﺴﻰ اﻟﺨﺎص ﺑﺘﻨﻈﯿﻢ ﻓﻜﺮة اﻟﻮﻗﻔﺔ اﻟﺼﺎﻣﺘﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻜﻮرﻧﯿ - 
>< ھﮭﮭﮭﮫ وﻗﻔﺔ ﺻﺎﻣﺘﺔ .. وﷲ اﻧﺘﻢ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ھﺎﯾﻔﺔ .. ﻣﺘﻌﻤﻠﻮھﺎ ﻓﺎﯾﺒﺮﯾﺸﻦ أﺣﺴﻦ! اﻟﺜﻮرة ھﻲ 
  اﻟﺤﻞ
  >< ﻓﻜﺮة ﺣﻠﻮة اوي اوي اوي وﺗﺴﻠﻢ اﯾﺪ اﻟﻠﻲ اﻗﺘﺮﺣﮭﺎ .. ﺑﺠﺪ ﺗﺤﺤﺤﺤﺤﻔﺔ ﯾﺎ ادﻣﻦ
 
 dnik a sa desu erew spuorg aidem laicos dna sgolb ’stsivitca emas eht taht elbaton si tI
 naht sredaer erom gnivah no sevlesmeht dedirp yeht dna aidem evitanretla fo
 dna erofeb ytilibisiv evissam deruces egap ehT  .)7 retpahC ees( aidem maertsniam
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after the January 25 revolution, but there was no strong evidence of direct 
mobilisation to offline activities other than an ad hoc sit-in with no coordinators and  
open for anyone to attend.  
The group administrator focused on posting comments about other victims of police 
brutality asking users to ‘like and share’ thereby confining political mobilisation to 
virtual ‘approval’. One example was a post about a university student (Somya Ashraf) 
who was beaten by the police and was moved to a hospital after she refused to be 
checked by a police officer when entering the university gates: 
 
 
Another example was a post on 28 November 2010 about ‘thugs’ who scared away 
voters, and the administrator asked: ‘How can you call these elections transparent?’   
It is also worth reprinting the post of 26 November 2010 when Facebook brought back 
the group’s page, which had apparently been suspended for a short period. The 
comment was: ‘Dear Facebook, thanks for bringing this page back!’, written in English 
as if it were addressed to Facebook’s management in the U.S.A. The post featured a 
blue heart with the Facebook logo. That particular post, unlike any other, received 
more than 10 thousand ‘likes’: 
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Users’ content, moreover, was confined to selected posts such as a link to a 5-minute 
YouTube film (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pUZpjg2OpIU) about 3 young men 
who had gathered round an old car. One of them was determined to repair it but the 
other two did not want to participate, saying:  ‘it’s 50 years old and doesn’t move’. 
One was thinking about what other people who had gone to the rich Gulf, could 
afford. Finally, he repaired it, after persuading the others to help, and they all drive off 
in the Nasr car, and the film ends with a folkloric song. The moral of the film, although 
not commented on explicitly, is not to give up on one’s native land and to face local 
challenges.  
The administrator, Wael Ghonim, published a long post on 11 February 2011,  
clarifying ‘his personal view’, after television reports about his arrest and 
imprisonment for 11 days (from 27 January to 7 February 2011). He was secretly 
incarcerated and his employer, Google, as well as his family appealed to the media to 
report his disappearance. Ghonim became an influential figure after his release, and 
he gave an emotional interview to the media in which he admitted his role as the 
administrator of the group. He was later named as one of the 100 most influential 
people of 2011 by the Time magazine. He also released his book ‘Revolution 2.0’ about 
his role in the 2011 revolution and particularly in the Facebook page  ‘We are all 
Khaled Said’.  
Ghonim wrote  in his post of 11 February 2011 that he had been ‘fighting the Ministry 
of Interior’ for eight months, and had been imprisoned for eleven days by asserting 
that someone like him would never strike a deal or want anything but freedom for 
Egypt. He also declared that he was not a hero, and the youth in the (village and town) 
squares did not intend to cause chaos, but rather to fight corruption. He finally said 
that he was not concerned with those who accused him of being a traitor, whether for 
or against the regime.  
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 ﺗﻮﺿﯿﺢ ﻛﺎﻣﻞ ﻟﻤﻮﻗﻔﻲ اﻟﺸﺨﺼﻲ وإﺟﺎﺑﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﻞ اﻟﺘﺴﺎؤﻻت
  ﺻﺒﺎﺣﺎ ً  00:50، اﻟﺴﺎﻋﺔ 1102ﻓﺒﺮاﯾﺮ،  11
  ﺑﺴﻢ ﷲ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ اﻟﺮﺣﯿﻢ
 أوﻻ: ﻣﺼﺮ ﻓﻮق اﻟﺠﻤﯿﻊ .. ﻣﺼﺮ ﻓﻮق اﻟﺠﻤﯿﻊ .. ﻣﺼﺮ ﻓﻮق اﻟﺠﻤﯿﻊ 
 21ﺴﺠﻨﺖ ﯾﻨﺎﯾﺮ واﺗ 52ﺷﮭﻮر وﻣﻌﺮض ﺣﯿﺎﺗﻲ ﻟﻠﺨﻄﺮ ودﻋﯿﺖ ﻟﯿﻮم  8ﺛﺎﻧﯿﺎ: أﻧﺎ ﻛﻨﺖ ﺑﺎﺣﺎرب اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﯿﺔ ﻟﻤﺪة  
ﺪ أي ﯾﻮم ﻛﻨﺖ ﻛﻞ ﯾﻮم ﺑﺎﻧﺘﻈﺮ اﻟﻤﻮت ﻓﯿﮭﺎ وﻟﺴﮫ ھﺎﺿﺤﻲ وﻗﻠﺖ إﻧﻲ ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪ أﻣﻮت. ﺻﺪﻗﻮﻧﻲ ﻣﺴﺘﺤﯿﻞ أﻋﻘ
 ﺻﻔﻘﺎت ﻷﻧﻲ ﻻ أطﻤﻊ ﻓﻲ أي ﺣﺎﺟﺔ وﻣﺶ ﻋﺎﯾﺰ ﻏﯿﺮ ﺣﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﺼﺮ واﻟﻤﺼﺮﯾﯿﻦ وﻛﺮاﻣﺘﮭﻢ.
ﻦ ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺎ: اﻟﻤﻮﻗﻒ ﺻﻌﺐ ﺟﺪا وﻣﻌﻘﺪ وﺻﻮت اﻟﺸﻌﺐ أﻗﻮى ﻣﻦ ﺻﻮت أي أﺷﺨﺎص أو رﻣﻮز. ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﺪاﯾﺔ ﻗﻠﺖ ﻣ 
ﻲ اﻟﺸﺎرع ﻞ ﻗﻠﺒﻲ ﻟﺴﺖ رﻣﺰا وﻟﺴﺖ ﺑﻄﻼ وﻟﺴﺖ ﻣﺘﺤﺪﺛﺎ رﺳﻤﯿﺎ ﺑﺎﺳﻢ اﻟﺸﻌﺐ. اﻟﺸﻌﺐ أﻗﻮى واﻟﺸﻌﺐ اﻵن ﻓﻛ
 ﯾﻔﺮض وﺟﮭﺔ ﻧﻈﺮه ﺑﻐﺾ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻋﻦ رأي واﺋﻞ ﻏﻨﯿﻢ أو ﻏﯿﺮه.
ﻠﺖ ﻓﻲ راﺑﻌﺎ: ﻻ ﺗﻮﺟﮭﻮا ﻟﺸﺒﺎب اﻟﺜﻮرة اﻻﺗﮭﺎﻣﺎت ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺨﺮﯾﺐ أو ﺗﻌﻄﯿﻞ اﻷﻋﻤﺎل. اﻟﻤﺴﺆول اﻟﺤﻘﯿﻘﻲ زي ﻣﺎ ﻗ 
ﺘﻲ ﻣﺶ ﻮ إن اﻟﻠﻲ ﻗﺘﻞ اﻟﺸﺒﺎب واﻟﻠﻲ ﺑﯿﺨﺮب ﻣﺼﺮ واﻟﻠﻲ ﺑﯿﻨﮭﺐ ﺛﺮوات اﻟﻨﺎس دﻟﻮﻗﺣﻠﻘﺔ ﻣﻨﻰ اﻟﺸﺎذﻟﻲ وھ
 اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎھﺮﯾﻦ ھﻤﺎ اﻟﻠﻲ ﻗﺎﻋﺪﯾﻦ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﺮاﺳﯿﮭﻢ وﻓﺎﻛﺮﯾﻦ إﻧﮭﻢ ﻓﻮق ﻣﺴﺘﻮى اﻟﺤﺴﺎب.
ﺗﺎﺳﻌﺎ: ﻻ ﯾﻀﯿﺮﻧﻲ أن ﯾﺘﮭﻤﻨﻲ اﻟﺒﻌﺾ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﯿﺎﻧﺔ ﺳﻮاء ﻛﺎﻧﻮا ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎھﺮﯾﻦ أو ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم. أﻧﺎ ھﺎﻓﻀﻞ أﻋﻤﻞ اﻟﻠﻲ 
  ي اﻟﻠﻲ ﻋﻤﺮه ﻣﺎ ھﯿﻤﻮت ﻷﻧﮫ ﺻﺤﻲ ﻋﺸﺎن ﺑﻠﺪه.ﺑﯿﻘﻮﻟﮫ ﻟﻲ ﺿﻤﯿﺮ
 
 detcartta osla dah ohw ,minohG leaW ,erugif yek eno no dertnec erofereht puorg ehT
 dekrow eh taht nevig ,aciremA ni sa hcus aidem nretseW ni noitnetta fo laed taerg a
 .nezitic naciremA na ot deirram saw eh taht dna ,elgooG ,ynapmoc naciremA eht rof
 1102 hcraM 5 no noillim eno dehcaer dah sresu s’puorg eht taht decnuonna minohG
  :tsop sih ’ekil‘ ot meht deksa eh dna
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Ghonim signed a book deal worth millions of dollars in 2012, and announced he was 
launching a charity in Egypt. One of his projects was entitled ‘The Poor First’, which 
aimed to collect money to help the poor. The group’s Facebook page featured 
advertising for the campaign:  
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 Links were mainly to mainstream media and the way they covered protests; 
one link was to the state-owned newspaper, Al-Ahram, and what the group 
called the ‘legendary issue of 4 May 2008’ (Mubarak’s birthday) and the 
excessive use of his photographs with reference to his and his wife’s 
‘achievements’, calling his rule ‘the day Egypt was born again’. The group re-
printed photographs of that issue on 20 February 2012:  
 مارھﻷا ةدﯾرﺟ-  يروطﺳﻷا ددﻌﻟا4  وﯾﺎﻣ2008 - عوﻠﺧﻣﻟا دﻼﯾﻣ دﯾﻋ )12 (روﺻﻟا نﻣ  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
There were references to victims other than Khaled Said, as previously mentioned, 
who also suffered from police brutality. Most of the cases occurred in Egypt but there 
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was also a single reference to the famous case concerning Ahmed Al-Gizawi which 
occurred in Saudi Arabia. Al-Gizawi, an activist arrested in Saudi Arabia in April 2012 
triggered massive protests from Egypt against the Islamic Kingdom. It was claimed that 
Al-Gizawi travelled to Saudi Arabia on a pilgrimage, when he was detained in a Saudi 
prison on 17 April 2012; prior to his trip, he had filed court cases against the Islamic 
Kingdom for detaining Egyptians in their prisons without fair trials. It was then claimed 
that he was sentenced to a year in prison and 20 lashes for insulting the king, but the 
Egyptian ambassador in Saudi issued a statement, denying the whole trial story and 
declaring that Saudi laws do not allow the trial of non-Saudi citizens for acts 
committed outside of the Kingdom. Other officials claimed that Al-Gizawi was trying to 
smuggle anti-anxiety pills into Saudi Arabia. The whole affair caused more than 1,000 
Egyptians to protest in front of the Saudi Embassy in Cairo on 27 April 2012, 
demanding Al-Gizawi’s release along with other Egyptians in Saudi jails. The Kingdom 
replied by shutting down its embassy and other consulates in Egypt, which prompted 
the Egyptian Military Council to accelerate diplomatic efforts to heal the rift with Saudi 
Arabia.  
We Are All Khaled Said group took part in the demonstration regarding this incident by 
posting a comment explaining the case in brief and asking Egyptians to demonstrate 
against Saudi Arabia. The post read:  
24 April 2012. Ahmed Al-Gizawi’s case in a nutshell: an Egyptian citizen expressed his 
view on an Egyptian television channel. The view was regarded as a crime in Saudi 
Arabia. Ahmed is not resident in Saudi Arabia but had gone there on a pilgrimage. 
The Saudi authorities decided to punish him for his view, which was not a crime in 
Egypt. One basic legal principle is that the act did not happen inside Saudi territories 
and Ahmed is not a Saudi citizen. If we remain silent, Ahmed will be imprisoned for 
one year and receive 20 lashes. Perhaps Ahmed’s case should be opened to allow us 
to ask for the release of Ahmed and all other Egyptians arrested illegally in Saudi 
prisons.  
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24  ،لﯾرﺑأ2012  
 :رﺎﺻﺗﺧﺎﺑ يوازﯾﺟﻟا دﻣﺣأ ﺔﯾﺿﻗ  
- ﺔﯾرﺻﻣ ﺔﯾﻣﻼﻋإ ةﺎﻧﻗ ﻲﻓ ﮫﯾأر نﻋ ّرﺑﻋ يرﺻﻣ نطاوﻣ  
- !ﺔﯾﻛﻠﻣﻟا تاذﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ يدﻌﺗﻟا ﺔﻣﮭﺗﺑ ﺔﯾدوﻌﺳﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﻣﯾرﺟ دُﻌﯾ يأرﻟا اذھ  
- ﺔﯾﻧﯾد ةرﯾﻌﺷ ﻲھو ةرﻣﻌﻟا ءادﻷ رﻓﺎﺳو ﺔﯾدوﻌﺳﻟﺎﺑ ﺎﻣﯾﻘﻣ سﯾﻟ دﻣﺣأ  
-  ﻰﻠﻋ ﮫﺑﺎﻘﻋ تررﻗ ﺔﯾدوﻌﺳﻟا تﺎطﻠﺳﻟا!ﺎﺳﺎﺳأ رﺻﻣ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻣﯾرﺟﺑ سﯾﻟ وھ ﻲﻠﻟا ﮫﯾأر  
-  !ﺎﮭﻟ ﺎﻧطاوﻣ سﯾﻟ وھو ﺔﯾدوﻌﺳﻟا ﻲﺿارﻷا ﻰﻠﻋ ذﻔُﻧﺗ مﻟ ﺔﻣﯾرﺟﻟا نأ لوﻘﺗﺑ ﻲﻧوﻧﺎﻘﻟا دﻋاوﻗ طﺳﺑأ ﻰﺗﺣو  
- و نﺟﺳ ﺔﻧﺳ وھ ﺎﻧﺗﻛﺳ وﻟ ﮫﻌﻓدﯾھ دﻣﺣأ ﻲﻠﻟا بﺎﻘﻌﻟا20 !!!!!!!!ةدﻠﺟ  
يوازﯾﺟﻟا دﻣﺣﻷ ﺔﯾرﺣﻟﺎﺑ سﺑ شﺑﻟﺎطﻧﻣ نﺎﺷﻋ تﺣﺗﻔﺗا دﻣﺣأ ﺔﯾﺿﻗ نﻛﻣﯾ  لﻛﻟ ﺔﯾرﺣﻟﺎﺑ بﻟﺎطﻧ نﺎﺷﻋ ﻻ ..
!ﺔﯾدوﻌﺳﻟا نوﺟﺳﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﻣﯾرﺟ نودﺑ لﻘﺗﻌُﻣو مﻠظﻟا نﻣ ﻲﻧﺎﻌﯾﺑ يرﺻﻣ  
  
The group administrator issued a survey form in August 2012, asking users to answer 
some questions about when they joined the page, their reasons for joining, whether 
they had contributed with ideas, and to give their suggestions for the future. The 
group asked users to ‘like’ other views and to ‘share’ with friends:   
 
 The group ended on 3 July 2013 when Egypt was waiting for a statement from the 
military officials regarding the overthrow of President Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood 
member; after that date, there was no activity whatsoever on that page.  
To sum up, the ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ group’s page was launched on 18 June 2010 
(‘Friday of Anger’) and was updated daily from September 2010, then weekly 
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throughout 2011 and then monthly, until it ceased to appear from 3 July 2013. There 
were links to the mainstream media and their coverage of the group, and to media 
presenters who showed solidarity with the 2011 revolution and its demands. One 
example was a sports presenter who said while on air: ‘God will punish the former 
regime severely […] there should  be no delay in putting on trial the people who 
tortured us for years [...] we should hold to account those who support fanaticism in 
sports’. There were also links to archive material from the state-owned Al-Ahram 
newspaper to reveal its hypocrisy during Mubarak’s rule when it arguably appeared to 
serve as a mouthpiece for the regime. There were very few instances, on the other 
hand, of links to alternative media such as an amateur movie posted on YouTube by 
young activists but there were a few links to other groups such as the ‘April 6 
movement’. Mobilisation activities were confined to calling for users to ‘like’ or ‘share’ 
a post with their friends, such as the one calling users to join protests on Friday 18 
June 2010 (‘Friday of Anger’), or to visit the familes of ‘martyrs’. There were also calls 
for users to express their views, but it is notable that comments and ‘likes’ during 2010 
were modest, compared to the activity recorded in 2011. It is argued here that the 
activity in 2011 was mainly due to two reasons: (i) the 2011 uprising and the soaring 
number of Facebook users in Egypt, following that event; and (ii) the fame of the 
group’s administrator, Wael Ghonim, who featured not only in Egyptian mainstream 
media but also in American media. Ghonim seemed to have been the centre of 
attention on the group’s page on which he personally posted comments about his 
views, following media interviews, or thanking people for joining or advertising his 
campaign (‘The Poor First’).  Ghonim’s passion to help the poor, fight corruption, and 
end police brutality, which he expressed in his interviews with mainstream media, 
were the themes that featured strongly on the group’s page between 2010 and 2013. 
Ghonim disappeared from the Egyptian political scene in 2013, following the 
overthrow of Morsi, when he left Egypt.  He posted a message on his personal 
Facebook account in January 2014  
(https://www.facebook.com/WaelGhonim/posts/599343166805431) - in reply to what 
he called ‘rumours about him’. He denied all accusations that he had made a fortune 
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from his media appearances or the book which he had released in 2011. He asserted 
that all revenues went to charity projects in Egypt, and he only wanted to help the 
people and the country. He lamented the violence following Morsi’s overthrow, saying 
that he preferred to stay away rather than join a debate that could contribute to more 
bloodshed. The posts received nearly 20 thousand ‘likes’ and thousands of ‘shares’. 
Ghonim’s comments came after a campaign in the Egyptian media, particularly 
independent TV channels, to discredit many of the 2011 revolutionaries, including 
Ghonim, with claims that they were paid handsomely by foreign agencies to ignite the 
revolution in Egypt.  
 
5.6 Tamarod 
Tamarod means ‘rebellion’ in Arabic and refers here to the movement launched in 
April 2013, to lead the protests against the Brotherhood and Morsi. The movement 
managed to mobilise massive protests to take to the streets on 20 June 2013, the first 
anniversary of Morsi’s rule, demanding that he step down. Morsi refused this demand 
and was removed from his post by the Military Council led by then current  Minister of 
Defence, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi.  
The group claimed to have collected over 20 million signatures in a petition calling for 
Morsi to step down, blaming Morsi for all social ills - from crimes to the failing 
economy. The Brotherhood responded by forming a group called ‘Tajaroud’ 
(‘Impartiality’) and claimed to have collected 10 million signatures of citizens who 
wanted Morsi to remain in power: a claim that was strongly refuted by many 
politicians and commentators.  
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The group set up a website to post their 1-page petition online in several languages: 
 
 
Tamarod’s petition complains that people should ‘reject’ Morsi on the grounds that:  
• Security had not been restored since the 2011 revolution 
• The poor ‘have no place’ in society 
• The government was still ‘begging’ the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for a loan  
• There had been ‘no justice for the ‘martyrs’ of the 2011 revolution  
• ‘No dignity was left’ for Egyptians or their country 
• The economy had ‘collapsed’ 
• Egypt was ‘still following in the footsteps of the U.S.A’. 
The website posted a short message, following the toppling of Morsi, thanking everyone 
who took part in the campaign; since when it had not been updated. There were recent 
claims by its founder, Mahmoud Badr, that the official Facebook page had been stolen 
and no longer represented or expressed the views of Tamarod (Ramadan, 2014. The 
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group split up in early 2014, with some of the members forming Tamarod 2. The new 
group criticised the post-coup government, and claimed that some of the founders of 
the original movement were agents of the state security system. It was perhaps for that 
reason that the founder of the original movement, Mahmoud Badr, announced to the 
mainstream media that the membership of leading figures such as Hassan Shahin and 
Mohammed Abdel Aziz had been frozen, and gave the names of new spokespeople, 
including Mohammed Nabawy.  
The Facebook group was launched on 24 May 2013 with the main message for all 
citizens to take to the streets on 30 June 2013:  
 
Following the launch, the main posts and images were of people, including celebrities, 
signing the movement’s petition: 
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It is evident from the group’s Facebook page that this movement was well-resourced 
compared to the previously discussed movements. The Tamarod page was updated 
daily, unlike those of other movements, and sometimes more than once a day. They 
also had a visible presence in many governorates and posted news about meetings 
and seminars in other towns such as a meeting in Menya, followed by another in 
Aswan, and another in Luxor:  
 
•  
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What is more, the group posted the names and numbers of several members who act 
as coordinators in several governorates together with the mobile number of each 
member:  
 
 
The group also announced its campaign in other countries such as Australia, supplying 
the name and number of their coordinator in Australia and urging all their supporters 
there not to deal with anyone else who might claim to be affiliated with Tamarod. 
This widespread group arrangement not only relies on a highly organised network but 
also on good resources unavailable to a spontaneous grassroots movement, to achieve 
its aims of presenting itself in mainstream media. These resources helped sustain the  
group’s objectives until they were fulfilled on 3 July 2013, by the toppling of Morsi and 
the subsequent ban of the Brotherhood.   
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It is also notable that posts by the group administrators did not receive many ‘shares’ 
or ‘likes’, compared, for example, to the ‘We are all Khaled Said’ group, in spite of 
frequent daily updating.  The group posted links to mainstream media interviews with 
Tamarod’s founders, such as a link to a programme inviting Waleed Al-Masry, one of 
the group’s members, to defend the group after accusations against them: 
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
Once Morsi’s regime was toppled, Tamarod used its mobilisation activities to call for 
people to support the Egyptian army. However, their support for the army-backed 
interim government diminished following the interim president’s signing of a new law 
criminalising protests without prior approval. The group held well-attended press 
conferences announcing their rejection of the law: 
•  
•  
•  
 
 
 
 
The group was also known for declining US aid to Egypt and for refusing to negotiate 
with them. They criticised the US efforts to mediate between the Brotherhood and the 
interim government, and they launched a campaign to support the Egyptian 
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government against any form of foreign intervention. the group issued a statement in 
May 2014, claiming that they were contacted by the US embassy in Cairo to hold a 
meeting with US officials, but the group announced publicly that they had refused to 
hold such a meeting on the basis that the US was seeking to harm the Arab world and 
Egypt; on a previous occasion (October 2013), the group had called for the Egyptian 
government not to accept US aid:   
•  
 
 
The most featured figures in the group were the leaders and founders and there were 
several pictures of them holding press conferences or speaking at public events:  
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The toppling of Morsi achieved its aims in July 2013, and the group featured several 
campaigns to tackle economic and social problems, such as a festival to revive the 
tourist industry in southern Egypt, a campaign to monitor sexual harassment in the 
street and another to monitor prices of basic goods, including meat:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The original group also publicly announced its full support for Al-Sisi’s candidacy for 
the presidency however, the new (split) group announced its support for Al-Sisi’s rival 
candidate, Hamdeen Sabahi. One of the leading members, Mohamed Heikal, said in an 
interview:  
What happened is that members of the movement conducted a poll to determine 
which presidential candidates they supported, and the overwhelming majority 
supported Al-Sisi. Thus, the movement responded to the opinion of the majority. 
The support voiced by another group for the presidential candidate Sabahi is a 
personal opinion that we respect,’ (quoted in Mokbel, 2014).  
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Mohamed Abdel Aziz, one of Sabahi’s supporters, stressed the importance of a 
difference of opinion, and that difference should not, according to him, be seen as a 
breeding ground for division. The group attempted to turn the movement into a 
political party but there was opposition within the movement. One of the opposing 
voices, Moheb Doss, said in an interview that turning the movement into a party would 
simply invalidate its aims, and that it should be dissolved once the parliamentary 
elections were concluded. Observers, on the other hand, did not foresee the 
movement as being successful as a political party due to its lack of a clear programme 
(Mokbel, 2014). 
 
5.7. Chapter summary 
The following table summarises the mapping of the selected interactivity features 
regarding the selected Facebook groups, divided by their focus - local or national -, and 
the extent of their updating, mobilisation activities and the targeted key figures or 
ordinary people:  
135 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Movement 
Focus Updating Links to Mobilisation 
activities 
Actors 
Local National Little Sufficient Extensive Mainstream 
media 
Alternative 
media 
Civil 
society 
Petition, 
campaign, 
action 
calendar 
None Founders 
and 
leaders 
Laymen  
Dar Essalam 
 
x  x     x x  x x 
6 April 
 
x x   x x x  x  x  
We are all KS 
 
 x  x  x x  x  x  
Tamarod  
 
x x   x x   x  x  
 
Table 5.1:  overview of interactivity features in selected Facebook groups
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Table 5.1 shows the prominence of key activists and founders of movements in such 
groups, who have monopolised debates on reforms and activism, although there do 
not appear to be any clear aims towards setting up political parties. Some groups such 
as ‘April 6’ and Tamarod, on the other hand, saw internal splits by members who set 
up rival groups with the same name but different leaders. It is notable in all these 
groups is that their mobilisation activities, as well as their desire to engage with users, 
generally focused on large issues such as reforming the police and the justice system, 
improving living standards, cleaning the cities, improving examinations and 
educational services, rationalising prices, and so on. This means that such groups were 
not acting as political parties with clear manifestos, instead, their mission seemed to 
centre on improving and reforming the state services (see also Chapters Six and 
Seven). The groups’ activities can therefore be characterised as sporadic rather than 
focused and strategic. This may not be an indicator of a healthy civil society in which 
each group is concerned with a particular policy or reform, instead, the selected 
groups here seem to use social media, Facebook in particular, as a medium of visibility 
and immediate impact rather than for sustainable civil society capacity-building. It is 
also worth noting that the Tamarod and ‘Khaled Said’ groups have since ceased their 
activities, and the ‘6 April’ group split up and were later banned by the Egyptian court, 
and the last group, ‘Dar Essalam and Maadi’ practically ceased updating their posts. 
This is another example of social media being used for the purpose of gaining 
attention rather than focusing on civil society sustainability.  
It is true that these Facebook groups created a space for debate and interaction as 
well as collaboration, but their greatest achievement, it is argued here, is that they 
managed to decentralise political debate in Egypt; for decades, movements and 
parties were focusing on Cairo and big cities such as Alexandria, with the internet and 
social media movements, as shown above, were competing against each other in 
order to launch sub-groups in other governorates, by posting several photographs of 
events held in remote places, for example. A group like Dar Essalam Youth is also an 
example of this decentralisation, serving one neighbourhood in Greater Cairo, and 
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calling for neighbours to collaborate on projects for the improvement of their 
neighbourhoods. Social media may indeed become a catalyst for long-term political 
gains.  
An attempt to distinguish between thick and thin civic engagement is based on 
Zuckerman’s model (2013) of online engagement. The second refers to actions which 
require little effort such as signing a petition or giving a donation, and the action 
organisers and coordinators had a clear idea of what they wanted the participants to 
do, while thick participation requires creativity and contribution towards solving a 
problem, and here the participants are expected to contribute ideas to the whole 
campaign. The other axis is best termed ‘voice’, as Zuckerman argues (2013). It can be 
symbolic-expressive or impactful-instrumental. The symbolic-expressive side of this 
spectrum denotes the participants’ support for, or opposition to, a certain cause, but 
there is little expectation that the movement behind the cause will lead to tangible 
results in changing the laws; the participation, however, could contribute to changing 
the climate in which that change could occur. Impactful or instrumental voicing, on the 
other hand, is focused on a specific outcome behind a major change such as passing 
new laws. It can be argued that the Dar Essalam Youth movement required thin-
symbolic involvement in that it did not aim to change any laws or the surrounding 
environment, but only to increase awareness and the level of people’s participation in 
the neighbourhood; on the opposite scale of thick impactful engagement is Tamarod, 
which directly sought to change the president and the whole cabinet and even 
eliminate the ‘Brotherhoodisation’ of the state by sacking officials and ministers hired 
by Morsi’s government.  
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• Figure 5.1 Zuckerman’s civic engagement model  
 
There is moreover, a general suspicion of partisanship and organised politics, as 
activists clearly prefer unaffiliated movements over structured political parties. 
Disenchantment with parties could be justified by years and decades of living with 
either one party system (Nasser’s regime) or suppressed opposition (Sadat’s and 
Mubarak’s regimes). It is in such an environment that individual figures could gain 
support, regardless of their political affiliation such as Hamdeen Sabbahi (Nasserite) 
and individual members of the Muslim Brotherhood who were known for their 
charitable organisations. Once Morsi began to show support for his party’s agenda, 
people denounced him (Iskandar, 2013). This is why movements like ‘We are all Khaled 
Said’ have managed to attract many followers and supporters, simply because they 
refused to be affiliated to a certain political ideology or party. Tamarod followed suit 
and organised its movements by seeking support from political constituencies and 
ideologies opposed to the Brotherhood. This process made it clear to its supporters 
that although the members did not seek to use certain slogans, flags or images of 
Thin  
Impactful   
Symbolic   
Thick  
Tamarod 
We are all 
Khaled Said 
Dar Essalam and Maadi 
6 April 
movement 
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political figures (Iskandar, 2013), once their mission was completed by the overthrow 
of Morsi, Tamarod’s leading figures announced their wish to form a political party and 
enter politics, but, to date, these efforts have been limited and the whole movement 
split into two fronts.  The following chapters continue with the discussion by focusing 
on the fieldwork regarding activists and ordinary citizens in Cairo.  
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Chapter Six 
Social media as a tool for political socialisation 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Cottle (2011, 657) points out that there is a need for more in-depth analyses of the 
Arab uprisings by paying close attention to ‘how media systems and communication 
networks have complexly entered into their different and continuing trajectories’, 
consequently, activists who regularly used new media, indirect users of these media 
and a few journalists from traditional media, such as print and television, were 
interviewed. The aim is to examine how use of the internet and social media 
transformed collective action in Egypt.  
The 18 days spent in Tahrir Square were like a dream for many informants, especially 
those interviewed in early 2011,  immediately after the success of the revolution 
which forced Mubarak to step down; for the first time they had discovered a sense of 
solidarity with other Egyptians, from all walks of life, who represented different 
ideologies such as Islamism, liberalism and socialism.  
I could never imagine that atmosphere in Tahrir where men and women sit in the 
same tents in the square and discuss politics. Did you see how Christians formed a 
circle around Muslims to protect them while [they were] praying, and we [Muslims] 
also protected them. This is the first time I felt so proud of being Egyptian and I did 
not care about my family’s pleas for me to come home and leave Tahrir. We all 
shared scarce food and water, and felt this feeling of unity which I have never felt 
before in my life’ (Mona, 34).   
This chapter reflects on themes emerging from these interviews by focusing on the 
advantages of using social media, as highlighted by the informants; such advantages 
include the immediate visibility gained by using these media, as well as being a tool for 
information dissemination. The interviewees’ opinions of mainstream media versus 
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social media will also be examined, which should be seen in contrast to the views 
expressed by focus groups (see Chapter 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Social media as a tool for political socialisation and information portal 
The rise of the internet as a new virtual platform has kindled hopes of a more 
democratic mode of exchanging information amongst citizens within the same 
national boundaries, and even with others outside of their region; through text, links 
and multimedia messages, including voice and video streaming, existing and new 
social movements can avoid state control while directly targeting and addressing 
audiences inside and outside of their area (Dartnell, 2003). New technology therefore, 
can play a critical role in facilitating public deliberation and public mobilisation by 
enabling debates and discussions about state security brutality (Lewinski and 
Mohammed, 2012). These virtual platforms enable access to like-minded dissidents 
who can engage in public deliberations while mobilising for political activities, 
including organised protests. New media and technology do not therefore only shake 
up political culture nationally and internationally, but also create it. Political culture 
here refers to activities based on communication, argumentation and building 
consensus (Almond & Verba, 1963).  
This culture serves as a framework for collective action which enables group members 
to identify and share their anti-regime criticism (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). It 
might be difficult to foster and sustain a healthy exchange of ideas in order to build a 
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consensus in authoritarian regimes like Egypt, unlike the situation in democratic 
societies. It might be even assumed that the public  in such authoritarian societies  
may not need to engage in any form of collective action, as decisions are not based on 
a consensus to accept change; in such societies, state institutions and civil society, 
however restricted these are, may not depend on citizens’ deliberations to initiate and 
implement transformation.  
Autocracies also depend on some form of participation, on the other hand, in order to 
ascertain what the public wants or needs, or even to engage with this public for 
indoctrination (Fuchs, 2007; Dalton and Kingemann, 2007). Howard (2010, p. 14) 
argues: ‘in an authoritarian context, “political culture” can mean a range of social 
activities that take on political importance in societies where regimes/elites actively 
manage cultural interaction’.  Scholars such as Inglehart (1997) argue that political 
cultures differ, according to cultural values that divide societies into those who adopt 
traditional cultural values (materialist) and those who adopt self-expression values 
(post-materialist). The traditional culture is seen as the opposite of secular-rational 
values, where the former foregrounds them as religious values, obedience and 
patriotism, for example, while the latter emphasise values such as trust, tolerance, 
equality and citizen participation (Inglehart & Welzel, 2010). It follows that the more 
cultural values shift towards the secular-rational dimension, the more society 
experiences dissent and protest. Citizens in such situations, or at least a large number 
of citizens in a given autocracy, will feel that the regime neither articulates their needs 
nor conforms to their principles, consequently, the regime would lose its legitimacy; 
moreover, citizens would lose trust in it from their own experiences, as the regime’s 
policy or actions accentuates the gap between the citizens’ principles and values and 
state rhetoric (Mishler and Rose, 2002). Political culture is thus drawn from citizens’ 
attitudes and values, which, in turn, have been internalised through cultural and 
political socialisation (Fuchs, 2007).  
Western coverage of the revolution and several studies assumed it was a ‘Facebook 
rebellion’, following the events in 2011 in Egypt, referring particularly to the role 
played by social and new media in shaking up the political culture in country. The 
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argument is that Egyptian citizens, particularly the young generation, have 
experienced a new openness to global political discourses, and have therefore shifted 
their cultural values towards that secular-rational dimension. New and social media 
were consequently seen as one direct cause of the revolution, which is an argument 
largely rejected by the interviewees in this research; for instance, Essam (32, male) 
rejects any direct link between social media and the success of the revolution, arguing 
that the political situation encourages the use of media, not vice versa: ‘It is the 
political scene that drives bloggers to write and mobilise, not the other way round. 
Don’t forget that millions of Egyptians still do not have access to the internet.’  
One of these activists was asked whether he thought that the January 25 Revolution 
was driven by the ‘media-savvy’ youth who had access to the internet, he said that it 
was the former regime’s intention to depict it that way: ‘The [Mubarak] government 
wanted to make it look like a Facebook revolution in order to create a gap between 
the working [class] and middle-class. The truth is we all took part and we [middle-
class] showed the others that we fight like them (Omar, 33). There is also a belief that 
blogging or social media politicise people; rather, bloggers and social media users 
simply use these media to express their views without necessarily being committed 
activists: ‘I know bloggers who only write about their views but not all of them are 
political activists - a few of them have become well known, even in the American 
media, because of their political views and they have turned into activists’ (Mustafa, 
29, male).  Social media, according to these interviews, were not the driving force 
behind the January revolution, although they helped in coordinating events. Some of 
them did not even hear about the event on Facebook: ‘I knew about the January 25 
[rebellion] from a friend of mine, not from Facebook. I then looked on Facebook and 
found a campaign calling for people to take to the streets on the Police Day [25 
January] (Karim, 28, male).  
Kholoud (36, male) claims that social media have significantly contributed to raising 
awareness about state corruption and police brutality:  
It was through social media that we heard about people like Khaled Said and what 
happened to him at the hands of the police. There were also debates on social media 
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about girls who were sexually harassed and even raped during protests. We used 
technology to reach out to people outside Egypt, even if we do not know all of them 
very well. We wanted them to know what was happening in Egypt and not to believe 
what Egyptian television was broadcasting. 
 Another informant, Hala (43, female) who was trained in making 
documentaries, said that she went to Tahrir during the 18 days in 2011 to 
record actual footage of the daily encounters between the youth and the 
police. 
I filmed tapes and tapes of footage, and every day I went to Tahrir, I was running the 
risk of getting shot in Tahrir, but I wanted to get those tapes and upload raw footage 
on YouTube so that my friends abroad would watch it and spread it among their 
circles. I wanted the whole world to know what was happening to us.   
Ziad (37, male) agrees with this view. ‘Social media had a role in our protests because 
they gave us a space which traditional media did not give us.’ 
Political activism is still seen as an effective and organised process that is based on 
commitment and engagement with like-minded activists and not just on ad hoc 
networking, as expressed by another interviewee (Amr, 28, male):  
It is still a luxury to have access to the internet and actually dedicate most of your 
day to writing a blog or a tweet. Even if we all write blogs and tweets, not all of us 
end up in street protests. We need to raise awareness among all citizens to take part 
in political action.  
Others appreciated the role played by social media in facilitating mobilisation, 
particularly with like-minded protestors. Sherine (43, female), for instance, argued that 
Facebook was instrumental in the successful spreading of the news about the 
revolution:  
We used to check FB [Facebook] to know about coming events and meetings. FB 
is the reason behind 25/1 and 30/6. When I went to the street during Morsi’s 
toppling, it was after I heard about it on FB. But 30/6 was because of TV, because 
of illiteracy. FB and Twitter remain leaders. We use them to know about protest 
places and times. People are connected via FB.  I met new activists on FB after 
25/1. I was not an activist before 25/1, but after it, I joined political parties. I used 
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to have a problem with MB [Muslim Brotherhood], and I joined a party to fight 
them. I started on FB around 25/1, when there was a curfew, 10 hours a day. I 
used to go on FB, my daughter taught me how to do so. 90 per cent of organisers 
of 25/1 were on FB. There were youth who have nothing to do with movements 
not even 6 April. There was no literary participation before 25/1. 
She personally depended on Facebook to check for any relevant information and 
arrange for protests and sit-ins, and even to sift through invitations to join such 
protests: 
I know about all movements and events on FB and I make up my mind after 
following the debates on it; for instance, I decided not to go to Mohamed 
Mahmoud protests but I followed all about it [sic] from FB. If I want to mobilise 
people for a protest, then I use FB. Of course, I target certain people who are 
interested in similar causes e.g. quota for women in parliament, and I know like-
minded people will join me. I can also follow MB’s news on FB. I also get the news 
about their protests so I avoid those streets. We use FB to upload out[side] 
events, but obviously we only approach or reach certain like-minded [people]. 
We have a problem reaching out to lower classes like [Tawfik] Okasha [a famous 
talk show host known for his large fan base among the poor] does.  
Tawfik Okasha, referred to above, was known for his rhetoric against the Muslim 
Brotherhood, delivered in an easy style and popular language which usually appealed 
to the less privileged class. He frequently defended the Egyptian army in his shows, 
calling it ‘the oldest and best in the world’ (Carr and Al-Dabh, 2013).  
Not all Egyptians had access to social media, however, but Sherine argues that they 
are keen to own a smartphone, and hence be connected to such portals as social 
media:  
FB is a strange phenomenon, you can see an employee who only earns 500 pounds 
and spends half of it on a smartphone or internet access in order to stay online and 
follow FB and social media, or use an internet café. There is an increase here I think.  
The informants interviewed for this research also strongly argued that Facebook and 
social media had attracted many Egyptians since the 2011 revolution, resulting from 
the extensive media coverage of several Facebook-based groups such as ‘We are all 
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Khaled Said’. Khaled (28, male, interviewee), for instance, said that he moved from 
one social medium to another following 2011, in an attempt to reach out to his 
generation who were, in his view, doubtful of traditional political institutions and saw 
in social media a new avenue for deliberation and political debate: 
I use Facebook, although, after the revolution [2011], I left it and joined Twitter 
instead. I did not use it before that time. I used it briefly in 2007, then I stopped 
using it for a long while. I can’t remember seeing anyone using FB for political 
reasons. After January 25, many people used it [… as they felt…] that it is a new 
tool to reach out to one another. There is a whole generation out there, and I 
want to communicate with them. It is a generation against traditional 
organisation, and they have therefore fled to the FB. For them, this is the kernel 
of communication and dissemination. These youth are against traditional 
ideologies and the principle of freedom from belonging to a certain party and 
tight affiliation; in 2006, people used to blog and there were talks about how 
blogging could change our political sphere and journalism. Now it is FB which is 
claimed to have caused the revolution. But blogs have disappeared, and became 
history. The movements, tools and street have become a very complex 
mechanism; of course, we can’t reach everyone, but I do have new tools today, 
and the FB is a successful tool, although not everyone uses it. The matter is 
complicated now, because I have to have online presence on FB and ‘Twitter’ as 
well as an actual presence via a party. All new media are tools and the means 
that help me in my work, but it is not the final aim, it is just the tool.  
Khaled therefore disputes the claims that some people make regarding the existence 
of a strong link between social media and revolution:  
I disagree with many countries which claim that we’ve just started to take part in 
politics now. There was mobilisation in 2000 and 2002. There was popular 
intifada, hundreds of thousands and even millions during the Iraq War. Today all 
of us have become politicised, even children, because of the 25/1 [revolution] 
and they saw the internet as an important tool that made it easier for them to 
talk and debate.  
Yasser (56, male) also agreed that social media may have galvanised political activity in 
Egypt, but it did not ignite the revolution:  
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Social media have invigorated political activities, but not the revolution, because 
revolutions  [… have to…] ‘brew’ for a few years because of many reasons on the 
ground. People resort to online fora, because offline fora are corrupt and usually 
belong to the state. 
6.3 Visibility in social versus traditional media 
Another strong motivation for using social media is the degree of convenience 
available to its users who would otherwise have limited or no access to traditional 
media, whether state-owned or private. Khaled (28, male) for instance, asserts that 
visibility has become accessible to many more citizens since the rise of social media 
use in Egypt:  
Visibility is now available to everyone. I write to people to call them to my events, 
sometimes I argue with some of them - I call it ‘dawa’ [evangelism] - to influence 
and mobilise [them]. I just wait for people to join me. I disagree with those who 
use FB to educate people. This is not my job. What happens online is that some 
people come with an idea, others develop it, and others implement it. We discuss 
ideas online - do the brainstorming like we do offline.  
Karim (28, male) provides another example of using social media to mobilise political 
action, referring particularly to the campaign to support Mohamed Al-Baradei on 
Facebook since 2005: 
At the time of Kefaya, our front [political movement] supported Baradei. There 
were half a million people on our FB page supporting Baradei, and signatures 
were collected from the street supporting the reform statement. This was well 
before 2011. Those who signed were street vendors and shoe polishers and many 
others from all walks of life. [The year] 2011 made a leap in using social media. All 
of a sudden there was a huge increase in the users. People embraced it, even 
among the older generation like Hamdeen Sabbahi and Amr Moussa, so it is only 
popular among youth. We received invites [invitations] to take part in the 
‘January 25’ protests on FB. These [social] media served also as a bridge between 
Egyptians inside and outside of Egypt. All meetings were on social media, because 
of security reasons. Instead of meeting offline, it was much easier to meet on FB. 
We used to hide our identit[ies], every one of us had 10 different accounts. The 
‘Baradei group’ was an important tool. All its youth risked their lives, especially 
the admins [administrators]. The same with ‘We are Kahled Said’. The 
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[administrators] were the leaders behind these pages. The ordinary citizen has a 
smart phone now. The number of users increased drastically and the number of 
pages as well. There was, for example, a huge debate on FB during the 
referendum of March 2011.  There was another debate during SCAF [Supreme 
Council of Armed Forces] rule, and again during the MB [reign].  
Eyad (56, male) also appreciated the role of social media in increasing his and other 
activists’ visibility, in what turned into a crowded political scene, post-2011: 
I used the FB to republish some of my articles from 2005 in which I attacked the 
MB. I used FB [and] blogs but then left them, and now use ‘Twitter’. I put links to 
my articles. The FB users increased dramatically after 6 April 2008 when it was 
looked [upon] as a dangerous Western tool, especially among the Salafists, now 
everyone, even Salafists, uses it. 
 The crowded social media sphere can be a disadvantage, however,  if the search for 
new media as a tool to document the 2011 revolution is required. ‘There has been a 
random documentation of the 2005 January revolution. Everyone sees it from their 
own perspective (FB as documentation tool)’ (Tariq, 41, male).  
The spread of social media use among Egyptians puzzled the state security institutions, 
asserted Khaled (28, male), since they were seen as part of the international plot to 
overthrow the regime in Egypt: 
The new ideology believed that revolution is a conspiracy, such as the police. 
They cannot believe that people who went out on 25/1, were complacent - how 
could people take to the street in Cairo, Assuit and all other cities?  They cannot 
believe it. They do not believe that Egyptians can get into discussion on ‘Twitter’. 
Why these tools are not the monopoly of the police and the army? This is why 
they think it is a conspiracy.  
What the state did not understand, argues another activist (Amr, 28) was that online 
activities went hand-in-hand with offline activities, paving the way for the 2011 
revolution: 
Alongside Kefaya and the blogs in 2005, protests for judicial independence in 
2006, ‘6 April’ in 2008, there was another parallel movement organising 
blockages in villages and small towns; for instance, villagers could block the main 
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road if the water services were disrupted; when both trends converged, the 
revolution erupted.   
Western media were not alone in depicting the typical Egyptian protester as social 
media-savvy (Fox, 2011)  but the Egyptian media did so as well, albeit for a different 
reason. Amr (28, male) went as far as arguing that the state deliberately depicted the 
uprising in 2011 as being triggered by social media users in order to weaken the 
solidarity between the middle-class (of which the majority of social media users were) 
and the less privileged classes (who had limited access to social media): 
The government used to say that it is a FB revolution so that they can separate 
those from Zamalek [rich neighbourhood] and those from Boulaq [poor 
neighbourhood, not far from Zamalek area], so that they take the latter to prison 
and the former to meetings with the regime, or to accuse us of treason. As one of 
the lucky class, I had to follow a new tactic - to be part of the problem - so we 
went to the street so that we could be beaten up and other people behind us 
would protest for us.  
Amr (28, male) was not the only activist who stressed that point; a few other middle-
class informants  said the same thing, and ironically, they all recounted the same 
experience of being in the squares, and the poor people (usually street vendors or 
street children) pledging to stay behind, so that they would take the beatings and the 
bullets, saving the middle-class rebels, on the grounds that the latter group alone was 
fit to ‘clean up the country’ in an indication that the poor thought of the middle-class 
as leaders of the country, even after the revolution.  One informant, Ahmed, is 27 
years old and has only primary school education. He recounted how some ‘middle-
class’ young men visited his neighbourhood before 25 January 2011, inviting people 
like him to join the planned protest. He guessed that those middle-class youths 
belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood; however, when he went to Tahrir Square to join 
the protests, he could not stay there for long: political activity is class-based, according 
to  the interviewee, and people like him could not afford the luxury of staying out of 
work for an extended period: 
When we went to Tahrir, we discovered that we [could not] be there for more 
than two days; after that, we discovered that we [could not] stay there unless we 
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were rich, [we were unable] to sustain our life there. People like us cannot afford 
not to work for two days in a row. People who stayed were those from the upper-
class and middle-class. We thought Egypt would change but this did not happen. 
The social justice was only for investors, not for us. You know, during Mubarak’s 
regime, new satellite cities used to have new houses for a moderate deposit, for 
example, 5,000 [Egyptian] pounds. Right after 25 January, many lands [sic] in 
these new cities were sold, and new units were advertised for deposits that 
exceed 25,000 [Egyptian] pounds or much more expensive than during Mubarak’s 
regime. 25 January has to happen again in order to ensure social justice.  
 
Using social media can also be seen as a safer alternative to going to public meetings, 
thereby avoiding heavy state censorship or, as Manal (28, female) put it: 
The government tries hard to follow activists online, but they cannot follow 
everyone, so we have a relatively free space there. I think many people join the 
online discussions [on Facebook] as a means of self-expression, because there is no 
other alternative for such a discussion otherwise. And in order to protect themselves, 
many people just use fake names. 
To sum up, the activists saw in social media a new forum for participation and 
conversation that was absent from the real political sphere. Social media, as Mayfield 
(2008, 7) argues, can therefore promote participation, openness, dialogue and 
connectedness, however, this does not mean that traditional media such as television 
have lost their influential role in society: the informants in this research tended to 
highlight the symbiotic relationship that had recently emerged between traditional 
media - including the press and television - on the one hand, and social media, on the 
other.   
6.4 Role of mainstream media 
The assumption that the 2011 revolution was partially responsible for the ubiquitous 
social media is contradicted by the 2013 uprising (and coup) being credited to the 
mainstream media, particularly television channels such as Al-Faraeen. The channel’s 
owner, Tawfik Okasha, was often mentioned in the press and other talk shows as a 
rhetorical force that helped overthrow the Brotherhood’s rule. Okasha resigned his job 
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in state television in 2009, in order to set up his channel, Al-Faraeen, and host his own 
talk show which was characterised by his frequent talks and warnings about 
conspiracies against Egypt and its army, although he did not produce any factual 
evidence (Carr and Al-Debh, 2013). He also used his show to attack NGOs such as the 
‘April 6’ movement on the grounds that they received funding from abroad. He also 
attacked Mohamed Al-Baradei, the former leader behind the Dustour Party, calling 
him an Israeli agent and Freemason (Carr and Al-Debh, 2013). Okasha’s rhetoric is 
characterised by his colloquial language, thus presenting himself as the everyman who 
understands the ordeal of the less advantaged groups. Two of the informants 
interviewed (Ahmed, age, male, and Said, age, male) belonged to such groups and 
they confirmed that they regularly watched Okasha’s programme, in which he referred 
to what he presented as ‘indisputable facts’. The channel claimed to have 300 million 
viewers in Egypt and the Middle East. His rhetoric against the Brotherhood, during 
Morsi’s rule, led to the closure of his channel in 2012, after he was accused of inciting 
his viewers to kill Morsi. The charges were dropped and the channel went back on the 
air in January 2013. Following the toppling of Morsi’s rule, Okasha produced a short 
documentary called ‘The Two Men’, in which he credited himself and Al-Sisi for the 
success of the massive protests of 30 June (Carr and Al-Dabh, 2013). 
Social media can serve as a new source of information for traditional news media, as 
Karim (28, male) argues:  
Social media provides material for the traditional media like television, which use 
opinions and news expressed on social media, and also get to know activists from 
there. SM [social media] has become the television’s research tool and 
producers’ tool. Social media can be used for participation, campaign, advocacy, 
mobilisation, local news, and alternative media. 
 Khaled (28, male) also agrees with this view, saying that journalists use social media 
for news-gathering purposes: 
There are journalists who make news from ‘Twitter’. They can also follow activists 
and meetings there, so social media have changed traditional media and news-
gathering so journalists do not even need to leave their desks. 
152 
 
 Karim (28, male) also asserts that there is a ‘symbiotic relationship between 
traditional and social media’ although, in his view, ‘television still leads’. 
The massive protests against the MB rule on 30 June is strong proof of the power of 
television and the press in stirring the public debate against the regime; although all 
the informants interviewed appreciated the role of social media in mobilisation, they 
robustly argued that traditional media, particularly television, had played a significant 
role in toppling the rule of the MB. Sherine (43, female) mentioned how each talk 
show host had secured a distinct fan base which he or she had mobilised, prior to the 
30 June protests:  
On Facebook, we used to coordinate with the television channels to educate 
people, but now there is an awakening, even among street vendors. During 
Mubarak […’s time], we did not dare to talk, now we can tell you who is honest 
and who is not. Women went down, during 30/6, with their couches in the street 
[referring to the group called ‘Couch Party’]. It was the TV that encouraged them. 
People like Lamees Hadidi and Tawfik Okahsa, Reem Maged [all talk show hosts] 
are leaders. These talk shows are very powerful. Okasha [from Faraeen channel] 
has a huge fan base among peasants and the lower class because of his ability to 
talk politics to them in a very simple style. I saw once on TV a lower-class lady 
holding [Al-]Sisi’s photo in front of Morsi’s photo, and the MB supporters hit her. 
She was then invited to Tahrir channel in Ahmed Mousa’s programme, and we 
knew then that she used to borrow money in order to go to protests against the 
MB, because she could not afford the travel ticket. On television, she said that 
she knew about Putin, Obama and Hamas, and she repeated what Okasha used 
to say in his talk show. Each channel has its supports: Lamees Hadidi [CBC 
channel] has her fans amongst the intellectuals and educated class; ONTV 
[channel] is for revolutionary youth, and Amr Adeeb [Orbit channel] talks to the 
rich because he appears on a subscription-only channel.  
Traditional media such as television, on the other hand, can also cause the fall of 
activists such as Yasser (58, male), who found that his contribution as a guest in a talk 
show led to his being sacked from his job in the state-owned media.  
Media can help and encourage this revolution. When I heard about the protest, I 
went to the Square. On the same night [25 January], I was invited to a television 
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programme, and I spoke fervently about the protest’s first day, about the protesters 
and about the corruption on Egyptian state television. On the same night, I received 
the decision that I was suspended from my job. 
Social media, therefore, can serve as a new source of news by defying traditional news 
sources such as state television, but also as an avenue for further debates on what has 
been broadcast in mainstream television. News about the Tunisian revolution, for 
instance, and the fleeing of the former Tunisian president, Ben-Ali, to Saudi Arabia in 
December 2010, was circulated and debated on social media sites inciting Egyptians 
‘to rise up like fellow Tunisians’ (Karim, 28, male). Young Egyptians then felt urged to 
follow the example of the Tunisian youth and their brave stand against Ben-Ali’s 
government. Mustafa (29, male) states that ‘I follow the news on Facebook better 
than reading the newspapers, except Al Masry Al Youm, I think’,  yet other informants 
such as Omar (33 , male), were still wary of the fabricated information circulated 
online: ‘I know that some news on Facebook is incorrect, so I sometimes check with 
newspaper websites to make sure the information is correct.  Papers like Al-Masry Al-
Youm tend to be more credible’, thus, mainstream media, although now competing 
with social media, can still serve as a credible source of information. 
Several informants saw social media not only as a new source of information but also 
as a tool by which to monitor the credibility of news broadcast on state media. Essam 
(32, male), for instance, recalls how he and his friends used social media such as 
Facebook and YouTube to check the truth of what state officials were saying on state 
television:  
There were bloggers [like Wael Abbas] who blogged about police brutality, and 
others who posted videos and short clips proving such brutality, while the [former] 
minister of the interior would appear on state television, denying that the police 
were ever brutal in their dealings with us.  
Information on social media, argues Essam, is seen as uncensored and honest 
communication from one citizen to another. YouTube videos posted by angry youths 
who rebelled against policy brutality and state corruption were seen as authentic 
communication, aiming to raise awareness and challenge the former regime which had 
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had complete control of state-owned media, and has practiced harsh censorship 
against private media. Young people would also use social media to arrange protests, 
even small-scale events; in fact, a popular television series broadcast during Ramadan 
2013, called ‘The Preacher’, tells the story of a female activist who used Facebook to 
arrange street protests, inviting friends on her Facebook page to join such protests; on 
the other hand, as Mohammed (39, male) says, social media can also be accessed by 
police and state forces to track and monitor protest movements: ‘Some people who 
you don’t know can ask you to go somewhere for a fake protest arranged by the police 
to track protestors.’ To address such risks, protestors would usually verify news about 
protests from trusted sources and other activists, which shows that strong ties and 
trust still play a pivotal role in authoritarian states such as Egypt.  
 
6.5 Decentralised politics 
There is no doubt that the internet has facilitated a public debate that reaches out to 
geographically dispersed citizens. It has, therefore, contributed to decentralising 
political movements, which, at least in the case of Egypt, had usually been confined to 
the capital, Cairo. Citizens, particularly the politically marginalised, are therefore not 
bound to the top-down communication previously monopolised by mainstream media 
such as television and radio (Chadwick, 2006; Mitra, 2001). Communication in new 
media, as mentioned in Chapter Three, is based on trust, but this does not mean there 
is a necessity for strong ties among participants for such communication: that they all 
know each other very well. McAdam et al. (2001) argue that social ties can act as 
brokerage in linking different groups, but information is actually communicated faster 
through weak and broad ties than via strong ones: weak ties can help create social 
bridges between different groups, while strong ties are based on insular relationships; 
in times of protest, such as during the eruption of the 2011 revolution, people are 
exposed to information about dissident movements, and such information is quickly 
diffused amongst groups characterised by their weak ties.  
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The internet and social media in Egypt could also be used to reach out to citizens who 
were previously politically marginalised in the villages and provinces. Sherine (43, 
female) for instance, stated that her party used Facebook to communicate more 
quickly with people in villages - a task which could have proved difficult and even 
dangerous if it had been performed face-to-face:   
In my party, we use Facebook to recruit and communicate with people across the 
country. This is one huge advantage of Facebook: it is the decentralisation of 
communication which was once confined to Cairo and Alexandria. All new members, 
whether to the east or west of Cairo, can have a Facebook page for their 
neighbourhood or town. They also use Facebook to communicate with us, and we 
get new recruits and enquiries from there.  
Karim (28, male) shared this view, citing many examples of how social media helped 
people in Cairo make contact with other cities and villages. Social media, Karim 
argued, helped people living in wealthy neighbourhoods become aware of the 
disadvantaged citizens of living in their areas. Dar Essalaam is a case in point: some 
residents there set up a Facebook page to exchange information about local news. 
Amr (28, male) highlighted the fact that Facebook allowed the set-up of many groups, 
all fighting for the same cause, such as sexual harassment, which was the theme of 
many Egyptian groups on the social media page. This proves the decentralisation of 
national politics, although it could also entail the risk of disorder, which may confuse 
ordinary citizens who wish to engage in debates about such themes as sexual 
harassment. 
Social and new media complement, rather than totally replace the role played by 
traditional media; if traditional mass communication media, such as newspapers and 
broadcasting, helped spread information to citizens and link urban with rural 
residents, the new media enhanced this communication by rapidly diffusing 
information to different segments of the population, both inside and outside of Egypt. 
Communication can therefore help create social movements which in turn are able to 
contribute to the formation of a vibrant public space (Tarrow, 1998). This trend began 
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with the mass communication which shifted the previously localised repertoire of 
collective action (Rucht, 2004). 
The internet, on the other hand, accelerates this trend by providing a much cheaper 
form of communication; although communicators have to pay for internet access, they 
do not need to finance the costly production of printed matter, thereby creating new 
opportunity structures for dissident movements (Chadwick, 2006). The internet in 
authoritarian states such as Egypt also plays a pivotal role in not only helping these 
movements circumvent state control which hinders collective physical action (Howard, 
2010, p. 146), but also involve other like-minded protestors who use the internet to 
express their views and needs without fear of retribution by state security institutions.  
Not all the interviewees saw the internet as a means of achieving real mobilisation; 
instead, they pointed to the need for more organised offline action, particularly the 
mature interviewees (above the age of 50) who shared this view. Ibrahim (56, male) 
for instance, saw social media as not being able to successfully initiate political 
mobilisation because it was not an organised space, especially if there were many 
groups set up, almost on a daily basis, to discuss a single issue such as sexual 
harassment, for example, instead of these sites joining forces to launch a single, 
organised and nationwide campaign.   Yasser (58, male) also stated that social media 
needed to be used more efficiently, in order to mobilise support for offline activities, 
otherwise the internet would remain a space ‘for screams and shouts’. He also 
believed that it was very easy to create a FB group about any cause, but it was more 
difficult to sustain the group and turn it into an effective organisation. Ibrahim (56, 
male) related the problem to the lack of experience with democracy in Egypt, 
therefore people had no idea of how to practice ‘proper activism’, as he called it. He 
pointed to the sheer volume of those people who expressed support online (via ‘like’ 
or ‘share’) but who never actually showed up in offline meetings. Eyad (58, male) 
asserted that only a fraction of those online would take to the street to turn their 
online protest into real action. He saw the street as the real place to practice politics 
and activism, rather than online action which should be only for disseminating 
information and news.  
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6.6. Chapter summary  
The interviewees introduced in this chapter agreed on one thing: the days of January 
25 2011 were like a dream’ in that there was a great sense of solidarity, which they 
now missed, amongst all protestors, regardless of their ideological beliefs. The 
majority of the informants spoke fervently about the 18 days in the Square when they 
were happy to go to Tahrir every morning, if they were not already sleeping in one of 
the tents erected there. Young women reported about how they, for the first time, did 
not feel subject to sexual harassment, and the fact that men and women would sit in 
the same tent and just talk about politics. Manal (28, female), for instance, said: ‘There 
were bearded men sitting in the same tent like us [socialists and liberals] and they did 
not comment on us girls sitting with them. I loved the atmosphere, and I loved being 
Egyptian’. Hosam (34, male) likewise said that he felt empowered by the 
overwhelming feeling of solidarity which he had thought did not exist:  
Everyone was helping, and everyone one was respecting the other. I could not 
believe that we could be like this [helpful] in times of crisis, it felt so great, and I felt 
that we were capable of doing anything. I did not expect any change to happen, but I 
wanted to show solidarity and do my part. The police were very brutal and they were 
acting like thugs. They could have killed me and my friends, but at least we would 
have died for our rights.  
Hosam was proud to recount how he went to the Square every day, joining other 
young men from the neighbourhood (he lived relatively near Tahrir) and how they 
agreed on every day’s chores between them. It was like a job he did every day, for him, 
and he did not seem to complain about the financial sacrifice he must have made for 
not going to work every day during the 18-day revolution. Ahmed (27, male), on the 
other hand,  highlighted the difficulty in joining the protest for more than 48 hours, 
because he could not survive longer than that without a daily income, even as a street 
vendor serving the protestors. The difference between these two informants indicates 
the need to include socio-economic factors in the political analysis, and the financial 
restrictions on certain sections of the population when they joined street protests. 
Ahmed (27, male) also said that people from the lower classes would be called 
‘populists’ rather than Islamists or leftist or liberal.  
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To conclude, the internet can contribute to fostering dissident mobilisation in that it 
offers a relatively safe space for citizens to deliberate; it spreads information amongst 
groups characterised by their weak ties that can join in an action if they share similar 
interests; more importantly, it can facilitate interaction amongst citizens which could 
translate into offline action. The internet not only allows protesters to communicate 
relatively cheaply and instantaneously over great distances, but also allows them to 
avoid state control. It encourages dialogue and debate, although more or less 
centralised, in that there are still information gatekeepers (particularly known activists 
such as Wael Ghonim and celebrities – see Chapter Eight). There is still doubt, 
however, about whether social media allows citizens to launch organised action that 
translates into effective offline activities.  
It is worth noting how activists originally regarded the role of mainstream media as 
more influential than social media, especially in the lives of the socially 
disadvantaged groups. The dispute in not with this view, however, (as shall be seen 
in the discussion in Chapter Eight), in which it will be shown how ordinary young 
people denounced the role of mainstream media, claiming that they had stopped 
following the news television and newspapers, for example, preferring instead to 
obtain their information from updates via social media sites. 
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Chapter Seven 
The rise of the independents - the virtue of independent political 
movements 
 
7.1 Introduction  
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took over from the ousted president 
Mubarak, in the wake of the January 25 revolution, which began with reviewing the 
framework of political life in Egypt, after 30 years of the dominance of Mubarak’s 
National Democratic Party (NDP).  SCAF introduced a number of political reforms 
governing the establishment of political parties. Law decree No. 12 of 2011 amended 
the laws governing political parties, introduced in 1977. The appointment of a special 
judicial committee would be responsible for examining notifications about new 
political parties, and would ensure that they would be set up according to the law; 
once approved by the committee, new parties could practice their work. Parties must 
secure support from at least ten governorates and ideally, should not be based on 
religious or sectarian principles which would breach the principles of the constitution. 
The reforms aimed at simplifying the process of establishing political parties, in order 
to satisfy the growing appetite for political participation, following the revolution. The 
law also aimed to increase the accountability of political parties, making it possible for 
the state to dissolve a party if it violated the terms of the law. It was during that time 
that the Muslim Brotherhood set up its ‘Freedom and Justice’ party, but that period 
also witnessed a deluge of political parties and movements which amounted to more 
than 40, as shown in the following diagram: 
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Source: the blog ‘Arabist’ (http://arabist.net/archives/) 
The diagram illustrates the polarisation of political groups, roughly divided into four 
main blocs: religiously-oriented, secular, rightist and leftist parties. Bearing in mind 
this sudden diversity in the Egyptian political arena, this chapter aims to continue the 
discussion of the sampled activists’ views on this diverse political scene post-2011. The 
main theme elaborated in this chapter is the rise of so-called ‘independent political 
participants’, or, as shall be seen below, the emergence of a cohort of activists who 
actually preferred to remain independent of any political party and free to debate 
political matters by using new and social media, as one medium. 
7.2 Political ‘currents’ versus ‘parties’  
Several parties were banned, such as the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, 
after the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi’s rule on 3 July 2013, while others were 
created during that period. What is notable is the grouping of several parties into large 
alliances. The following is a list of known political alliances in Egypt, of which some 
were unregistered: 
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• National Front Coalition, which included the National Progressive Unionist 
Party, Future Party, Conference Party, Republican People's Party, Egyptian 
Patriotic Movement, My Homeland Egypt Party 
• Coalition of Social Justice and Democracy, which included the Tamarod 
movement, Egyptian Popular Current, Dignity Party, Arab Democratic 
Nasserist [Nasserite] Party, Socialist Popular Alliance Party 
• Anti-Coup Alliance (formed in June 2013 combating the military’s role in 
overthrowing Mohamed Morsi), included Building and Development 
Party, Freedom and Justice Party, New Labour Party, Virtue Party, 
Egyptian Reform Party, Arab Unification Party, Homeland Party, Al-Wasat 
Party, Authenticity Party, People’s Party 
• National Salvation Front, which included the Social Democratic Party, New 
Wafd Party, Farmers General Syndicate Constitution Party, Egyptian 
Popular Current, Socialist Popular Alliance Party, National Association for 
Change,  National Progressive Unionist Party, Conference Party, Reform 
and Development Misruna Party,  Socialist Party of Egypt,  Egypt's Future 
Party, Democratic Generation Party, Social Peace Party, Freedom Party, 
Freedom Egypt Party,  United Nasserist [Nasserite] Party, Egyptian 
Communist Party, Free Egyptians Party 
• Coalition for the Defence of Shari’a (Islamist party formed after the 
overthrow of Morsi) included Freedom and Justice Party, Building and 
Development Party,  Safety and Development Party, Authenticity Party, 
People’s Party, Egyptian Reform Party 
• Civil Democratic Movement, includes  Secular  Arab Democratic Nasserist 
[Nasserite] Party, Democratic Front Party, Egyptian Communist Party, 
Free Egyptians Party, Freedom Egypt Party, Egyptian Green Party,  Life of 
the Egyptians Party, Liberal Constitutional Party, Liberals Party, New Wafd 
Party, Socialist Popular Alliance Party, Young Egypt Party 
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• Egyptian Nation Alliance, which included Social Liberalism, Conference 
Party,  New Wafd Party, Free Egyptians Party,  Socialist Party of Egypt, 
Egyptian Communist Party, Socialist Popular Alliance Party, Socialist 
Revolutionary Movement (January), Tagammu Party, Workers 
Democratic Party, Workers and Peasants Party, Egyptian Popular Current 
Reform and Development Party, Egyptian Social Democratic Party, 
Egyptian Renaissance Party, Victory Party, Egyptian Liberation Party, 
Dignity Party 
• Social Justice Coalition (secular), included Egyptian Social Democratic Party, 
Socialist Party of Egypt, Constitution Party, Popular Coalition 
• Democratic Alliance for Egypt, (mainly Islamic), included Democratic 
Generation Party, Egyptian Arab Socialist Party, Ghad El-Thawra Party, 
Dignity Party, Labour Party, Ahrar Party, Egyptian Reform Party, Reform 
and Renaissance Party, Freedom and Justice Party, Freedom and 
Development Party 
Young Egyptians were not systematically targeted by traditional parties, and therefore 
they had not shown any appetite to join the political process in the past. The 
Generation in Waiting (Dhillon & Yousef, 2009) project, for instance, documented the 
frustration of young people, under the age of 29, with the education services in their 
countries. Young people were not interested in building their nation, according to a 
survey by the Egyptian Population Council in 2010, and many of them wished to 
emigrate, especially to the Gulf countries; moreover, recent surveys among young 
Egyptians showed that the majority were politically inactive (Sika, 2012), being unable 
to name the correct number of political parties in Egypt. It is worth noting that around 
21 per cent of people aged between 10  and 29 years had received limited or no 
education (IDSC, 2013). A survey conducted after the revolution of 2011, among a 
sample of 3,500 Egyptians who had participated in the revolution, showed that the 
majority of them belonged to a higher socio-economic stratum, and were avid users of 
the internet and other media (Moaddel, 2012).  
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Traditional parties did not put much effort into integrating young people into 
dedicated youth wings, and perhaps therefore, they embraced the opportunities 
provided by the 2011 revolution, in order to set up their own political movements and 
a few parties such as the Egyptian Current Party (Tayyar Masry party). The Current 
Party was set up in June 2011 by young people from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 
who chose to leave the group and form their own movement, with about 1,500 
members in Cairo and Alexandria and in some governorates in Upper Egypt. The 
founding members split from the MB, after nearly 10 years of working for it,  and 
contributed to the 2011 revolution; however, they decided to split from the 
movement, due to disagreement with the MB’s policy after it came to power. It was 
particularly parties moulded after intellectual ideologies such as liberalism and leftism 
which were abandoned by young people, compared to the religious parties such as the 
Salafist Nour or the Muslim Brotherhood. Influential Islamic preacher, Amr Khaled, set 
up Egypt’s ‘Future Party’ in September 2012, aiming to focus on social development 
rather than a specific political ideology. Following the toppling of Morsi’s rule in July 
2013, however, Khaled announced his permanent resignation from the leadership of 
the party, on the grounds that his preaching did not fit in with a political life.  
7.3 Moving between parties  
Several research informants either joined different political parties and movements, or 
moved from one to the other, particularly to the ‘Popular Current’ party (Tayyar 
Shaabi), led by the leftist, Hamdeen Sabahi (also a presidential candidate), the 
Egyptian Current (Tayyar Masry), the Dustour Party, the Oreed movement, and the 
‘April 6’ movement. The Popular Current party included many former members of the 
Karama Party and Al-Baradei’s campaign, and later, Al-Baradei’s Dostour Party, prior 
to Al-Baradei leaving it in 2013. The Dostour Party was founded in 2012 by Hamdeen 
Sabahi, who came third in the presidential elections in 2012. The Party declared itself 
as a movement that did not represent any particular political party but rather 
amalgamated different ideologies to create a current trend;  similar to many 
movements formed post-2011, the Popular Current party thrived on repeating the 
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2011 revolution slogans such as social justice, the end of military trials and the arrest 
of activists.  
 
Oreed (literally ‘I want’) was another movement which engaged in outreach activities 
such as workshops to inform and educate people about citizenship rights. It derived its 
funding from several Egyptian commercial corporations and publicised its aim to foster 
social entrepreneurship. It had agreements with different universities to offer training 
sessions to students that focused on interactive citizenship workshops. One of its key 
projects was called the Nahdat el Mahrousa (Innovative Social Enterprise), which 
trained social entrepreneurs to integrate their leadership skills and develop their 
potential in business and development (http://nahdetelmahrousa.org/social-
enterprises/oreed).  Such movements tended to target young people who were keen 
to join the political process but did not know how to begin, and it was one of many 
initiatives that surfaced post-2011, to educate and inform people about democracy 
and citizenship. Many such initiatives ceased to exist, however, either due to changes 
in their management or organisation, or due to the end of their funding, or a host of 
other reasons. This aim should be seen in contrast to the views expressed by some 
youths, including some of the research informants, who denounced the objective of 
‘educating the public’ as their mission, preferring, instead, to raise awareness of 
political rights. 
 
Al-Dustour party (literally ‘Constitution Party’) was a liberal party founded in 2012 by 
Mohamed Al-Baradei, former Director-General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (AEA). The party managed to attract a large cohort of young activists and many 
others of different age groups. Several of the research informants were former 
members or supporters of Al-Dustour. One of them, Eyad (58, male) joined the party in 
its first year of inception, before resigning in 2013 because he felt that the party no 
longer spoke for his interests. He saw the problem with this particular party as being 
one of those inclusive movements in which the members were undecided about their 
aims and objectives: one group wanted Al-Dustour to be a popular ‘current’ party and 
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another group wanted it to be an official political party. The problem, according to 
him, was that the members  could neither agree on the structure of the party nor on 
one ideological framework:  
People [members] managed to push for the set-up of a party, which was launched as 
Al-Dustour party; however, I expected this party to fail, because I thought it was 
better to support the idea of popular alliance with Al-Baradei as our leader, exactly 
like Hamdeen Sabahi did in his Popular Alliance. There are many movements, such as 
the Al-Baradei campaign, Haqenna [Our Right], Youth for Justice and Freedom (leftist 
movement), Lazem movement. They all met and wanted to form an alliance, and I 
thought we should have formed a popular alliance of all these diverse groups, not 
one political party. Each group wanted to dominate the party, but we ended up with 
a political party and all groups fought together about the manifesto. Al-Dustour had 
initially 20,000 members but many of them left and did not join any party later. 
Among the supporters we had some Salafist groups. This number is small though, if 
you know that more than 120,000 people expressed their interest in joining us, and 
filled out the joining form on the internet; however, when it was time to hold our 
first general assembly, only 3,000 showed up.  
Eyad (58, male) commented on why many of the supporters left Al-Dustour: 
Originally, we wanted to revive the old Wafd experience, without its ideological 
liberalism. We wanted a party that could gather people of all walks of life around 
one political manifesto, devoid of ideologies but centring on social justice, such as 
solving the housing problem, ensuring good education for all. We need a mix of 
ideas but not necessarily liberal ideology like the Wafd’s; in fact, Al-Wafd used to 
be called Omma Party [Nation Party] and in 1919,  it used to include Copts, 
Bedouins, workers, etc. why can’t we have a party like that?  
Eyad joined an alliance of socialists which included the Popular Current, Revolutionary 
Socialists, and the Bread and Freedom movement. Egyptian activists generally seemed 
to join and leave movements and parties for arbitrary reasons, which, for Eyad, was a 
sign of ‘chaos and immaturity when it comes to the public and political sphere. The 
ordinary citizen now does not vote for a manifesto but for [high profile] individuals’.  
It is worth noting that Al-Dustour had recently elected a leader: the first Egyptian 
female party leader, Hala Shukrallah, and also the first Christian female to lead a party 
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in Egypt. Shukrallah told the British newspaper, The Observer, that being a woman and 
Christian was irrelevant to the political process:  
What we're seeing here is that something truly on-the-ground is happening […] I 
think it's a reflection of the changes in the people's psyche since 25 January. They 
do not really see these elements as significant – being a woman, being a Copt, or 
whatever. These elements are no longer significant in comparison to a much 
bigger thing that they are aspiring to […]. Our parties have always been a one-
man show – both in the way that it's been ruled by one personality, and that it's 
usually been men who've been in the position (cited in Kingsley, 2014).   
Shukrallah is a veteran activist who was jailed for her political views in the 1970s and 
1980s, and she earned her Ph.D. from University College London. She thinks weak 
opposition, including her party, is an inevitable result of the past 40 years of military 
rule, during which opposition was suppressed: 
How can we expect there to be replacement of power within the ruling parties 
when the opposition parties don't [either]? […]. The only organised force that had 
been allowed to evolve was the Muslim Brotherhood. This is something the West 
does not see: from the ‘70s, ‘80s, ‘90s and 2000s, the democratic movement was 
being smashed. You couldn't rally anywhere without getting arrested – meetings 
between middle-class intellectuals and social movements were not allowed […] 
whereas the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to infiltrate the slum areas, 
through the mosques. What has happened in the Al-Dustour party is a reflection 
of these residues – of these real, deep changes in the psyche of the Egyptian 
people, and the Egyptian youth (cited in Kingsley, 2014). 
 
Karim (28, male) was one of those who left Al-Dustour in its early years who saw a 
virtue in being ‘politically independent’ with no affiliation to any party:  
I am in the National Association for Change and Reform. I used to be in Al-Baradei’s 
campaign, then the Salvation Front. It is true that political participation has 
increased, but the number of the independents has also increased, because people 
mistrust political parties. Al-Dustour party should not have any ideology - there 
should not be ideologies. 
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Khaled (28, male) was also another of those who  shifted from one movement or party 
to another. He used to belong to the Socialist Popular Alliance but was currently 
affiliated with the Revolutionary Road Front. He was also working on founding a new 
party (with a socialist ideology), but admitted that the future was not for political 
parties but for political debate among ‘politically independent individuals’: 
I really think there is a decrease in the idea of setting up new parties, because, in 
my view, the real freedom lies on the internet. We can use the internet to debate 
our ideas. There are new opportunities for people to present themselves freely 
on the internet. You will find all sorts of ideas online: there are crazy pages 
against atheism and other pages which support it, and so on. This is freedom: 
people choose what they want to debate and choose their own battles, online.  
Yasser (56, male) had a different interpretation of the upsurge of political parties and 
movements: for him, the political scene in Egypt was largely manipulated by the 
military council and state security: 
After SCAF [the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces] took over, we have seen 
the mushrooming of all movements and parties. I think the force behind them 
was the military intelligence which helped form 180 movements and 
revolutionary councils in 2011 and 2012 alone - Tamarod was one of them. They 
[the army] wanted to make sure that people would not follow one particular 
trend. They succeeded in this. If you scrutinise these movements, you will see 
that all of them use the same rhetoric but for different goals. I do not think this 
can last long. Ordinary citizens watch the whole matter as a surreal scene. They 
watch and even clap while others are being killed - this reminds me of the Roman 
times.  
Yasser had a unique background: he was largely seen by some activists as a supporter 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, although he categorically denied this.  The security forces, 
led by the military council (SCAF), raided several NGO offices in 2011, as part of its 
investigation into illegal foreign funding, including those funded by the U.S.A., 
established to promote democracy.  SCAF announced that the investigation aimed to 
unravel the hidden agenda behind some foreign-funded NGOs. The Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation announced three important issues: (i) that 14 
US NGOs were operating in Egypt and had received more than US$47 million; (ii) that 
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all funding had to be registered and monitored; and (iii) according to Law 84/2002 
NGOs would be required to seek the ministry’s approval before accepting foreign 
funds. 
Yasser was arrested on the charge of threatening the system. The trial ended in 
December 2011, and he was sentenced to a term in prison. This researcher asked him 
about that charge: 
They [the army] accused me of being part of a Zionist plot, and SCAF wanted to 
arrest someone, during the NGO battle. I was a suitable target. I was sentenced a few 
days before Morsi’s toppling [on 3 July 2013]. Everyone else who was arrested was 
released, except me. Everyone else had suspended sentences. I was sure I would be 
released too, because there was not a single piece of evidence and all witnesses 
against me withdrew their statements. 
Yasser managed to leave Egypt in order to participate in a conference abroad, a few 
days before the sentence was imposed;  when he heard from friends and family about 
the sentence, he cancelled his trip back to Cairo, and decided to remain abroad (up to 
the time of writing this thesis, he was still there). He refused to admit any links with 
the Muslim Brotherhood:  
I used to support the end of SCAF rule, and I was not against the Muslim 
Brotherhood; I was simply with everyone, as long as they provided a better 
programme. I did not see the Muslim Brotherhood [commit] crimes, only 
mistakes. The Muslim Brotherhood could never stand in front of these 
established institutions; besides, Israel thought that the Muslim Brotherhood was 
a disaster for its own security. Many movements agreed on protesting against the 
Muslim Brotherhood. If those who went to the street were really 30 million 
people, or even 10 million people, then why were they [SCAF] afraid of the 
Muslim Brotherhood? If they [SCAF] can mobilise this kind of mass, they should 
not fear the Muslim Brotherhood. The whole thing was an illusion. I support the 
army, as long as they stay in their barracks. I am against the coup [of 30 June 
2013], but those who are corrupt are part of the regime, and they all sided with 
SCAF.   I did not see many of those who now pretend to have been in Tahrir on 25 
January, and even this ‘6 April’ movement often shifted its allegiance. The first 
days were difficult. I never expected Mubarak to leave until 2 February.   
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The view that the army and intelligence services maintained new parties and 
movements was recently repeated in the mainstream media by supporters of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. One of those people was the Egyptian security expert, Sameh Al-
Yazel, who claimed that the Egyptian army funded many Egyptian political parties and 
youth coalition groups, in order to present a strong opposition against the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the elections. The aim, claimed Al-Yazel, was to persuade the public to 
accept the extension of the transitional period of the SCAF in power, which would give 
the army and the former regime’s supporters a chance to ‘organise or reorganise’ 
themselves, after seeing that the Muslim Brotherhood was the only well-organised 
party (Middle East Monitor, 2014).  
It was not only activists who saw the virtue of being ‘politically independent: artists 
and media professionals were also keen to mark their independence from any 
structured state organisation.  
7.4 Independent media 
It is notable that all the informants in this research were suspicious of the neutrality of 
Egyptian media, whether state-owned or privately-owned; several even claimed that 
both private and state media received instructions, directly from the security forces, 
about what to publish or broadcast. Yasser (56, male) was one of those informants 
who was adamant that the security ‘held regular meetings with talk show hosts, such 
as Mona Al-Shadly [who subsequently joined MBC Egypt channel, at the time of 
writing] in order to decide what topics would be discussed every day’. He continued:  
Our media used to take instructions and guidance from the army. I know some of 
these movements were recommended by SCAF which would then ask media 
professionals to invite youth behind such movements - they get their 15 minutes 
of fame […] to give them some attention […] and you’d think, as a viewer, that 
these groups [had] already mobilised thousands, and their FB group [was] so 
successful with thousands of ‘likes’, only to find out that each movement may 
only have 6 or 7 supporters.  
Hala (43, female) on the other hand, stressed the role of the so-called independent 
artists who, in her view, fought as hard as independent activists in order to make the 
170 
 
January 25 revolution a reality. She considered the contribution of artists such as the 
writer and documentary-maker, Wahid Hamid, whose films about terrorism 
…used to attack Islamist groups, in their works, but mainly the corrupt Mubarak 
regime […]. Artists wanted to become independent and not to be like him; for 
instance, I know of theatre groups who performed in the streets because they 
could not rent an expensive theatre, or the censors would not allow their plays 
[to be performed]. We were like this for at least 10 years before the revolution. 
The regime used to control everything, as if it was [sic] a movie: they created 
their own media, art, opposition. Everyone who refused to work for them was 
either blacklisted from receiving public funding or was accused of treason. The 
alternative media or parallel media grew in parallel with the state and private 
media, and the latter was also part of the conspiracy. This alternative media 
included blogs and FB groups and independent artistic movements. The youth did 
not want to take part, or did not know how to take part, in Mubarak’s game; they 
left opposition, state and private media and resorted to social media, and talked 
together there, creating new forums. The government accused them of apathy 
and of living in a virtual reality. It turned out that this virtual reality was the only 
accepted reality.  
One such alternative media outlet was Mosireen (‘We Are Determined’), a non-profit 
activism group, offering training and workshops on film-making and documenting the 
situation in Egypt during and after the 2011 revolution. The organisation also provided 
public screenings and launched the Tahrir Cinema initiative for mass public screenings, 
across the whole of Egypt. It had a dedicated YouTube channel, screening over 200 
documentaries about the 2011 revolution. Some of the films were played as part of 
the Kazeboon (‘Liars’) initiative which was critical of SCAF. Kazeboon was started in 
2011 by young people who wanted to reveal the lies of SCAF, using video screening 
and social media as their main media tools. Videos would usually be projected against 
the walls of buildings and screening would be held in public spaces to ensure the 
participation of as many people as possible. The campaign screened hours of footage, 
held and archived by Mosireen, and several of these were also uploaded to YouTube. 
The campaign originally began as a response to the incident of 17 December 2011 in 
Cairo, when a young woman was dragged along the ground by Egyptian soldiers, 
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exposing her blue brassiere. A picture, showing this incident, was circulated by global 
media outlets such as the American CNN. The campaign continued as a counter-state 
narrative under the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule, exposing the MB’s lies. Sally Toma, 
one of the campaign’s founders, once said that public screenings were used, because 
uploading clips on social media had not proved effective in reaching people or 
changing public opinion: ‘We had to bring the revolution back to the people’, she 
declared, and public screenings were deliberately planned (cited in Eskandar, 2013). 
The challenge, however, was to find good spots for screenings in the street, and also 
to secure a good source of electricity for the running of equipment. Another challenge 
was to stand up to ‘thugs’ sent by the police or the regime. The number of screenings 
was reduced in 2013, after mainstream media became much more open in its criticism 
of the Brotherhood’s rule (Eskandar, 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A cartoon featuring two characters, one representing security forces (on the right), and another Mosireen 
(on  the left). The security forces are pointing guns at the heads of Mosireen, calling them ‘thugs’, while 
Mosireen are pointing their camera towards the police calling them ‘Liars’ (Kazeboon).  
 
Mosireen and Kazeboon  consequently served as citizen journalism platforms and 
alternative media, as well as a collective memory archive of the revolution by 
recording and archiving personal stories regarding activists and victims of the past 
three years. One of the members of Mosireen, Sherif Gaber, argued that the purpose 
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of the initiative was not only to capture images of the revolution and conflicts in the 
street, but also to take control of the memory of the revolution, referring to Walter 
Benjamin’s words that ‘to articulate what is past does not mean to recognise how it 
really was’. It intends to ‘take control of a memory, as it flashes in a moment of 
danger’ (cited in Jadaliyaa, 2014). Mosireen, in the same vein, denied that it focused 
on one single historical narrative of the revolution, but insisted on diverse 
perspectives, by seeing the revolution through different camera lenses and different 
authors’ angles.  This type of diversity is one important weapon in fighting the 
dominance of state media and its supporters, which offer ‘oversimplified, sanitised 
narratives that attempt to erase not only the crimes and violence committed by the 
state […] but also the individual experiences,’ argued Gaber, who also hoped that this 
energy would continue ‘to render Egypt ungovernable’ (cited in Jadaliyya, 2014). This 
citizen journalism work is also important in light of the dangerous and hazardous 
environment for professional journalists reporting on protests in Egypt, and citizen 
journalism here complements professional journalism.  
The 2011 revolution and the rise of independent media (and independent activism) 
has also provided a thriving milieu for local media to flourish. Mainstream media 
hardly moved beyond the capital, Cairo, before 2011, apart from reporting on major 
events or clashes in places like Port Said. A new wave of community media thrived 
after 2011, however, in an attempt to break the cycle of Cairo-centric media. One 
influential initiative here was Welad Al-Balad Media Services, a company established 
in 2011 to encourage localised and community media. Its founder, Fatema Farag, said:  
There are so many stories to be told that are not told because of the centralised 
method with which we produce news in Egypt […].  I think that the problem with 
local news in Egypt is not that people don’t want it, it’s just that it’s been [in the 
past] really bad. That’s what people don’t want (cited in Berger, 2013).  
The company, which received its funding from overseas organisations such as the 
Open Society, had, at the time of writing, helped produce weekly newspapers in 
provinces such as Dishna, Mansoura, Fayoum, Nagaa Hammadi, Assiut and Marsa 
Matrouh. These newspapers ran stories relevant to their communities; copies of local 
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newspapers were printed in Cairo and distributed to respective governorates on the 
same day. Welad Al-Balad also helped local newspapers to set up their own websites, 
in order to ensure as broad an audience as possible for their stories, and also to keep 
those in Cairo informed about what was happening in the governorates. ‘Launching 
the websites is as much about developing the skills of local journalists in different 
media as it is about the target audiences’, Farag said (cited in Berger, 2013). Local 
newspapers were advertised on its website as a project aiming to: 
support the core values of the Egyptian Revolution, including democracy, human rights, 
equality, government accountability, and freedom of belief and expression. The battle for 
democracy must incorporate the local level and take root outside of Cairo, the traditional 
focus of political and professional media work. Despite its enormity and diversity, Egypt 
has yet to develop a local media model  (http://www.weladelbalad.com/ ).  
It is worth noting that established newspapers tried to issue localised supplements in 
the past, but they were usually closed down after a short while for lack of funding or 
lack of enough subscribers.  The internet, however, provided a new platform for local 
media to flourish, and Farag argues that it had become difficult to discern the dividing 
line between professional journalism and media activism: ‘Activists have a point of 
view, but journalists are supposed to provide [only] the facts [...] and it’s up to the 
people to come up with their own opinion,’ (cited in Berger, 2013). Welad Al-Balad 
therefore emerged as one initiative that had challenged the current media ownership 
and regulation laws since the revolution. 
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The leaders behind the local media were young volunteers like Ahmed Abdel Ghani, 
one of the founders of the Alexandria-based online radio station, Radio Tram, who 
justified the aims of the station: ‘After the revolution, we wanted to make a radio 
[station] for underground music and issues specific to Alexandria, we felt that we 
needed our own platform for our voices to be heard […] people want interaction.’ He 
continued:  ‘They want to be part of the media. They want to trust it. Our listeners like 
what we do. We present in a new way so they can understand it differently’ (cited in 
Berger, 2013). Radio Tram (www.radiotram.com) is defined on its website as ‘the 
underground voice of Alexandria’, and also has a Facebook group 
(https://www.facebook.com/radiotram/info). The station had an average of 17,000 
visitors a day and its main focus was issues of local concern to Alexandria.  
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The rise of local media also highlights the historic marginalisation of people in rural 
areas and Upper Egypt, in the national media; although constituting over half of the 
Egyptian population, inhabitants of the countryside have rarely been represented in 
the national Egyptian media, except in typecast depictions in films and television 
series, or colourful television commercials for homecare products (Aly, 2011). Their 
depiction on television soaps and films are usually confined to the stereotype of 
violent and honour-driven characters. It is unthinkable to watch a television presenter 
speaking in a rural or Upper Egyptian (sai’di) accent, as everything rural is subordinate 
to Cairene ‘manners’ (Aly, 2011). The same applies to minorities such as the Bedouin 
of Sinai, deserts-dwellers and Nubians in Aswan, who only feature in the national news 
if conflict or violence has erupted in their areas. The recent focus on local media, 
therefore, is a welcome break from the dominance of Cairene affairs and the 
centralisation of the media in the capital and big cities.  
  
7.5 Chapter summary  
The heated debate surrounding the most recent constitution which was endorsed by 
the majority of Egyptians in January 2014 reflected an important problem in the 
Egyptian political scene: whether to base the electoral systems on an individual or a 
list-based system. The decision was to allow a mixed electoral system, allocating 80 
per cent of the seats to single winners and the remaining to the list-based system. 
Mohamed Aboul Ghar, head of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, argued that the 
single-member plurality system was nothing but a disaster for the revolution, because 
it could end up becoming a war between wealthy people, who were able to secure a 
parliamentary seat as a result of their position in society, and the possible exclusion of 
minorities such as Copts and women (Ashraf, 2013).   
 
A recent poll suggested that the majority of respondents (around 32 per cent) had no 
confidence in any of the existing political parties (Sabry, 2013). Many of the existing 
organisations are an alliance of several parties such as the National Salvation Front, 
which is an umbrella for secular parties formed in 2012, in opposition to Morsi’s 
government. One of the oldest parties is the liberal Al-Wafd, which managed to unite 
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the nation in the early 20th century, during the 1919 revolution against the British 
occupation. Al-Wafd no longer had such weight in Egypt, and it failed to appeal to 
young Egyptians who opted for newer parties and movements such as Tamarod and 
the ‘ April 6’ movements. Al-Wafd was led by the millionaire, Al-Said Al-Badawi, and 
his leadership was criticised by internal dissenters calling for his resignation, and for 
reforming the party post-2011. One of the newer parties was ‘Free Egyptians’, 
founded by the billionaire Copt, Naguib Sawiris,  and featured as a pro-Copt and pro-
business party, with limited popular appeal (Sabry, 2013). Islamist parties, on the other 
hand, had been challenged since the massive uprisings of 30 June, due to the hostile 
environment in the streets, particularly towards the Muslim Brotherhood. If the latter 
were to return to politics under new alliances, (it is officially banned in Egypt), it would 
have to make a concerted effort to repair its damaged image and appeal to 
independent voters. 
 
What has become apparent to all parties and movements in the past three years is 
that appealing to rural areas is now a matter of survival: they need to have direct 
contact with their voters instead of relying solely on media campaigns (Sabry, 2013). 
Local media have therefore become more and more important, not only as a political 
tool but also as a platform to engage and address rural and Upper Egyptians. One 
advantage of the 2011 revolution is that it helped direct the attention of politicians, 
activists and journalists towards marginalised areas, such as the rural zones, after 
many decades of centralised politics focusing on Cairo and the large cities. Time will 
show how sustainable such localised media projects will be, and how much they can 
impact on citizens’ awareness of, and participation in, the political process in Egypt.  
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Chapter Eight  
Analysis of focus groups 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a discussion about the findings of the focus groups. There were 
three groups in total, as previously mentioned in the methodology section, each with 
six participants. Two of the groups had female participants and one had only males. 
The reason for having separate gender groups was the initial concern that female 
participants may not have felt comfortable entering into discussions with male 
participants. It was surprising to discover, however, that the female groups were far 
more outspoken and eloquent than their male counterparts; besides, many males 
approached in Cairo were reluctant to join the research. The choice to have two 
groups of females, therefore seemed to be the right one, as they would probably 
provide more information. The female participants, moreover, were not sceptical of 
this research and welcomed the opportunity to participate. A female academic from 
Cairo assisted this researcher as co-moderator of the focus groups with female 
participants. This was to create a comfortable atmosphere, especially since the 
interviews were conducted in a private club in Cairo. All participants, male and female, 
were aged between 18 and 25, and the majority were university or college students.  
Three different themes emerged during the discussions: (i) the role of social versus 
traditional mainstream media; (ii) the 2011 revolution as a turning point in the political 
perception of the informants’ and (iii) online versus offline political deliberation. These 
themes are related to those extracted from the literature review and used as pointers 
for the interviews with activists. Each theme is discussed below, with quotes from the 
informants.   
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8.2 Revolution as a turning point in political knowledge 
Facebook was celebrated as a safe political haven for young Egyptians (Mansour, 
2008) who may have known no other ruler than Mubarak, but were still determined to 
change the political scene, especially as Mubarak planned to groom his son, Gamal, to 
succeed him, thereby excluding other candidates from competing in any presidential 
elections. The security forces arrested many young people who called for a strike on 
Facebook in 2008.  Many activists protested, such as the 20-year-old college student, 
Belal Diab, who interrupted one of the former prime minister’s speeches in 2008 to 
protest against the arrest of Facebook activists (Mansour, 2008). Mabrouk (2010) 
similarly regards the new media as important in the political development of Egypt, 
illustrating this case with examples of bloggers who seemed to have attracted a great 
deal of attention from the international media; although many of these bloggers were 
arrested, and new legislation issued to curb such activities, Mabrouk (2010) argues 
that the state should have realised that it was simply not possible to restrict free 
expression on the internet. The new media therefore allowed citizens to ask questions 
about the efficacy and efficiency of their government, and the corruption that was 
endemic in Egypt, at that time. Political dialogue and deliberation would continue on 
social media sites, he adds, even if the state refused to listen.   
 
Social media sites such as Facebook facilitate the communication and exchange of 
views between like-minded people, and in this case, they operate similarly to 
traditional interpersonal communication (Bode, 2008). Users are naturally exposed to 
different or opposing views, and are able to accept this diversity. Online deliberation, 
however, does not necessarily lead to positive offline participation (Bode, 2008).  It is 
inevitable that engaging in a political discussion or even passively reading through 
posts and comments will encourage deliberation and an understanding of the political 
process, because users are able to learn more about that process: 
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Radwa: My internet use after 2013 is different than it was in 2011. 
After 25 January [2011], everyone heard in the media that 
internet youth were behind the revolution, so everyone 
started using the internet and social media.  
Yara: Yes, even my mother and aunties are now reading news on 
the internet. 
Nourhan: I think everything that is forbidden is desirable [an Egyptian 
saying], so when the internet was blacked out in January 
2011, people used their Android to know what was going 
on. But after 2012, people realised that there were as many 
rumours on the internet as there were on TV. 
Dina: Yes, if you want to circulate any piece of news, correct or 
not, you can do so online. 
One example of online activists who had become ‘celebrity activists’, following 2011, 
was Esraa Abdel Fattah, a 29-year-old woman who was arrested and detained for two 
weeks, for organising a Facebook group in 2008, calling for a strike on 6 April, in 
sympathy with workers in Mahalla Al-Kobra, in the Delta sub-region. It is worth noting 
that the April 6 movement was set up to commemorate that date in 2008. Abdel 
Fattah was part of the group which attracted 60,000 members in two weeks, and the 
strike was actually successful, as many people abstained from going to work. It was 
not easy for the Egyptian security forces to arrest thousands of people, especially if 
they came from well-connected families, merely because they had chosen to stay at 
home; however, they were made aware of the power of new media in disseminating 
information and mobilising action (Faris, 2008); needless to say, the regime attempted 
to organise campaigns against the dangers of social media, particularly Facebook, for 
the young generation; furthermore, people like Abdel Fattah were reflected as heroes, 
and as victims of the authoritarian state in international media. Addostour newspaper 
(2014) carried out a survey among young Egyptians, confirming that they were 
attracted to the Facebook campaign, managed by Mohamed Al-Baradei to run for 
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presidential elections, which also attracted members from the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The newspaper reported that although the vast majority of respondents (around 75 
per cent) did not participate in any political activities offline, they were ready to take 
part in the coming elections, if Al-Baradei decided to nominate himself. The conclusion 
was that social media, particularly Facebook, were powerful tools in the Egyptian 
political process, providing an alternative sphere for young people’s participation and 
their ability to connect with like-minded people. Social media facilitate noticeability 
and visibility and can make users feel that their voice is being heard. Users can, for 
instance, react to Facebook posts, either by adding their own comments or sharing the 
post: 
Nevine: We knew about 25 January from the internet and maybe 
also Al-Jazeera. 
Enjy: I knew about demonstrations from the internet and from my 
friends.  
Nermine: The internet tells you about events well before they happen 
and you’d know when the demonstration would be held, but 
television tells you about it after it’s happened and over.  
 
Studies such as that of Feezell, Conroy and Guerrero (2009), on the other hand, argue 
that social media participation may lead to increased levels of offline political 
involvement, although not necessarily a similar increase in political knowledge. This 
was not the case in Egypt, as young Egyptians had notably increased their political 
awareness, and developed an appetite for more information regarding how the 
country was run, through their engagement in social media commentaries. This 
deliberation did not necessarily translate into offline activities, however, and one 
explanation was the lack of opportunities for these young people to become involved 
in the political process in their lives, offline; unlike the situation in Western 
democracies, young Egyptians cannot easily access political parties or movements, 
which seemed to be monopolised by a certain generation or certain key public figures. 
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There were no party youth committees to accommodate these young people, who 
often felt frustrated by not being able to take on leading roles within these parties. 
Another important reason, which echoes what has been discussed in the previous 
chapters, was the apparent suspicion of the motivations and intentions of political 
parties, which inspired young people to form new movements instead of joining 
established ones. These movements, however, often  ended up being dissolved, or 
split into sub-movements such as the ‘April 6’ movement, indicating the difficulty in 
leading sustainable offline political action. 
Social media sites such as Facebook groups, in principle enable users to link to other 
related sites and view audio-visual material, in addition to exchanging comments. Such 
fora provide new platforms for young Egyptians to deliberate and trade views 
‘virtually’, in a way that is not available offline, due to censorship or state control. It is 
also important to recall that, unlike mainstream media, social media sites draw on 
‘street’ language or the vernacular, and not standard modern Arabic. Pan-Arab media 
outlets such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya pride themselves on using this higher 
register of Arabic in their talk shows and news bulletins. Social media sites are 
inclusive, on the other hand, and many consumers are able to freely converse in a 
common dialect, understood by a large number of users.  
Enjy: The internet, and especially Facebook, increased people’s political 
understanding. 
Nevine: It is enough to share or like a post to ensure it is spread to many 
users. 
 
It is noticeable that the majority of focus group participants emphasised that their 
enthusiasm in following political posts on social media sites faded considerably after 
the 30 June uprising. It is argued here that this could have been the result of the 
overwhelming campaign embarked on by traditional media, supporting the military on 
one hand and demonising the MB on the other, which probably overshadowed 
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individual voices and made individual contributors feel that the social media fora were 
ineffective (Opp, 2009): 
 
Nermine: I started to care about politics after 25 January [2011]  and I 
followed the news on Facebook and also in Youm 7 
[newspaper] online. I started to read more, but since Morsi 
has gone, I am not so eager to do so. I started to join 
demonstrations after 25 January. 
Wafaa: I think many of us started to use the internet more after 
Morsi went. All TV channels were against him and the 
internet was the only venue to show stuff which was not 
available on mainstream television which had only one 
opinion [against Morsi] but through the internet, I can read 
about different views. 
 
Social media can therefore function as alternative media by encouraging citizens to 
practise a form of decentralised communication, independent from the hegemony of 
mainstream media and journalism (Bennett, 2003). It is especially the interactive 
nature of social and new media that help citizens co-operate and discuss political 
decisions, rather than being passive recipients of messages from the mainstream 
media, which challenge the power of those citizens (Dahlgren, 2009, p. 190).  
Social media can indeed provide adequate information and infinite opportunities to 
engage with as many like-minded citizens as desired; it can also afford opportunities 
for activists to participate who are not able to meet offline, for various reasons. Social 
media sites also constitute a low-cost platform compared to arranging offline 
meetings, hiring rooms, publishing pamphlets, and so on. Social media sites are able, 
to a certain degree, to provide some anonymity which may encourage many 
participants to contribute to online discussions, without the fear of a security 
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crackdown.  The State issued Law No. 10 of 2003, in that year, known as the 
Telecommunications Regulations Act, for example, which criminalised some 
telecommunication facilities, but not online publishing. The State did not attempt to 
black out the internet - except during the 2011 revolution - although it did close 
opposition newspapers and TV stations, for instance. The internet remained relatively 
accessible; even though the internet was not completely obstructed, the government 
was able to block certain websites without giving any legal reasons for doing so 
(Mehanna, 2008). 
It is also worth noting that the growth of the independent press in recent years, as 
well as the mushrooming of more outlets since the 2011 revolution, provided an 
invaluable link between social media users and independent media (Faris, 2010, p. 7). 
This is also evident in the informants’ assertions that they preferred television (albeit 
briefly during 2012 and 2013), especially when following live events such as Mubarak’s 
trial:  
Wafaa: People abandoned the internet in 2012 when life [under the 
Brotherhood rule] was different, and they watched TV, but 
some have kept following news online to evaluate the 
accuracy of news. You know there are matters which do not 
appear online, like the ‘Trial of the Century’ [Mubarak’s trial] 
or Morsi’s trial. 
The following section reviews the way informants compared and contrasted 
traditional and social media, and how their use may have been contingent with the 
type of event they wanted to follow, Morsi’s trial, for instance. They also expressed 
their concern regarding inaccurate information circulating in both forms of media. 
8.3 Traditional versus new media 
Recent surveys (such as the Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2014) confirm that 
television viewing in Egypt is ubiquitous, and is regarded as the most common source 
of information - nearly 99 per cent of Egyptians have television in their homes, and 
nearly 94 per cent of Egyptians use the TV as their source of news, at least once a 
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week, compared to only 20 per cent who use the internet for news, on a weekly basis. 
That survey also found that Egyptians’ appetite for news was increasing - more than 76 
per cent of Egyptians accessed the news at least once a day, especially news about 
Egyptian affairs.  
There are studies, on the other hand, that see audiences’ scepticism as a negative 
factor that can lead to people’s loss of confidence in the political process (Capella and 
Jamieson, 1997). Scepticism therefore, can isolate people from collective action as 
they doubt its usefulness. The scepticism of what young citizens such as those in Egypt 
hear and watch on mainstream media, and sometimes what is posted on social media 
sites, may actually increase their engagement, in that they find themselves exposed to 
different viewpoints and are more willing to assess the views that match their own. 
The concept of the audience as powerful decoders of media began with Hall’s seminal 
work (1980) and continued with John Fiske’s (1989) argument against a passive 
audience, defined as an easy target for propaganda. Fiske also asserts audiences’ 
ability to read media messages, thereby emphasising their subjectivity in the act of 
decoding and the presence of polysemy and interpretations, rather than one preferred 
meaning. With the myriad of media messages available to young Egyptians, one can 
argue that they are engaged in ‘semiotic warfare’, to borrow Fiske’s term (1987, p. 
313), in that they are constantly interpreting media messages.  
Radwa: All talk shows are the same. Even the same hosts and guests 
sometimes move from one programme to another. It is the 
same style. Surely no one watches this study. The internet 
can replace television, because you can always watch 
television programmes on YouTube later. 
Farida: I used to like Mona Shadly [TV host] in her programme ‘10 
o’clock’ [used to broadcast before the 2011 revolution] 
although they [talk show hosts] are all hypocrites.  
Mona: Yes, they all lack credibility, but I used to like Bassem 
Youssef’s show. 
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Dina: The internet also is not so credible, there are fake pictures 
on the net, and people also use insulting words more often, 
online. The television channels were used to announce the 
30/6 [30 June 30] protests. 
Radwa: I remember the television publicising the Tamarod 
campaign, and there were many clubs where Tamarod 
forms were [being] distributed. I even took some forms, 
copied them, and distributed them to collect signatures 
from everywhere I went. 
 
It is worth noting that there were more than 500 newspapers and publications in Egypt 
(at the time of writing), of which the majority were in the hands of the State, under 
Mubarak’s rule; however, following the 2011 revolution, the media sector witnessed a 
major shake-up, with new outlets emerging that represented different ideologies, 
particularly Islamic movements. All terrestrial channels were owned and run by the 
State under Mubarak, except four private satellite channels which were owned by 
businessmen close to the government. The State had allowed media liberalisation 
during the past decade,  but investors were mainly attracted to the broadcasting 
sector. Many businessmen, known for their close ties to Mubarak’s regime, set up 
private TV networks such as ‘Dream TV 9’ (2001), owned by Ahmed Bahgat, Al-Mehar 
TV (2005) owned by Hassan Rateb, Cairo Broadcasting Channel (CBC), owned by 
Mohammed Al-Amin, who also owned Al-Watan and Al-Youm Sabei newspapers, and 
Al-Hayat TV, owned by Al-Sayed Badai, who was also the Al-Wafd party leader.  
The ousting of Mubarak also witnessed many more outlets emerging, such as the 
Tahrir newspaper and the Tahrir TV channel,  founded by Ibrahim Eissa, the famous 
journalist known for his anti-Mubarak stance, but was later sold to a group of 
investors. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist groups set up several TV channels 
such as Misr 25 TV and Al-Nas TV, owned by the Brotherhood and Salafists, 
respectively (both outlets were shut down, following the coup in 2013) (Al-Issawi, 
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2013, p. 56). Scores of new private channels emerged after the revolution, but their 
ownership and sources of funding were not always monitored or under state scrutiny.  
The post-2011 governments seemed to have exercised some form of scrutiny on 
privately-owned media - it was claimed that the Morsi government put pressure on 
the English-language edition of Masry Youm (‘Egypt Independent’), forcing it to shut 
down due to its critical political views (Freedom House, 2014).  
Decisions regarding permission to publish or broadcast were usually overseen by the 
Ministry of Information (which had recently been dissolved), the Egyptian Radio and 
Television Union (ERTU), and the Shura Council (Upper House of Parliament).  The 
Morsi government, however, had the power to withdraw the licenses issued to 
stations or publications which were deemed to violate cultural codes, including 
religious ones, and impose penalties for agitating violence or sectarianism. 
Mainstream state and private media were caught up in an adversarial ideological 
battle with the Islamists, on the one hand, and opposition voices on the other, for 
using their media as platforms to attack each other. That was indeed a period in which 
many viewers questioned the integrity of those outlets and the ethical code of 
objectivity. Morsi also allowed the Shura Council, largely ruled by Islamist parties, to 
appoint heads of state media organisations, usually Brotherhood supporters. The 
toppling of Morsi’s government, and the arrest of leading figures from the 
Brotherhood movement, prompted the interim government to create the Supreme 
Press Council to oversee media functions, and, similar to Morsi, selected heads of 
state media outlets. Many outlets failed to objectively report on the military’s 
crackdown on the Islamists during that period, which led to the killing of hundreds of 
Brotherhood supporters and the arrest of hundreds of others. No media outlet wanted 
to be accused of sympathising with the Brotherhood and therefore, many journalists 
either practised self-censorship or exaggerated their support for the military council 
(Freedom House, 2014). The very few critical voices in the mainstream media were 
forced to withdraw their shows, of which arguably the most important voice was the 
political satirist, Bassem Youssef, who started broadcasting on YouTube during the 
2011 revolution, and his popularity secured him a slot on ONTV, and on the CBC 
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network. His show was suspended in November 2013, after he openly criticised and 
mocked the military and the current president, Al-Sisi. There was a crackdown on all 
outlets siding with Morsi and the Brotherhood, following the military’s takeover on 3 
July 2013, consequently, five Islamist channels were shut down, equipment was 
confiscated, and many journalists were arrested. Three pan-Arab outlets were blocked 
by the state-owned Nilesat, the telecommunications satellite operator: Al Quds and Al-
Aqsa stations, supported by Hamas, which in turn, showed allegiance to the 
Brotherhood movement, and Al-Yarmouk station, based in Jordan. Al-Jazeera’s 
Mubasher Misr was also among the channels forced to close following the fall of 
Morsi; their offices were raided and many journalists were arrested; some later fled to 
Qatar, while a few announced in mainstream media that they were disappointed with 
Al-Jazeera’s policies, and had resigned in protest. One of those who renounced her 
post was Nouran Sallam, one of the main anchors in Al-Jazeera, happened to be 
presenting a live show on Al-Jazeera, Mubasher Misr, when the security forces raided 
the building. Sallam resigned and later joined the private outlet, Al Hayat TV. Al-
Jazeera’s Mubasher Misr was later declared an illegal network and was banned from 
operating in Egypt (Freedom House, 2014). Polarisation considerably increased, after 
the interim government decided to declare the Brotherhood  a ‘terrorist’ organisation 
in December 2013, and later shut down its newspaper, Freedom and Justice.  
Amr: After 30/6, Brotherhood supporters started using social 
media extensively to upload photos of police beating them 
up, so I’ve followed all of this. Before 25 January, I did not 
care about politics. 
Mohammed:   Media in general lacks credibility - did you even see 
how Bassem Youssef poked fun at many talk show hosts? 
Egyptian media have an agenda. Like the story about the 
‘Virus C’ invention and how the media exaggerated this 
device. 
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Ahmed: During Morsi, the media made a big deal out of the issue of 
electricity cuts, but you know what, yesterday the electricity 
was cut [off] 6 times where I lived, and all the TV is saying is 
that we should put up with the situation at the moment. 
Why did they not say the same during Morsi’s rule? There 
are many talk show hosts who have not even studied Media, 
and they lack professionalism.  
 
Another group also expressed similar views about traditional media, whether state-
owned or private outlets: 
Ann: There has not been any real improvement or reform. Look at the 
police stations: they still have the same problems. No reform 
happened. 
Nermine: I don’t believe TV, it lacks credibility, and no presenter is honest. 
They are all hypocrites. 
Wafaa:  I do not watch any show at home, only if my family asked me to 
watch something with them. 
Enjy: I used to watch Bassem Youssef. 
 
Television talk show hosts were at times opinionated about several national and 
international policies. The controversial TV host and owner of Al-Faraeen channel, 
Tawfiq Oukasha, challenged the Syrian refugees in Egypt to withdraw their support for 
the Brotherhood, following the 3 July coup, or else, he said, their property would be 
destroyed: 
in the name of the Egyptian people, I give all Syrians living in Egypt, a 48-hour 
ultimatum, the Egyptian people have all the addresses where you live: those who 
rent flats and those who live in New Damietta City […] and those who live in 
Sadat City, those who live in 6 October City. All the addresses, the Egyptian 
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people have them, and give you a 48-hour ultimatum. If you sit with the Muslim 
Brotherhood after 48 hours, the people will come out to destroy your houses. 
Your addresses are all there. The people will come out to destroy your houses’ 
(quoted in Amnesty International, 2013, p. 2).  
The ultimatum came after several public figures accused the Syrians of being 
supporters of Morsi and the Brotherhood. Youssef Al-Husseini, another talk show host 
on ONTV, threated Syrians with violence if they continued with their allegiance to the 
Brotherhood: ‘If you interfere in Egyptian affairs, you will take 30 shoes [be beaten up] 
in the middle of the street’ (Amnesty International, p. 3). Some media outlets charged 
the Syrians with participating in the Raba’a al-Adawiyya and Al-Nahda sit-ins which 
were broken up in August 2013. Syrian refugees were also accused of carrying 
weapons and attacking security officials, as were supporters of the Palestinian group, 
Hamas. One Syrian refugee expressed the difficulty of life in Egypt since 2013: ‘My kids 
can’t play outside anymore. They are cursed by the other kids, told really bad words 
[…]. There were 1,700 [refugees] living in the area, but now there are no more than 
500  (Amnesty Internatonal, p. 3).  
State and private media adopted a rather propagandist style, following the 2011 
uprising, in order to demonise opposing voices; according to a BBC monitoring officer: 
Egyptian ‘state media and the private media instantly moved to supporting the army 
[following the coup on 30 June 2013]. They reacted on the spot to the military council 
statement, they supported it, they cheered it, and [they] adopted an ultra-nationalist 
tone […]. I haven’t seen or heard any pro-Muslim Brotherhood voice on any of these 
channels since 3 July’ (quoted in Al-Issawi, 2013, p. 48).  
The above discussion shows that young Egyptians sought to reclaim their power in 
decoding the news in the way they wished. They stressed their power in deciphering 
messages, whether in mainstream or social media and their distrust of anything they 
heard or read via these media: although they were avid consumers of new and social 
media, they were still sceptical of news posted on these sites. This scepticism, it is 
argued here, is a positive attitude in that it reflects their desire and ability to verify the 
news they receive as active rather than passive consumers.  This does not discourage 
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them from following social media sites; in fact, people do so for cognition, because 
they want to be involved, to be able to access different viewpoints and engage in 
informed arguments. The more sceptical people are, the more they consume news, 
according to Tsfati and Capella (2005).  
 
8.4 Online versus offline political deliberation  
Activists are able, in principle, to use social media sites to disseminate information 
about their movements, to mobilise audiences, and to garner support from like-
minded citizens; however, as discussed in Chapter Seven, this is not always the case. 
Facebook groups still strongly profile ‘star activists’ who are usually the central figures 
of the movements, rather than being members of an open platform for all 
participants. These sites do not always mobilise in a systematic manner by urging 
supporters to join the movements; the main aim is rather to ensure visibility for the 
movement and its central figures. The power of social media may be limited in its 
translation of online campaigns into offline tangible action, and in this regard, it 
cannot really provide a substitute for on-the-ground political parties and movements 
(Faris, 2010).  
The majority of focus group participants in this study did not join offline movements or 
parties, except one female activist, who began her activism immediately after the 
January 25 revolution. This is despite the fact that all participants read live discussions 
on social media sites and sometimes added or shared some comments:  
Radwa: I am an activist with links to a human rights organisation 
which began working right after 25 January. I felt then that I 
wanted to know about the political system. Before 25 
January, I did not care at all. 
Dina: I express my views on FB, and sometimes even enter an 
argument with friends and family about my views. 
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Nourhan: I have used FB since 2011. I read posts to know what is 
happening but do not necessarily post my own views. 
The majority were also unhappy with the situation in Egypt, reverting largely to the 
apathetic attitude recorded before 2011 - many of them expressed a renewed desire 
to leave Egypt for good: 
Farida: We started a revolution to remove a president, and it was 
debatable whether to call 30/6 [June 30] a coup, now 
people think of it as a coup.   
Nourhan: I am not happy with the situation in Egypt. Many things have 
changed and look at the sexual harassment, and no one 
helps a girl who is harassed. 
Radwa: I disagree, I think now is better than right after 25 January, 
when there were many problems in the street. There used 
to be gun fire and crimes. Now it is a bit better.  
Nourhan: Things get a bit better then turn bad again. I wish I could 
move abroad and continue my life there. Our education 
system is bad and there are no job prospects. So when we 
marry and have kids, what would their future look like, if our 
future is bleak? 
Radwa: I am optimistic that life will get better. During Morsi’s rule, I 
was pessimistic, but now I am a bit optimistic. 
It is difficult to infer that just because those young Egyptians followed social media 
sites about planned demonstrations, they developed a sense of identification with 
certain movements or even parties. Offline participation plays a major role in 
developing this sense of identification (Della Porta & Mosca, 2005), however, young 
people may adopt certain views via new and social media, but these views do not 
necessarily create new identities (van Laer, 2010). The use of the internet does not 
therefore turn non-activists into activists, as the focus group participants explained: 
192 
 
Farida: I have a lot of friends, and they will make a lot of comments 
and make arguments, so if they discuss an issue a lot 
without too much argument, then I share it. 
Nourhan: I need to know if what others write is true or not and how 
they think, I only share what I really think is good.  
Yara: Because I have a lot of friends and they […] comment a lot 
on the issue and I […] worry that expressing our opinions 
would become a fight later.  
Dina: I don't talk about my political views, I only read or listen. I 
talk with the close ones only. I listen from [sic] the TV but 
don't believe them much, and I don't talk with friends as 
everyone has a point of view and sticks to it. 
That group was cautious in even sharing or posting new comments, may ‘share’ with 
their closest circle of friends. The second group also expressed their disinterest in 
joining traditional parties: 
Ann: I am not a member of any party. 
Nevine:  I wanted to join Al-Dostor then I did not because those in 
charge of the party were so young. 
Enjy: We all joined Tamarod and contributed to circulating their 
forms. I knew about them from a website called ‘Al-Haq 
Wal-Dalal’ and through  Al-Youm 7 [newspaper], I used to 
photocopy the forms and distribute to everyone I know. 
Nermine: I also got some copies to distribute everywhere and then I 
took the signed papers and sent them to Al-Masreyeen Al-
Ahrar party. 
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Wafaa: As for me I did not join anything because of my mother and 
husband they worry about me a lot, I only watch from afar. I 
am [a member of the] ‘Hezb al-Kanaba ‘[Couch Party].  
The final group also expressed similar disinterest in joining political parties: 
Amr: I did not want to join any political party.  
Ahmed: No I am not a member, but I have friends who joined 
political groups like the Muslim brotherhood, Nahda, 
‘Molhed [atheist] group, or Foloul [Mubarak’s followers]. 
Social media have facilitated the fast exchange of information amongst young 
Egyptians, thereby reducing the cost and enhancing the speed of communication. This 
is especially true if compared to traditional media such as leaflets or even word-of-
mouth. Social media, and digital media in general such as smartphones, have therefore 
helped people organise themselves in innovative ways to overcome problems of space 
and time, and to deliver messages that could not otherwise be disseminated via 
traditional means of communication. 
 Meetings arranged via social media, on the other hand, may include participants who 
do not necessarily share the same political views or collective identities of other 
participants; for instance, an MB supporter can participate in a demonstration against 
the Egyptian military together with a supporter of a leftist or liberal movement; 
although these participants share the same goal, such as expressing their discontent 
with the army, the demonstration may not necessarily be a reflection of the efficiency 
of political networking unless this group somehow manages to create and maintain a 
sense of collective identity with all participants.  
It is also worth noting that although social media sites are available, whether on 
smartphones or in internet cafes, to a large segment of Egyptians across all social 
classes, the use of such sites does not necessarily mean parity for all: poorer 
participants may not be able to exercise some form of power here (Myers, 2002). The 
findings of these focus groups show that social media users tend to follow celebrities 
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such as Bassem Youssef, or the young preacher, Moustafa Hosni. A few of them 
indicated that they followed ordinary people, but the participants emphasised that 
they could  ‘follow’ a stranger but would not ‘add’ him (or her) as a ‘friend’: 
Radwa: We follow celebrities like Moustafa Hosni and Tamer 
Ashour. Sometimes I follow someone I do not know because 
he expresses similar political views to mine. I […] follow him 
[but do] not ‘add’ him as I do not know him. 
Farida: There are people of our generation who have very strong 
political views. There is someone at our university who has 
5,000 followers and he posts such strong political comments 
on his FB.  
Nourhan: If there is someone expressing bold views like Bassem 
Yousef, then I follow him.  
Yara: There is a poet who writes very powerful posts about life in 
Egypt, like lately, he wrote about the electricity problem and 
why the media talk about it differently now, compared to 
what they said during Morsi’s rule. I am not a Brotherhood 
supporter by the way. 
The use of social media does not necessarily translate into direct offline activism, it has 
to be noted that this virtual environment has enhanced participants’ political 
knowledge and provided information about the political process in Egypt. This is so 
despite the mixed messages they receive from mainstream media, which they 
automatically compare to what is circulating on Facebook: 
Nevine: SM [social media] has been the common thing we’ve had 
since 2011, except that now people are not afraid of 
expressing their views online - before 2011, they used to 
fear that. 
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Ann: Even the net lacks credibility. We do not believe anything 
now.  I have to form my own opinion, but I think in social 
media no one is taking sides, and everyone is expressing 
their own view. 
Nermine: Yes, but the net shows you loads of different opinions, 
unlike the TV, even Al-Jazeera, where each channel has its 
own agenda. The TV focuses on Al-Sisi and his achievements, 
and there is no criticism whatsoever. 
Wafaa: I did not vote [for Sisi] 
Ann: Me neither. 
 
What the above discussion illustrates is the role of trust in forming online networks, 
and how this is dependent on the specific cultural context; in the case of Egypt, strong 
ties contribute to trust, and this may explain why some of the above informants do not 
‘add’ a stranger to their social media groups. They can, however, still ‘follow’ these 
strangers if they find their views resonate with their own, even if they share weak ties 
with those strangers. It is the diffusion of weak ties that diminishes the role of 
traditional leaders, as their followers are exposed to other viewpoints; however, in 
Egypt, young people still want to relate to a reliable source of information, and their 
choice rests unanimously on a strong critical voice, such as the political satirist, Bassem 
Youssef. The latter’s unfavourable comments against the Brotherhood, and later the 
military leaders, attracted young followers who saw Bassem as an example of a defiant 
leader, who was not afraid of expressing and sharing his views (Knocke and Wisely 
1993; Fukuyama, 2001). Youssef therefore serves as a broker of information, able to 
create a crucial constituency (Kulikova and Perlmutter 2007): his status then becomes 
more important in disseminating views and information.  
Many informants also expressed their reluctance to share comments or even offer 
comments on social media sites. This can be explained by their frustration which ends 
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in ‘the spiral of violence’ (Noelle-Neumann, 1993; Hayes 2007), meaning that they 
perceive their own opinion as unpopular, which makes them less willing to voice their 
views, lest they are negatively evaluated by their peers. This, on the one hand, can 
eventually lead to isolation from one’s community as one resorts to silencing oneself 
after being discouraged from voicing one’s views, and on the other, this can also keep 
disagreements at bay in order to maintain social links (Hayes, 2007), as some 
informants argued.  
 
8.5 Conclusion 
Young Egyptians were hailed as the ‘Facebook generation’, but what the above 
discussion shows is that they did not really use social media for ‘revolutionary 
purposes’; in fact, none of them, except one, engaged in activism. They used social 
media for deliberation in the form of arguments, discussions and exchange of 
comments, however, social media sites cannot be applauded here for causing radical 
political change in terms of mobilisation on the ground. Social media can serve to 
facilitate the forging of strong ties amongst citizens which hopefully can result in 
offline activities in the future, given citizens’ sustained civic engagement efforts 
offline.  Without offline organisation and activism, social media sites will only remain 
as fora for dialogue, like IslamOnline website or the like, but will not necessarily be a 
catalyst for changing the political process. Using Facebook groups, for instance, to 
‘like’, ‘comment’ or ‘share’ does not necessarily mean that users would also engage in 
political parties or demonstrations offline. Many of the informants cited above 
confined their political activities to passive acts of sharing and re-posting. The change 
brought about by social media is therefore notable at the individual level, where more 
young people and other generations, now consider themselves more informed about 
what is happening in Egypt, thanks to the abundance of information on social media 
sites. Any significant change at the collective level in terms of mobilisation, however,  
is still rather limited and sporadic and may be subject to the nature of events such as 
those that occurred on 25 January 2011 or 30 June 2013. 
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Internet access does not in itself guarantee openness, especially within an 
authoritarian and conservative society such as Egypt; however, Egypt stands in a much 
better position that some ultra-conservative societies with a much more limited 
history of deliberation such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Wheeler, 2006), where the 
authorities can still enforce restrictions on any critical activities against the regime: 
they usually do this via mainstream media, whether state-owned or privately-owned 
(Kalathil and Boas 2003). It can be concluded, therefore, that the efficacy of the 
internet as a mobilisation tool depends on the particular cultural and social norms 
which beget trust.  
The above sections have shown that informants expressed their complete mistrust of 
traditional media, although some of them still followed these media, particularly 
certain programmes that ‘must’ be viewed on television, such as Mubarak’s trial, 
rather than read in a commentary. They also expressed similar distrust of some of the 
information circulated via social media sites. The irony is that some talk show hosts 
accused social media sites of spreading rumours and lies. These views may have an 
impact on young people’s views about what is circulated. None of this research’s 
informants confirmed that they made any effort to verify what was circulated online, 
by checking foreign news sites, for example.  
The role of traditional media remains strong in reaching out to certain social strata 
(see Chapter 6) and also to the older generations. A few of the interviewees (cited in 
the previous two chapters) claimed that those who protested (in 2011) were from the 
lower classes, although the success of January 25 was credited to two ‘middle-class’ 
movements, Ayman Nour’s party and the Muslim Brotherhood:  
Those who went to the street on 25/1 were [the] lower classes, but they were 
much more organised and knew which street to go to. The leaders were  Ayman 
Nour and MB, especially the latter, because they have an online presence, 
unusual for our Egyptian political life, even before 25/1.  Many of the youth 
behind 25/1 are now in the ‘50-committee’. There are rumours about many of 
them such as Asmaa or Israa, but I think these are lies. Israa still leads the same 
lifestyle, but Asmaa came all of a sudden in a ‘4 x 4’ car, and the youth in Tahrir 
mocked her and the signs of wealth she was displaying (Sherine, 43). 
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 Another respondent asserted that mobilisation for 25 January was never expected to 
reach that scale, but Al-Baradei’s return to Egypt had an impact, especially on the 
middle-class young people: 
 Anyone who tells you that they anticipated 25/1 is a liar. We thought it would be a 
normal protest, but on 14 January, when Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, a huge leap 
happened. There was another protest on 25 January 2010 but no one reported on it; 
at that time, there was a call to protest signed by thousands but in 2011 the 
participation was enormous compared to the year before, especially after Baradei’s 
return to Egypt [...] There are no revolutions without leaders’ (Khaled, 28). 
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Chapter Nine  
Discussion 
 
9.1 introduction 
The aim of this study was to analyse and explain the uses of social media in political 
activism, focusing on Egypt as a representative case, especially since 25 January 2011. 
The opinions of political activists and non-activists were sought, mainly those of 
Cairene students from various socio-economic groups using social media. A selection 
of prominent social media sites that promoted political activism was presented, as well 
as those that played a marked role in the uprisings of 2011 and 2013. The analyses 
presented in previous chapters endeavoured to illustrate the strategies that activists 
adopted through social media, online or offline, in order to achieve their political 
activism and mobilisation objectives. 
  
The study is based on the following research questions: 
1. To what extent has the internet changed the political sphere in 
Egypt allowing a more democratic environment?  
2. To what extent has the use of social media led to more collective 
action in Egypt?  
3. Have social media facilitated the transformation of online activities 
into offline activism?  
4. How have social media contributed to attract the socially or 
politically marginalised groups in Egyptian society?  
The following is a discussion of the main arguments presented in Chapters Five, Six , 
Seven and Eight, and the themes that have emerged from the scrutiny of the 
arguments. 
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9.2 Social media and cyber activism  
New and social media have become an important platform in the Arab region as a 
whole and specifically in Egypt, during the past few years. A recent study by 
Northwestern University in Doha (2014) shows that Facebook and Twitter (followed to 
some extent by Google+) have become the leading tools in several Arab states, 
including Egypt, where 90 per cent of people use Facebook. This is why the internet 
and the new communication technologies have been regarded as important 
mobilisation tools in the region (Shehata, 2008) and the bedrock for media activism 
(Arvizu, 2009, p. 388). The past decade saw a surge in the number of street 
demonstrations and protests during Mubarak’s rule which have escalated since 2011. 
It is here that this research makes a contribution to the field of studying media 
activism against the corruption and deteriorating political and economic conditions, 
focusing not on the motivations behind such activism but on its impact and patterns of 
use (Shah et al., 2001).  
 
The interviewees and focus group participants saw a new forum in social media for 
dialogue and conversation about real political concerns. New and social media 
provided a less costly and convenient alternative to ‘offline’ activism (demonstrations, 
for example) as well as a relatively safe space to operate, and arguably, free from state 
intervention. These media can indeed facilitate interaction amongst citizens which 
could, in theory, translate into offline action. The dialogue sparked on social media is 
still, to a great extent, monopolised by ‘star activists’ such as Wael Ghonim and Esraa 
Abdel Fattah, among others. Doubt remains, however, whether social media actually 
allows citizens to launch organised action that translates into effective offline 
activities; although activists can use social media to mobilise for action, social media 
sites do not always serve as an open platform for all citizens, if discussions continue to 
be centred on a handful of celebrity activists; not all such sites end up mobilising 
citizens in a systematic manner,  for instance to join a certain movement (see Chapter 
Five); rather, the main aim is to ensure visibility of the campaign or movement and 
perhaps even, of its central figures. The power of social media may be limited in 
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converting online action or campaigns into offline tangible engagement, and as such, 
social media do not provide a substitute for offline political action. Chapter Eight also 
showed that, except for one, all the focus group participants (aged 18 to 25) had not 
joined offline movements or parties, although they did access myriad of live debates 
on Facebook. It is also difficult to argue that young people’s knowledge about 
campaigns or demonstrations from Facebook would entice them to identify with the 
aims of any particular campaign or demonstration: it is offline participation that helps 
to foster this sense of identification. It is true that they shared one aim in 2011: to oust 
Mubarak, and later, to express their discontent with the rule of the military council or 
with the Brotherhood, but their participation in demonstrations is not necessarily a 
reflection of the efficiency of political networking, unless their groups managed to 
create a sense of collective identity for all participants. The fact that Egyptians have 
been ideologically polarised by many different political parties and movements since 
2011, and the frequent movement of active youth between these parties, is a sign that 
this collective identity has not been sufficiently nurtured to allow for a more sustained 
political action that involves as many young citizens as possible, in enduring political 
organisations.  
Online action may not have been translated into offline activism, but perhaps the most 
important benefit of using social media is that they have helped enhance people’s 
knowledge and proffered information about the political situation, not only in Egypt, 
but in other countries, as well; however, as shown in Chapter Eight, many of the 
participants in this research confined their political activities to passive acts of ‘share’, 
‘like’ or ‘post’ on social media; although some did not ‘post’ any comments, they did 
follow and read ‘posts’ by various other users. The significant change at the collective 
level, in terms of mobilisation, is generally rather limited and sporadic, and may be 
subject to the nature of the event such as 25 January 2011 or 30 June 2013. There 
remains, therefore, a strong need for offline organisation and activism by using social 
media as a communication avenue, not as a catalyst for changing the political process. 
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9.3 Traditional versus social media 
The participants also emphasised the role of traditional media (particularly television) 
in influencing public opinion, with some of them highlighting the symbiotic 
relationship between traditional and social media. Many of them also expressed their 
mistrust of traditional media, even though they still followed it. They agreed that 
social media supplement, rather than replace, traditional media . This researcher also 
argues that users’ scepticism of mainstream media and what is occasionally ‘posted’ 
on social media sites, may paradoxically increase their engagement in the political 
process rather than remain passive participants, in as much as they are constantly 
exposed to different viewpoints which provide the chance to assess them; as such, 
they are constantly interpreting  the messages available on either mainstream or social 
media. These young people reinforce their power in decoding media messages and in 
their ability to unravel any propagandist element in such messages, by emphasising 
their mistrust of either medium. Seen in this light, it is argued here that their 
scepticism reflects their role as active users in that they still follow both forms of 
media (especially social media sites). They may be doing so for ontological and 
epistemological reasons  in order to make sense of the world around them.  
The abundance of information, on social media sites, satellite television or 
independent press, moreover, has provided an invaluable link between social media 
users and independent media. Many participants, for instance,  assert their preference 
for following television for certain issues, such as Mubarak’s trial, and social media for 
other purposes. It is also a positive development that independent media have started 
appealing to local areas such as rural and Upper Egypt, albeit still modest. Social media 
groups, such as Tamarod and ‘6 April’ movements, have realised the need to appeal to 
these regional areas, rather than confining their efforts to the capital and large cities.  
The preceding chapters have demonstrated the role of trust in forming online 
networks, and how strong ties can play a pivotal role in spreading messages via social 
media sites. Some of the focus group participants, for example, said that they would 
not ‘add’ a stranger to their network, and yet would still follow that stranger if they 
found their views resonated with their own. People still wanted to relate to a reliable 
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source of information, notably, the majority of the participants agreed on following 
the political satirist, Bassem Youssef, on social media sites, given that his critical 
comments about the government and the Brotherhood generally echoed their own 
sentiments.  
It is also notable how social media sites have been used since 2011, in order to launch 
campaigns to discredit other parties: since the toppling of Morsi, for instance, 
Brotherhood supporters launched a series of social media campaigns ridiculing the 
newly-appointed president, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, among which was a very famous 
campaign on Twitter - ‘#vote for the pimp’ - referring to Al-Sisi. The Lebanese 
Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) reported on it, after the ‘hashtag’ went viral on social 
media, not only in Egypt but across the Arab region. Al-Sisi’s supporters, including 
several Egyptian journalists and media commentators, called for the government to 
block Twitter, while others asserted that social media discussions cannot be controlled 
by the state (Ajbaili, 2014). These campaigns prove that social media can make 
headlines in traditional newsrooms, and therefore, their relationship may indeed be 
symbiotic and complementary. 
Social media functioned as new avenues for communication and to connect Egyptian 
citizens, which in itself, was a challenge to the authoritarian rule in Egypt. These 
media, however, cannot change the political structure or process in Egypt on their own 
as such changes require a greater investment of time and effort directed towards 
offline campaigning; social media, therefore, served as one factor amongst others, 
which facilitated the success of the 2011-revoltion, but did not create it.  
 
9.4 social media as a virtual civil society?   
The argument here is that activists relied on social media as a visibility medium; for 
those who had not been active in the political sphere, social media were instrumental 
in raising their awareness about diverse political movements, and also in educating 
them about the political process, after decades of political apathy under Mubarak’s 
regime; for them, however, social media did not necessarily help in mobilisation 
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activities, such as motivating large numbers of citizens to join a movement, party or 
even a demonstration; parallel with virtual campaigns, it is vital to develop offline 
activities in order to cultivate trust and a sense of commitment amongst participants 
(Della Porta & Mosca, 2005).  
The diagram on p. 42 illustrates the lifecycle of a social movement, here, it is now 
possible to factor in the role of social media as a facilitator in the processes of 
campaigning and networking, even though its influence is still limited in the process of 
organisation and massive mobilisation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1 social media in the lifetime of social movement  
 
Young activists use social media to disseminate information about their activities, and 
some of them use these media as a means of raising political awareness among non-
activists. Activists did not regard social media as an effective mobilising tool for mass 
protests across the country, prior to 2011, as their main ambition was to reach like-
minded protestors. Proof that the 2011 uprising did not solely rely on social media 
activity is the fact that activists called for a similar protest on 25 January 2010, a year 
before, but that was a small-scale protest which the security forces managed to curb. 
The 2011 uprising was successful because of the ability to translate virtual calls into 
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offline action: when social media activists took to the streets and spoke to ordinary 
Egyptians which motivated them to join the protests. The role of the Brotherhood was 
also instrumental in mobilising the masses to join the protesters in Tahrir Square. It is 
evident, therefore, that maintaining the power of interpersonal communication in 
mobilising social movements can have offline success. Social media platforms are able 
to provide a form of interpersonal communication in which users engage in dialogue 
with each other, although the conversation is still initiated and managed by a select 
group of activists. Social media were used, prior to the uprising of 2011, as an 
alternative form of communication, asserts one of the activists; reading blogs was like 
reading an opposition newspaper, criticising the government’s performance and 
attacking  police oppression. These new media are also cheaper in use than printing 
pamphlets or hiring venues, as they provided new possibilities to disseminate 
information about public dissatisfaction with Mubarak’s regime. Non-politicised 
citizens can still be informed about campaigns and social movements by following such 
groups on social media and reading about coming events, even if they do not actively 
participate in these activities. This knowledge may be passed on to others in their 
social circles, who may not have access to social media sites, but become interested 
and are consequently influenced to support the government or opposition parties.  
Activists used social media to disseminate information about the regime’s brutality, 
particularly the security forces. This was evident in the ‘Khaled Said’ group on 
Facebook which used images, appealing to ordinary citizens to help them identify with 
victims like Khaled Said. Social media therefore created an alternative media platform, 
other than the mainstream media, which were significantly under the control of the 
regime. The interview respondents indicated that those social media users who 
regularly visited activists’ pages on Facebook, for example, could not be regarded as 
‘politically active’ unless they were able to translate that virtual activity into offline 
action. What is notable was the call by some of those activists to centralise the online 
activity by having a ministry or public body responsible for organising online and social 
media. The risk seen by those activists was a polarisation in the online debate between 
pro- and anti-Islamic movements. Social media, according to many activists, can be 
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used to sow the seeds of activism, by disseminating information about the 
constitution, political debates, polls, parties, and elections, and citizens should build 
on these virtual activities by participating in offline action. Social media, therefore, can 
be said to have an educational role in raising awareness about the political process in 
Egypt.  
 
Social media alone cannot trigger and sustain a social movement, nor can they drive 
and sustain a revolution on the scale of that recorded in 2011, or the upheaval of 
2013; for this to happen, other important factors need to be present, such as the 
participants’ mutual interests in the motivation to take part in such a massive protests, 
for example. The success of such massive protests is also bound to previous political 
action; in the case of Egypt, this was evident in the protests, labour strikes and sit-ins 
recorded since 2005, when Gamal Mubarak entered the political scene, thereby 
agitating many political groups as well as ordinary citizens, who feared that Mubarak’s 
rule would be extended for yet another thirty years if his son took over the presidency 
of Egypt.  
This researcher has argued that social media have reinforced existing offline networks 
of activists and their supporters, and have not necessarily managed to create new 
networks. Eyad (56), for instance, confirms that when they engaged in disseminating 
information about Al-Doustor party on social media, particularly on Facebook, 
thousands showed interest in joining the party; at the first general meeting, however, 
only a few hundred showed up. Group identity and collective empathy is instrumental 
in offline activities (Chen & Lee, 2008), which can be further supported by social 
media, as a facilitators of existing networks, but not necessarily as originators of new 
ones. It is true that social media have created new opportunities for both activists and 
non-politicised actors, but the impact may vary across socio-economic groups. Well-
educated middle-class activists, for instance,  may have more resources,  in terms of 
time to plan, orchestrate and disseminate activities and using social media, compared 
to the less privileged groups. One example is of the interviewee Ahmed (26), who said 
that he joined the protestors in Tahrir Square in January 2011, but only for two days, 
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as he soon realised that protesting was a costly affair, and was forced to return to his 
work.  
 
There are a number of problems associated with the use of such media in the political 
deliberation regarding Egypt, notwithstanding the positive effects of social media on 
the political socialisation of young Egyptians.  These problems question Western-
centric theories that may see that technology can be the driving force for 
modernisation and change in the developing world. The use of this technology must 
first be analysed in its unique socio-cultural context such as Egypt. One of the 
problems identified in this study is the lack of sustainability of online campaigns which 
should ideally convert into offline collective action. The descriptive analysis of web 
features (Chapter Five) illustrated the differences in websites, in terms of frequent 
updating and calls for campaigning, illustrating the difficulty in sustaining online 
presence over a long period. Very few groups such as Tamarod and April 6 movements 
were able to sustain their online campaigns, owing to a constant stream of funding, 
available to both movements, and the co-operation with mainstream media, 
particularly with Tamarod, in order to broadcast the movement’s goals and publicise 
the movement’s campaign to oust Morsi. It is to be noted, however, that neither 
group managed to continue its activities, once their ultimate goals were reached 
(ousting Mubarak and Morsi); instead, they both suffered internal division with their 
leading figures, moving out of the groups to form separate movements, even under 
the same name (such as April 6 movement). The interviews (Chapters 6 & 7), 
moreover, illustrate activists’ dilemmas in recruiting citizens in their offline activities, 
not to mention that some of these activists kept switching from one movement or 
party to another. It can be argued that a sustainable civil society and a truly diverse 
public sphere rest on a more sustainable, offline action, which can indeed bring about 
significant changes in the Egyptian political sphere. Activists have so far used social 
media to ensure visibility of their actions, not only nationally, but also regionally and 
internationally. Citizens, on the other hand, have been using social media sites to 
orient themselves around different views, to follow celebrities such as Bassem 
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Youssef, renowned for his sharp critique of the Brotherhood and the military, and to 
share views. Social media in this case, have served as an alternative media platform on 
which citizens can exchange views, however, this has not translated into a functional 
public sphere either, mainly because of youth’s reluctance (see Chapter Eight) in 
adding strangers to their networks, although they were happy to follow them. Chapter 
Eight demonstrated that the majority of participants in this study were reluctant to 
initiate discussions on social media sites, preferring instead to remain passive by 
following the posts of others, without posting their own. It is noteworthy, however, 
that the online space provides an array of different opinions, perhaps not readily 
available in mainstream media, which helps youth to acquaint themselves with 
opposing views other than those expressed in state and private broadcasting media. 
Power relations on online space remain with those who seem to direct the debates 
such as celebrities (Bassem Youssef) and leading activists such as Wael Ghonim.  
 
9.5 Chapter summary 
The 2011-revolution began with a huge surge in optimism, and what new media could 
do and how civil society could flourish, but it ended with apprehension, caution, and 
suspicion of one another and of those living abroad. Treason had become high on the 
agenda, with accusations accumulating from all directions, targeting activists, 
Islamists, and any party opposing the current regime, accusing them of masterminding 
the 2011 revolution, for the benefit of foreign nations. Wael Ghonim, once celebrated 
as one of the heroes of social media and architects of the 2011 revolution, was 
condemned on television shows for being a spy and agent for foreign organisations 
(Youssef, 2014).  
Media scholars (Curran, 1991; Castells, 2009) have long argued that media institutions 
can play a pivotal role in ensuring diverse and pluralist debates, thereby enhancing 
citizens’ deliberations and participation in the political process.  The rise of social 
media has triggered similar hopes in its role of pushing for political and social reforms, 
based on genuine political participation. What the above discussion aimed to show is 
that social media do indeed help in disseminating information and trickling it down via 
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large networks of citizens with ‘weak ties’. This process, however, does not guarantee 
offline political action, nor can it drive deep structural changes in the Egyptian political 
system, on its own. Those who have a strong profile in social media groups represent a 
handful of citizens, and although they can attract thousands of followers, they do not 
necessarily engage in campaigning for a new party to join the traditional political 
process in the country. One such group is the 6 April movement, which later split into 
at least two sub-groups; they had thousands of followers but only a handful of its 
leading figures were visible and active online (Faris, 2010). What is notable, however, 
is that some of the famous social media activists also had links to global organisations, 
thus creating a process of diffusion across political protest networks across the world 
(Abdel Rahman, 2011), which also enhanced their visibility outside of Egypt.  The 
challenge is how to integrate citizens from disadvantaged groups (such as peasants 
and the lower classes) into the political process in Egypt, and perhaps many other 
developing nations,  rather than confining this political practice to the well-educated, 
English-fluent middle-class.  
If young people seem less politically active in traditional political institutions, such as 
joining parties or voting in general elections, nonetheless, they can still identify with, 
and show interest in, the political process (Henn et al. 2002). Some scholars argue 
(Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2009) that at a young age, citizens may be less interested in 
such political participation but this attitude changes with maturity. Others (Norris, 
2004) argue that young people’s seeming disinterest in politics does not prove their 
disengagement, because they can still be active in other institutions such as NGOs or 
voluntary institutions. This may be the case in Egypt, where young people, whether 
activists or those opting out of traditional politics, show interest in tackling social 
problems such as poverty or helping slum-dwellers. This could indeed prove previous 
scholars’ argument (see particularly Marsh et al., 2007) that young people may have a 
different understanding of politics, which is not seen as confined to formal institutions 
but as lived experience. Future studies should therefore seek a broader definition of 
politics (Bang, 2011) by illustrating how young people perceive and implement their 
understanding of the political process in their daily lives.  
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Chapter Ten  
Conclusions 
 
10.1 Introduction  
This study’s aims were to examine the power of social media in serving as a virtual civil 
society in Egypt, as a topical case study, and particularly how social media could 
facilitate the change in the political sphere in Egypt. It was essential here to examine 
how activists, across the generations, used social media in their cyber activism, but 
also how those under the age of 35, who constituted around 50 per cent of the 
population, responded to this kind of activism. The study demonstrates the activists’ 
perception of the role of social media, their uses of these media since 2011, and their 
ability to utilise social media to convert online activities into offline collective action. 
The objectives, therefore, were to identify the uses of social media in political activism, 
drawing on the fieldwork conducted amongst Egyptian activists, to assess users’ views 
of this type of activism, and whether they felt encouraged and motivated to engage in 
civic action and were able to assess the role of social media versus mainstream media 
in mobilisation.  
This final chapter has two specific aims: 
(i) to summarise the overall findings; and 
(ii) to provide pointers for future research.  
 
The first objective is to re-consider some methodological considerations which helped 
position this study, vis-à-vis previous studies in this field. 
 
10.2 Methodological issues  
This project relied on triangulated data retrieved from a descriptive web feature 
analysis, combined with semi-structured interviews with activists and focus groups 
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with ordinary Egyptian youth (non-activists). In the review of previous studies, three 
important themes were identified, which were explored from a plethora of angles in 
those studies. The themes are: the role of social media in fostering cyber activism, the 
role of these media as a virtual public sphere, and how they compete with traditional 
mainstream media. Several previous studies supported the positive role of social 
media in enabling a collective action in Egypt, although they also highlighted that new 
and social media alone are not enough to activate a revolution on the scale 
demonstrated in Egypt in 2011. The underlying conditions and grievances against 
Mubarak’s regime  helped ignite the uprising against him. Some other studies focused 
on documenting, in quantitative terms, the rise of using social media such as Twitter, 
during the uprising, but this approach does not take enough account of the activists’ 
subjective views, and finally, a number of studies argued that mainstream media still 
played a pivotal role in the Arab region as a whole (see Chapter Two). The contribution 
of this study lies in its close examination of the actors behind the collective action, as 
well as other social media users who may have been influenced to join a political 
action or group through social or mainstream media campaigns.  
 
The assessment  of the role and function of social media as a virtual civil society,  the 
concept of civil society was defined, not only as reviewed in Western literature but 
also, more importantly, as it is understood and practiced in a Muslim and developing 
country like Egypt (see Chapter Three). What is notable in the context of Egypt, is the 
prevalence of civil society organisations that are characterised as charity associations, 
offering welfare services to the less privileged social groups. Civil society associations 
are generally barred from expressing a political view, and even the minority of such 
organisations that deal with human rights issues are usually closely monitored by the 
government. It is here that many movements in Egypt, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, saw a means to mobilise citizens through charitable organisations, while 
avoiding state censorship. It is noteworthy that the Egyptian state needed such charity 
organisations to compensate for the deteriorating state services; although literature 
review regarding civil society in Egypt showed a preference for the so-called 
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‘alternative’ definition of civil society as a realm for organised associations and 
deliberation, the choice was made to adopt the alternative approach as the realm of 
deliberation, not only as a formal organised subject, but also as any form of 
deliberations amongst individuals and  groups which aim to empower citizens and 
achieve civic engagement. Chapter three explains how this researcher sees social 
media as providing a created space for discussions away from state control and 
monitoring, which calls for a closer examination of all forms of engagement, not 
necessarily formal, as is the case with charity organisations, trade unions or human 
rights associations in Egypt. 
 
This study adopted an integrative approach of inductive and deductive research, in 
that it began with pre-defined themes (or constructs) to guide the qualitative 
research; however, the methods adopted allowed for some flexibility to incorporate 
new emerging themes from the interviews and focus groups. This integrative approach 
was inspired by Duneier (2002) who does not see a research approach as being strictly 
inductive or deductive.  
 
10.3 virtual deliberation  
Based on web feature analysis, selected Facebook group sites were examined that 
focused on the following features, which,  in  this researcher’s view, are amongst the 
characteristics of an efficient virtual deliberation:  
• The focus of campaigning, whether it is national (across Egypt) or local (confined to a 
certain neighbourhood or a city in Egypt) 
• The frequency of updating the site - this can show the extent of resources available to the 
selected Facebook group 
• Characters and activists often referred to within the discussion (and whether these are 
confined to ‘star’ activists like Wael Ghoniem) 
• Links made to other sites, particularly mainstream versus alternative media, or to civil 
society associations 
• Mobilisation activities such as the call to join a protest. 
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The analysis in Chapter Six shows the prominence of key activists and founders of 
those sites (and groups). It also shows that there was hardly a call to set up offline 
political parties; moreover, some of these movements, such as April 6  and Tamarod 
have seen internal splits amongst its members with some of them forming competing 
movements sometimes even under the same name (such as April 6 movement); 
although these sites did include some mobilisation activities, they were often linked to 
large issues such as police reforms or rationalising prices, thereby seeking to improve 
state services rather than creating new political parties with clear manifestos. These 
groups generally seemed to use Facebook as a tool of visibility and immediate impact, 
rather than as a tool to create a sustainable political movement or an offline civil 
society association. A few of these groups such as Tamarod and ‘I am Khaled Said’, 
ceased to update their postings, and the April 6 movement was later banned by the 
Egyptian courts. The only selected group with a local focus, Dar Essalam and Maadi, 
also ceased to update its site, which is regrettable, given the acute need for such 
groups working on engaging citizens in local communities.  
These Facebook groups managed to create a space for debate and interaction, albeit 
for a short period, but they also managed to decentralise political debate in Egypt 
which was always confined to the capital, Cairo, or big cities like Alexandria. Many of 
these groups, such as Tamarod, were competing with each other to reach out to 
communities in distant governorates, although the Facebook sites of these 
communities still drew on the same news and events posted in the Cairo branch site. 
This shows the potential of social media in providing a new avenue for deliberation in 
local communities, which is acutely needed to support the democratic reforms in 
Egypt. It is also noteworthy that several local media outlets mushroomed in the wake 
of the 2011 uprising (although many of them did not last) which shows the attention 
media and politicians alike gave to the role of local media as a new avenue for political 
participation, and arguably, even propaganda. This was particularly clear with the 
sweeping victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Parliamentary elections in 2012, 
which was credited to their outreach in local and rural areas.  
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To summarise, social media can contribute to providing a virtual haven for citizens to 
deliberate and access information relatively fast and cheaply. It can also facilitate 
interaction amongst citizens, which should, ideally, translate into offline action; above 
all, it secured the visibility of citizens’ demands in global media which dubbed this 
uprising the ‘Facebook revolution’. Groups and individuals, however, should aim at 
decentralising that virtual debate, rather than confining it to known activists.  
 
10.4  Activists’ and non-activists reflections on the role of (social) media 
Chapter Seven and Eight reflected on the fieldwork conducted from a sample of 
activists and non-activists. The latter group comprised youth, where the majority were 
well under the age of 35.  They were included in the three focus groups, each with six 
participants, from each gender and various social classes. It was noteworthy how the 
activists (across age and gender) regarded mainstream media, particularly privately-
owned television channels, as more influential in swaying public opinion in Egypt, 
including the youth. The non-activists group, on the other hand, were almost 
unanimous in rejecting this role of mainstream media, declaring that they did not 
follow television channels and relied instead on obtaining news updates from social 
media. Young non-activists, moreover, stressed their ability to decode underlying 
propaganda, whether in mainstream or social media, and their ability to verify the 
information on the social media platforms. The opinion held here, is that their 
scepticism of what they read or accessed via mainstream or social media could be a 
reflection of their role as active interpreters of information, rather than merely passive 
recipients of political propaganda. Such scepticism can also, it is argued, motivate 
them to seek information from various, and even competing, sources which can foster 
a healthy public debate.  
The previous chapter also illustrated the role of trust in forming online networks, 
which may explain why non-activists tended to follow known activists and artists, such 
as the political satirist, Bassem Youseef. They were still content to follow Facebook 
accounts of strangers, but they did so with caution, carefully considering the 
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consequences before ‘adding’ or seeking to ‘join’ new groups or individuals, with 
whom they had had no previous interaction. It was also regrettable that this cohort of 
non-activists felt reluctant to share their views on Facebook, fearing that such views 
might have made them unpopular with their peers or relatives, which risked silencing 
such a cohort.  It is difficult to overestimate the role of social media, according to 
youth’s reluctance to engage in social media, being used for ‘revolutionary purposes’ 
or causing radical political changes. What is needed is the translation of online 
deliberation into a sustained offline action, otherwise social media would remain a 
communication forum to ‘share’, ‘join’ and ‘post’, without necessarily causing radical 
action on the ground. The above chapters have argued that any significant change at 
the collective level, in terms of mobilisation, is limited, and is very much subject to the 
nature of events. 
The internet in Egypt cannot be said to guarantee openness and the end of 
authoritarian rule, Egypt still stands in a better position than other Arab societies such 
as Saudi Arabia, where online debate can be curbed on moral and religious grounds. 
One television programme, for example, which was launched in the wake of the 2011 
revolution, was about debating the legacy of past clerics and fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence). The programme, Ma’a Islam, (‘With Islam’), (Islam here refers to the 
programmes’s host, Islam Al-Beherie) who is educated in Islamic jurisprudence. The 
efficacy of social and new media as a mobilisation tool, as previously stated, may 
profoundly depend on the particular cultural and social norms.  
 
10.5 Future studies 
Future studies, as previously mentioned, can closely examine Egyptian youth’s 
understanding and definition of the political sphere, as recent years have shown the 
engagement of this cohort in charitable projects, such as those initiated by Islamic 
tele-evangelists such as Amr Khaled. The adoption by youth of a different 
understanding of politics, and the parameters of their political engagements, which 
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may not necessarily be confined to traditional political party work and campaigning, 
could be a subject for further investigation.    
 
It is important, moreover, to remember that the internet is never utilised in isolation: 
other (traditional) media such as television, radio and print or even mobile phones also 
have a role. It is the synergy and convergence of these media forms that can bring 
about radical changes to the communication sphere in Egypt, and indeed, the rest of 
the region. The impact of these changes on the political space has been assessed in 
this study, but will need to be continuously assessed in future studies, in light of the 
rapid regional political changes, and the threat of Islamic fundamentalist groups, such 
as ISIS, and how these groups have used social media as one of their media strategies.  
 
One important role that social media  played in the Egyptian uprising, and indeed in 
the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ as a whole, is that it managed to bring global attention to 
the conflict. These media also helped Egyptians convert their ideas into organised 
action - albeit short-lived - such as arranging ad hoc protests against various issues, 
including local problems, sexual harassment, and so on.  They also helped to break 
the barrier of fear, as users were able to freely search for and retrieve information 
through these media, while making them feel that they were not alone in suffering 
hardships such as torture, censorship or arbitrary arrests; in this respect, social 
media users can serve as ‘whistle-blowers’ by uncovering corruption and any forms 
of state abuse and violence. It would still prudent, however, not to overestimate the 
role of social media in triggering such an uprising, as they can only be effective if 
there is wider public support; in the Egyptian case, the uprising was the result of 
many years of protests, civic engagement and grievances against Mubarak’s long-
lasting regime.  
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Appendix 1 - Participant Information Sheet 
 
A. About this project 
 
Title of Project: Social Media:  a new virtual civil society in Egypt? 
 
The aim of my research is to trace the power of social media in serving as a 
virtual civil society in the Arab world, focusing on Egypt as a topical case 
study. 
 
The research will shed new light on the significant role that social media 
is expected to play in the future particularly with the declining credibility 
of traditional mainstream media in the Arab world, which is usually run 
by political parties. 
 
 
B. Your Participation in the Research Project 
 
Why you have been asked? 
The project is based on the following data sources: 
1)  Interviews with activists 
2) Focus groups 
 
You have been asked as an activist, or a voter to participate.   
 
What happens if you want to change your mind? 
If you decide to join the study you can change your mind and stop at any time. I will 
completely respect your decision. There are absolutely no penalties for stopping.  
 
What would happen if you join the study? 
If you agree to join the study, I will need to carry out an interview with you for around 
1 hour where you will be asked specific questions about your evaluation of the use of 
social media in mobilising Egyptian youth.   
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Are there any risks? 
I do not think there are any significant risks due to the study.  If you did feel that there 
was any stress involved you can stop at any time.  
 
What happens to the questionnaire and interview results? 
I will collect the data to use as a basis for my analysis. I intend to use quotes from the 
interviews after translating them into English along with interviewers’ names, when 
possible, in order to support my argument. However, interviewers who wish to be 
anonymised to protect their identities would be respected.  
 
Are there any benefits from taking part? 
There are no direct benefits to you for taking part; however I hope this research may 
help provide new insights to Arab and western scholarships.  
 
I also hope that my research will be of interest to media institutions and media 
students in the UK and Middle East.  
 
How I protect your privacy 
All the information I get from you is strictly confidential.  I will not use any identifiers 
and will keep your identity anonymous unless otherwise agreed - in the case of in-
depth interviews.  
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS SHEET TO KEEP, TOGETHER WITH A COPY OF 
YOUR CONSENT FORM 
 
Contact Details: 
Abdul Aziz Sharbatly 
Email:  sharbatlya@gmail.com      
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Appendix 2 - CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of the project: Social Media:  a new virtual civil society in Egypt? 
Abdulaziz Sharbatly  
Email: sharbatlya@gmail.com  
 
 Please initial box 
 
 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
  
 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I  
 am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason. 
 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
  
 
 Please tick box 
 
   Yes            No 
4. I agree to the interview being audio recorded   
   
I agree to be quoted in publications with my position, title and 
name identified  
 
 
If you don’t agree with 6, please answer 7.  
 
I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications  
 
  
 
 
 
Name of Participant    Date   
 Signature 
 
 
 
 
Name of Researcher    Date   
 Signature 
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Appendix 3 - Focus group participants 
 
Group 1 
Name Age Education Occupation 
Osama  18 University student  Not Working 
Mohamed  18 High School student Not Working 
Ahmed  18 High School student Not Working 
Youssef  18 High School student Not Working 
Amr  19 University student Not Working 
Mohamed  18 High School student Not Working 
 
Group 2:  
Name Age Education Occupation 
Samira  32 University  Not Working 
Engy  35 University Not Working 
Nivin  35 University Administration  
Wafaa  33 University Not Working 
Ann  26 University Not Working 
Nermin  29 University Not Working 
 
Group 3:  
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Name Age Education Occupation 
Yara  18 High School student Not Working 
Radwa  18 University student  Not Working 
Mona  19 University student  Not Working 
Dina  19 University student Not Working 
Farida  18 High School student Not Working 
Nourhan  21 University student Not Working 
 
 
 
  
 
